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Abstract 
Although prior research has used a variety of methods for studying college 
students‟ critical thinking skills, few have provided an observational account of the 
reasoning strategies students develop while in college.  The goal of my dissertation was 
to observe how college students utilized experiential and scientific reasoning strategies 
when evaluating evidence-based claims.  I considered these questions in light of the dual 
process model of reasoning, which views reasoning in terms of quick and intuitive 
experiential systems or effortful and deliberate rational systems.  I also examined the 
relationship between students‟ scientific knowledge, thinking dispositions, and prior 
beliefs on their experiential and scientific reasoning outcomes.  Study 1 asked 
underclassmen to evaluate experimental studies.  When not explicitly asked to think 
critically, students used experiential strategies over scientific strategies to evaluate 
evidence.  Study 2 compared college freshmen with senior psychology majors and 
additionally examined how alluring anecdotal stories influenced the reasoning process.  
Students were asked to evaluate a set of flawed evidence-based claims.  Half received an 
alluring anecdotal story alongside each claim.  Students agreed more and provided more 
experiential evaluations when the claims contained alluring anecdotal stories.  Seniors 
were better at evaluating the claims scientifically and provided more in-depth evaluations 
when compared to freshmen.  Differences in students‟ scientific knowledge and open-
minded thinking were related to providing more scientific evaluations.  Students‟ prior 
beliefs showed the opposite relationship; when claims fit students‟ prior beliefs, they 
 xi 
agreed more with the claims and provided more experiential evaluations.  My results 
show that college training in psychology may teach students how to evaluate claims 
scientifically, but alluring information and belief-basis reasoning remain key barriers 
towards critical thinking.  However, open-mindedness may be an important characteristic 
that helps promote the ability to reason independently from one‟s prior beliefs.  
 1 
 
 
 
CHAPTER I 
Introduction 
We encounter a number of claims in our day-to-day lives that influence our views 
and decisions, such as whether video games are bad for children or if certain foods 
prevent disease.  For instance, it is very common for news articles to describe the latest 
scientific studies and discuss their implications.  Although scientific research studies are 
more valid than other sources of evidence, it is still important to be critical about how 
news articles present and interpret scientific studies.  Articles can make flawed assertions 
about scientific results.  They may over-interpret studies containing weak findings as 
being critically important, or they may state that a causal relationship exists from 
correlational findings.  Additionally, scientific news reports often include vivid anecdotal 
stories, which may influence people to believe that the article is more valid that what the 
evidence implies.  Being able to evaluate claims is not only relevant in the context of 
evaluating scientific news reports but also when listening to speakers or political leaders, 
whose goals are to persuade people to accept their viewpoints.  Additionally, advertisers 
also use „scientific data‟ and anecdotal testimonials to convince people to buy their 
products. 
There is a danger in accepting information at face value or in making decisions 
based on whether something seems intuitively appealing.  Reasoning this way can lead to 
adopting unfounded beliefs, making poor decisions, and diminishing one‟s ability to 
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make accurate judgments about the world.  People need the important critical thinking 
skills to make good choices in their day-to-day lives and college may be the most 
important place where students learn to do this.  Understanding whether college helps 
students develop these skills is therefore worthwhile.  
The goal of my dissertation is to understand how college students develop the 
ability to think critically about everyday claims.  I pay special attention to evidence-based 
claims, like the kind people come across when reading news reports about the latest 
social-scientific studies.  The ability to evaluate these types of claims requires scientific 
reasoning skills.  This strategy for reasoning involves assessing how a research study was 
designed, how observations were measured and quantified, whether important factors 
were controlled for, and whether flawed interpretations were made from the findings, to 
name a few (Schunn & Anderson, 1999; Zimmerman, 2000).  More fundamentally, 
however, the purpose of reasoning scientifically about evidence-based claims is premised 
on the idea that in order conclude whether a claim or argument is genuinely valid one has 
to examine the quality of the supporting evidence, a process is known as theory-evidence 
coordination (Kuhn, 1992). 
Educators want students to make well-informed judgments when presented with 
knowledge claims, assertions, or arguments in their everyday lives.  However, a recent 
study by Arum and Roska (2011) found that students‟ critical thinking skills improved 
very little during the first two years in college.  Other scholars have also questioned 
whether college graduates learn important scientific reasoning skills (Bullock, Sodian, & 
Koerber, 2008; Kuhn, 2009; Sodian & Bullock, 2008).  Despite these concerns, the extent 
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to which students are learning to think scientifically about claims has yet to be fully 
understood.   
One reason is because some disciplines emphasize scientific thinking and 
reasoning more than others.  Although one of the goals of college is teach every student 
to think more critically about claims and arguments, studies have found that these 
abilities develop differently across disciplines.  For instance, students majoring in the 
social sciences, who learn about the scientific logic behind conducting and evaluating 
experiments, have been shown to be better at evaluating experimental and statistical 
evidence than students majoring in math, who do better evaluating the validity of logical 
statements.  Therefore, the extent to which we can understand whether college students 
learn to think critically is limited to the set of students we observe and the field of study 
we ask them to think critically about.  Because of this, my dissertation only considers 
how college students evaluate evidence-based claims and whether seniors majoring in 
psychology are better able to evaluate these claims more scientifically than freshmen 
students. 
Although numerous studies have examined college students‟ critical thinking 
development, few have offered an observational account of the reasoning strategies 
students use to evaluate claims and arguments.  Traditional methods for assessing critical 
thinking have focused on using multiple-choice items, asking students to evaluate 
information using Likert-type scales, or scoring students‟ responses in terms of whether 
they reflect good or poor critical thinking.  These methods are useful for understanding 
whether students are thinking critically, but an observational approach is also needed that 
captures how students‟ reasoning processes change as a function of college.   
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Dual process models provide a useful framework for observing how students 
evaluate evidence.  This model describes reasoning as stemming from two basic 
cognitive systems: the autonomous and the non-autonomous (Evans, 2003; Stanovich, 
1999; Stanovich & West, 2000).  Where the former relies on quick and intuitive 
processing the other is more deliberate, effortful, and controlled.  Studies have generally 
found that people prefer using their intuition, belief, and experiences when reasoning, 
which oftentimes lead to making poor inferences from information and evidence (Evans, 
2007; Klaczynski, 2001a; Klaczynski, Gordon, & Fauth, 1997; Klaczynski & Robinson, 
2000).  Using this dual process approach, I examine if psychology majors, who are taught 
important principles of scientific reasoning, use less intuitive-experiential forms of 
reasoning and more rational-analytic approaches – such as scientific reasoning – when 
evaluating evidence-based claims.  
Viewing critical thinking as the ability to reason scientifically only tells half of 
the story, however.  Critical thinking also requires reflective skills, such as the ability to 
notice when it is appropriate to think critically and to separate one‟s beliefs and 
experiences when evaluating evidence.  For instance, belief-bias reasoning has been 
shown to undermine how well individuals think critically about evidence.  That is, 
individuals are more likely to evaluate evidence favorably when it confirms their 
previous beliefs and less favorably when evidence is belief-threatening.   
Several studies have demonstrated that intellectual ability, as indexed by ACT 
scores, verbal intelligence, and fluid intelligence measures, is unrelated to avoiding 
belief-basis reasoning (Macpherson & Stanovich, 2007; Stanovich, 1999, 2009; 
Stanovich & West, 2008).   Instead, important dispositional factors have been linked to 
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differences in individuals‟ tendencies to engage in belief-bias reasoning (Halpern, 1999; 
Stanovich & West, 1998).  Some students are more motivated to engage in effortful 
thinking than others.  Additionally, students also differ by their willingness to consider 
different viewpoints and ideas.  Finally, students have different epistemic beliefs about 
what constitutes knowledge and how knowledge is justified (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997; 
King & Kitchener, 1994; King, Wood, & Mines, 1990).  These dispositions are important 
to consider when observing students‟ reasoning processes, since they help explain why 
some students‟ reasoning is more effortful and less biased than others.   
 Another issue I consider is how alluring anecdotal stories influence how college 
students perceive and evaluate evidence-based claims.  It is very common for scientific 
news articles to include short anecdotal stories prior to describing a research study.  
Although anecdotal stories help readers understand how research studies relate to real 
events and experiences, such stories may also elicit experiential processing in which 
individuals evaluate articles on based on how well stories fits with their own personal 
experiences or whether the story seems believable (Dahlstrom, 2010; Strange & Leung, 
1999; Winterbottom, Bekker, Conner, & Mooney, 2008).  Although the ability to resist 
alluring information is considered an important critical thinking skill, the extent to which 
students can avoid being influenced by anecdotal information when evaluating evidence-
based claims has not been thoroughly studied. 
 The purpose of my dissertation is to shed light on whether students learn to think 
critically about evidence-based claims.  Given that social science majors are taught to 
think scientifically, I examine whether seniors majoring in psychology are better able to 
reason scientifically when evaluating evidence-based claims than freshman students.  I 
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additionally want to understand whether college potentially changes students thinking 
dispositions and epistemic beliefs, since it has implications for understanding whether 
college training also helps students‟ avoid belief-bias reasoning.   Finally, I also examine 
whether college training helps students resist the allure of persuasive information.  In the 
literature review that follows, I define critical thinking, overview key studies, discuss the 
different lines of research, and propose a model for understanding college students‟ 
critical thinking development.  Afterwards, I present two studies in which I observe how 
students evaluate evidence while also exploring how differences in students‟ evaluations 
are related to their thinking dispositions and class standing. 
Study 1 was deigned to provide an observational account of students‟ reasoning 
strategies.  For this study, I asked college underclassmen to evaluate a set of research 
studies, once in an informal context and again in a critical thinking context and compared 
how their reasoning strategies differed in these two situations.  I also considered how 
individual differences in students‟ need for cognition and open-mindedness was related to 
the type of reasoned evaluation students provided.   In Study 2a, I compared freshmen 
students with seniors majoring in psychology.  I wanted to understand whether seniors 
used more scientific reasoning strategies than freshmen.  I also compared whether seniors 
reported being more open-minded, more rationally (versus experientially) oriented, and 
more reflective in their epistemic beliefs about the nature and sources of knowledge.  
Finally, I examined whether seniors were less persuaded by anecdotal information than 
freshmen.  In Study 2b, I address alternative explanations regarding the results of Study 
2a.  Lastly, I discuss how my results address some gaps in the literature and advance how 
scholars understand the nature of college students‟ critical thinking development. 
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CHAPTER II 
Review of the Literature 
Understanding what it means to think critically 
There has been much debate about how to best define and measure critical 
thinking, since it occurs in a wide range of tasks and involves a wide array of skills and 
abilities (Ennis, 1989; McPeck, 1981; Williams, 1999). Thus, attempts to provide 
overarching definitions of critical thinking have been criticized for being vague while 
definitions that itemize critical thinking into specific skills and strategies do not offer 
clear conceptual explanations.  However, discussions, most notably by McPeck (1981) 
and Williams (1999), have helped clarify how we understand critical thinking in three 
important ways.  These clarifying points serve as my guiding model for how I define 
critical thinking in the domain of evaluating claims and arguments. 
The first involves how critical thinking is conceptualized.  Generally speaking, 
critical thinking is a process of thinking deliberately and reflectively.  This deliberate 
component involves using specific reasoning skills and strategies when deciding what to 
believe or do (Bensley & Haynes, 1995; Halpern, 1998).  The reflective component, on 
the other hand, involves metacognitive processes, such as understanding how beliefs, 
biases, dispositions, and abilities influence the critical thinking process (Giancarlo & 
Facione, 2001; King, 2000; Kuhn, 1999, 2000).  
 8 
The second clarification is that critical thinking should be explicitly defined and 
measured according to the task that is being considered (McPeck, 1981; Williams, 1999).  
People think critically in a variety of situations, such as when making decisions, 
developing arguments, and forming theories, to name a few.  What it means to think 
critically will therefore function differently across these different tasks.  For instance, 
making managerial decisions, where one has to choose a single course of action from 
several competing options, involves generating hypotheses about which action will lead 
to the most optimal outcome while also reflecting about whether one‟s decision will 
adversely affect some other outcome, like social cohesion among team members.  
Evaluating claims, on the other hand, involves assessing whether the rationale for the 
claim is grounded in evidence, and if so, whether the evidence is strong and convincing 
enough to support the claim.  This also involves reflective skills, like monitoring whether 
one‟s personal beliefs are biasing how a claim is being evaluated. 
The third and final point is that critical thinking is dependent on knowledge. 
Having sufficient knowledge in a given domain provides individuals with the necessary 
understanding and relevant skills that are needed to reach well-reasoned conclusions 
(Leshowitz & Okun, 2011; Norcross, Gerrity, & Hogan, 1993; Schunn & Anderson, 
1999).  There has been some debate, however, about whether critical thinking skills are 
subject-specific.  Some have argued that subject-specific knowledge is only useful in its 
given domain (McPeck, 1981), whereas others posits that subject-specific knowledge can 
aid critical thinking across other domains (Ennis, 1989; Smith, 2002).  In the context of 
scientific reasoning, work by Schunn and Anderson (1999) helped clarify part of this 
debate by differentiating between scientific reasoning skills that are domain-specific and 
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domain-general.  Domain-specific knowledge refers to understanding specific concepts, 
principles, and epistemological assumptions that govern a given domain.  Domain-
general knowledge, on the other hand, refers to the process of applying conceptual and 
procedural knowledge to problems and tasks.  Although it is not entirely clear how 
domain-specific knowledge functions in other domains, studies have demonstrated that 
domain-general knowledge can be used to think and solve problems in other domains 
(Fong, Krantz, & Nisbett, 1986; Fong & Nisbett, 1991; Kosonen & Winne, 1995; Nisbett, 
Fong, Lehman, & Cheng, 1987). 
 
Critical thinking in the context of evaluating claims and arguments 
For dissertation, I pay specific attention to understanding how college students 
critically evaluate claims and arguments.  Under this context, I define critical thinking as 
a process of coordinating between theory and evidence, where the validity of a claim or 
an argument is critically evaluated by examining the strength and sources of the 
supporting evidence (Bensley, Crowe, Bernhardt, Buckner, & Allman, 2010; Kuhn, 1992; 
Stanovich & Stanovich, 2010).  As an example, take the following claim regarding 
siblings and creativity, 
Younger siblings are more creative. As one parent notes, “Anyone who‟s around 
children will tell you that younger siblings are very unique.  My youngest son, 
Jacob, for instance, spends his free time creating costumes and speaking in 
imaginary languages, while my oldest child, Brendon, prefers to watch TV and 
play videogames.”  Interestingly, a recent study also found that younger siblings 
scored 2 points higher on a creative test than older siblings. 
 
 
Scholars note that the ability to coordinate between theory and evidence requires 
scientific reasoning skills (Koslowski, 1996; Kuhn, Iordanou, Pease, & Wirkala, 2008; 
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Zimmerman, 2000). These reasoning skills can be understood as involving domain-
specific and domain-general knowledge.  Domain-specific scientific knowledge refers to 
and individuals‟ scientific understanding, such as the idea that knowledge about the 
physical and social world is obtained by creating and evaluating experiments that test 
theories and ideas, and that as more evidence becomes available, we can know with 
greater confidence that a particular theory provides a valid explanation.  Domain-general 
scientific knowledge, however, refers to the process of applying scientific concepts and 
procedures, like how to tests theories and structure experimental designs, to thinking 
about problems and tasks.  In the context of evaluating claims, this would involve things 
like identifying evidence from other types of information, examining how evidence is 
constructed and measured, considering the role of other factors, and identifying strengths 
and flaws in the evidence.  In the above claim, for example, one would immediately 
question whether a parent‟s anecdotal observations is a reliable source of evidence and 
whether a 2-point difference in a creativity score is meaningful enough to support the 
claim that younger siblings are more creative. 
There have been a number of studies that have examined students‟ critical 
thinking skills in the context of evaluating claims and arguments.  However, many of 
these studies have traditionally measured students‟ critical thinking using problems with 
pre-determined solutions, in which students are asked to choose the best response from a 
set of options (Lehman & Nisbett, 1990; Pascarella, Bohr, Nora, & Terenzini, 1996; 
Terenzini, Springer, Pascarella, & Nora, 1995).  Other studies have also relied on using 
Likert-type scales to reflect whether students are thinking more or less critically 
(Bastardi, Uhlmann, & Ross, in press; Cacioppo, Petty, & Morris, 1983; Macpherson & 
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Stanovich, 2007; Stanovich & West, 2007).  Although these methods provide us with a 
general index of students‟ critical thinking skills, they do little to tell us how students are 
reasoning when thinking critically.  Accordingly, there have been recent calls to specify 
the specific scientific reasoning strategies students utilize when evaluating evidence 
(Kuhn et al., 2008; Schunn & Anderson, 1999; Sodian & Bullock, 2008). 
Observing how students reason scientifically advances how we understand critical 
thinking processes in two important ways.  First, it provides us with a clear picture of 
how students reason when evaluating evidence.  Second, examining the patterns of 
students responses – whether they provide more experiential versus scientifically 
reasoned evaluations, whether they engage in belief-bias reasoning, and whether their 
scientific reasoning reflects surface versus deep level processing – provides valuable 
insights into understanding why some students are better able to think critically about 
evidence than others.  
A major ongoing debate has been whether American college students are 
developing important critical thinking skills, especially those that are needed to evaluate 
claims and arguments.  Arum and Roskas‟ (2011) work gained recent attention for 
showing that students‟ critical thinking abilities does improved little over the course of 
two years in college.  Arum and Roska have also suggested that college students‟ critical 
thinking abilities have been steadily declining within the last decade.  However, critical 
thinking has been defined and measured quite differently over the years and to varying 
degrees of success.  
In the following sections I review some common ways critical thinking has been 
studied.  In doing so, I try to distinguish between measures that reflect overarching skills 
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versus task specific ones and point out some developments in measuring critical thinking.  
Using a dual process model for understanding reasoning, I argue that attending college 
helps students more away from using institutive-experiential reasoning systems and more 
towards rational-analytic systems when evaluating evidence.  In examining this, I 
consider how domain-general scientific knowledge as well as reflective aspects of critical 
thinking, like thinking dispositions and epistemic beliefs, play a role in understanding 
how college students evaluate claims and arguments.  Another issue I discuss is how the 
characteristics of a claim, like the presence of anecdotal stories, influences how students 
perceive and evaluate evidence.  Finally, I point out some key issues in the research that 
have not been fully addressed and propose a model of critical thinking development that 
focuses on observing students‟ students‟ individual characteristics (e.g., scientific 
knowledge, thinking dispositions) and their reasoning strategies. 
 
Measuring the development of college students critical thinking skills 
Early work studied critical thinking under a problem solving framework, which 
primarily focused on how well students could correctly assess statements (Ennis, 1962).  
One of the earliest critical thinking measures, the Test of Critical Thinking, developed by 
Dressel & Mayhew (1954), assessed five abilities they believed to be essential for 
thinking critically.  These were the ability to, 1) define a problem, 2) select pertinent 
information for the solution to a problem, 3) recognize stated and unstated assumptions, 
4) formulate and select relevant and promising hypotheses, and 5) draw valid conclusions 
(Dressel & Mayhew, 1954, pgs. 179-180).  The Watson-Glaser Critical Thinking 
Appraisal (Watson & Glaser, 1964) was another widely used measure during this time.  
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Borrowing it‟s ideas from the Test of Critical Thinking, The Watson-Glaser CTA 
assessed similar sets of skills, like the ability to draw inferences from information, 
recognizing assumptions, using deduction, drawing interpretations, and evaluating 
arguments. Using these measures, a number of longitudinal studies found that students 
made significant gains in critical thinking skills over the course of college (Dressel & 
Mayhew, 1954; Feldman & Newcomb, 1969; Lehmann, 1963; Rickert, 1967). 
Since these were the first measures that attempted to capture critical thinking, 
they had several limitations.  First, the items were not constructed to assess how well 
people thought critically in a given task, but rather they represented a wide variety of 
logical problems that were believed to capture some important aspect of critical thinking.  
For example, one of the inference problems on the Watson-Glaser CTA asked students to 
read a passage and provide one of five responses regarding the truthfulness of the stated 
facts: true, partly true, insufficient data, partly false, false. The following example was 
taken from McPeck (1981, p. 136). 
Two hundred eighth-grade students voluntarily attended a recent weekend student 
forum conference in a Midwestern city.  At this conference, the topics of race 
relations and means of achieving lasting world peace were discussed, since these 
were the problems the students selected as being most vital in today‟s world.   
 
Stated Facts 
1. As a group, the students who attend this conference showed a keener 
interest in humanitarian or broad social problems than have most 
eighth-grade students. (correct answer: partly true) 
2. The majority of these students were between the ages of 17 and 18. 
(correct answer: partly false) 
3. The students came from all sections of the country. (correct answer: 
insufficient data) 
4. The students discussed only labor relations problems. (correct answer: 
false) 
5. Some eight-grade students felt that discussion of race relations and 
means of achieving world peace might be worthwhile. (correct answer: 
true) 
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For these tasks, only one of the responses options was considered correct.  Thus, 
getting the correct answer implied that one used important critical thinking skills to do so.  
Another limitation of these tests was that, as McPeck (1981) pointed out, the way the 
responses were scored did not reflect what participants were instructed to do.  In the 
above example, participants were asked to base their responses using only the given 
information, but some correct scores required participants to use their „general 
knowledge‟ to draw appropriate conclusions from the information. 
Scholars of critical thinking measures have pointed out that it is important to 
differentiate between problems that are either well-structured or ill-structured 
(Churchman, 1971; King, 2000; Schraw, Dunkle, & Benedixon, 1995; Sternberg, 1982).  
Well-structured problems are self-contained, where all the relevant information is given 
and the premises are assumed to be true.  Therefore, individuals can solve these problems 
with a high degree of certainty by applying logical rules and principles to reach the 
correct solution.  In contrast, ill-structured problems are more complex in nature.  They 
involve solving problems that people encounter in their everyday lives, like who to vote 
for, what to decide, and whether one should believe new scientific findings.  These 
problems do not always have clear-cut solutions since people will have varying amounts 
of information and expertise.  Therefore, under this second problem structure, thinking 
critically is not about the ability to reach a correct conclusion, but is instead the ability to 
reach a solution that is well reasoned and adequately justified.   
Later work using this distinction led to a more nuanced understanding how 
college differentially impacted students‟ critical thinking development (Lehman, 
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Lempert, & Nisbett, 1988; Lehman & Nisbett, 1990; Pascarella et al., 1996; Schraw et 
al., 1995).  In Lehman and Nisbetts‟ (1990) longitudinal study, college students were 
followed from the start of their freshmen year to the end of their senior year.  In order to 
examine whether students‟ disciplinary training was related to their ability to solve well-
structured and ill-structured problems, Lehman and Nisbett sampled students from the 
natural sciences, humanities, social sciences, and psychology.  Students were given a set 
of well-structured and ill-structured problems to solve and observed whether their 
responses improved over the course of college.  For the well-structured problem, students 
solved a conditional-logic task in which they had to correctly select one of four cards 
based on a permission rule.  For the ill-structured problem, students were given real 
world problems to think about (e.g., Why do rookies who perform well their first year 
have lower batting averages the following year?) and were assessed according to whether 
they selected a statistical explanation from a set of answers.  As they predicted, natural 
science students showed the most improvement in the conditional-logic problem (65% 
gain) whereas students in social science and psychology showed no significant gains.  
Conversely, students in social science and psychology made the largest gains on the ill-
structured problems (67% and 65%, respectively) compared to students in natural science 
and humanities. 
Distinguishing between well-structured and ill-structured tasks has helped 
scholars understand and discuss critical thinking more precisely.  Studies have also 
moved away from multiple choice and scale type measures towards measures that capture 
how well students thinking about everyday problems (Sandoval & Milwood, 2005; 
Toplak & Stanovich, 2003).   For instance, in a study by Norcross and colleagues (1993) 
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college students were asked to read a set of recommendations that were supported by 
research studies.  These studies, however, had clear flaws in the methodology, which 
served to discredit the validity of the evidence.  This included things such as lack of a 
comparison group or bias in the sampling.  When asked to evaluate these 
recommendations, students with little to no scientific training were not able to identify 
the flaws in the evidence compared to students who were later in their college careers and 
had social science backgrounds.  Burrage‟s (2008) comparative study also found that 
when asked to discuss a set of research studies that contained methodological flaws, 
seniors provided more evaluations of evidence and were better at recognizing when 
studies contained methodological flaws when compared to freshmen. 
A recent large-scale study by Arum and Roska (2011) provides one of the most 
comprehensive studies of students‟ critical thinking development using open-ended 
questions in which students‟ responses are scored based on the quality of their reasoning.  
In their study, Arum and Roska used the Collegiate Learning Assessment (CLA), which 
assesses broad abilities important for critical thinking, like the ability to articulate 
complex problems, justify ideas, and evaluate claims and evidence.  The CLA consists of 
three critical thinking tasks: a performance, a make-an-argument, and a critique-an-
argument task.   
The performance task attempts to simulate real-life scenarios that require students 
to evaluate and draw conclusions from several sources of information.  One of these 
scenarios, for example, presents students with the following dilemma: a company was in 
the midst of purchasing a small private plane, but the model they were interested in 
purchasing recently crashed.  Students are asked to examine different sources of 
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information, some which was relevant and some which was not, and provide a written 
memo addressing whether the plane had some safety issues, whether there were other 
possible reasons the accident occurred, and whether they would recommend purchasing 
the plane.   
In the make-an-argument task, students are asked to state their perspective about a 
number of issues, like whether more government funds should be spent on preventing 
crime than enforcing crime, and provide relevant reasons to support their position.  For 
the critique-an-argument task, students are asked to read arguments about everyday topics 
and evaluate the soundness and reasonableness of the argument‟s logic.  As an example, 
one of the arguments reads, 
 The number of marriages that end in separation or divorce is growing steadily.  A 
disproportional number of them are from June weddings.  Because June wedding 
are so culturally desirable, they are often preceded by long engagements as the 
couple wait until the summer months.  The number of divorces increases with 
each passing year, and the latest statistics indicate that more than 1 out of 3 
marriages will end in divorce.  With the deck stacked against “forever more” it is 
best to take every step possible from joining the pool of divorcees.  Therefore, it 
is sage advice to young couples to shorten their engagements and choose a month 
other than June for a wedding (CLA, 2006). 
 
These tasks are scored using a holistic method, in which a trained researcher uses 
a Likert-type scale to evaluate multiple dimensions of a students‟ response, like whether 
they drew appropriate conclusions, used relevant information, and recognized strengths 
and weaknesses in information. These scores range from 1-6 where 1 reflects responses 
that are under-developed or uninformative and 6 reflects responses that clearly identify 
important facts and ideas that support or refute an argument or justify a claim.  However, 
given that each prompt emphasizes a specific critical thinking skill, responses are also 
scored according to these specific skills, like whether a student identified a crucial piece 
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of information when critiquing and argument.  An overall score is obtained by averaging 
the scores on the performance and one of the two argument tasks (students‟ completed 
either the make-an-argument or critique-an-argument task). 
Using this measure of critical thinking, Arum and Roska found that students‟ 
CLA scores improved by only 0.18 standard during the first two years in college.  
Additionally, 45% of the students showed no change in their CLA scores across these 
two years.  Although these findings raise concerns regarding whether college students are 
learning to think critically in college, some caution is needed when interpreting these 
findings. 
Since Arum and Roskas‟ goals were to provide a large and representative account 
of college students‟ critical thinking development, it was useful for pragmatic purposes to 
define critical thinking as an overarching set of skills, such as the ability to articulate 
problems, justify ideas, and evaluate claims and evidence.  The CLA was also adequately 
suited to capture how these skills were utilized in everyday contexts, since these tasks 
were situated in some practical problem.  Given the large scale of this study, using a 
single score to represent students‟ depth of evaluation was efficient for data analysis 
purposes and allowed the authors to draw general conclusions.  This method of scoring, 
however, may have hid some important developmental differences in students‟ ability to 
think critically between the different tasks in the CLA (articulating problems, justify 
ideas, and evaluate claims and evidence).  It may also be premature to assume from the 
findings that students developed little critical thinking skills, since the study only 
followed students during their first two years in college.  Despite these general 
limitations, the CLA fills an important gap in the critical thinking research because it 
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approached critical thinking in terms of the extent to which students could provide an in-
depth response. 
 
Thinking dispositions and their relation to critical thinking development 
 Being able to reason scientifically about claims is an important critical thinking 
skill, since it provides individuals with the necessary skills and strategies to examine 
evidence in relation to the claim.  However, scholars have also argued that is it simply 
isn‟t enough for individuals to have domain-general scientific knowledge and that equal 
emphasis should be given to understanding more dispositional aspects of critical thinking 
(Bensley, 2010; Halpern, 1998; Norris, 1989; Stanovich, 2009).  Thinking dispositions 
refer to two characteristics:  a) an individual‟s willingness to engage in cognitive tasks, 
and b) the general tendencies an individual exhibits when thinking and reasoning 
(Halpern, 1999; Stanovich & West, 1998).  Much of the psychological research on 
thinking dispositions has focused on the Need for Cognition and Actively Open-minded 
Thinking.  Below I discuss these constructs and highlight studies that have examined 
their relationship with college students‟ critical thinking development.  
 Need for Cognition.  Cacioppo and Petty (1982) proposed that people vary in 
their Need for Cognition, their disposition to engage in and enjoy effortful thinking. 
Whereas some individuals prefer to think as little as possible in situations requiring 
effortful processing, others are more motivated to engage in the thinking process.  
Cacioppo and Petty‟s (1982) study examined how differences in college students‟ need 
for cognition related to whether they enjoyed complex thinking by placing them in either 
a simple task or complex task condition.  For this task, participants were presented with a 
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notebook containing 3,500 random numbers and were instructed to circle numbers based 
on either an easy rule set (e.g., circle all 1, 5, and 7s) or a complex one (e.g., circle all the 
3s, any 6 that preceded 7, and every other 4).  They were also given the Need for 
Cognition scale, a 45-item survey which assessed their willingness to engage (e.g., I find 
satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours) or avoid thinking (e.g., Thinking is 
not my idea of fun).  Participants with a high need for cognition reported that they 
enjoyed the complex task over the simple task when compared to those with a low need 
for cognition. 
Actively Open-minded Thinking. The work by Stanovich and West (1997) on 
Actively Open-minded Thinking has shown that individuals also vary according in their 
willingness to listen and consider views that are different from their own.  For instance, 
people with more open-minded dispositions never rule out the possibility that their views 
may be incorrect.  Therefore, when presented with evidence that challenges their beliefs, 
they are more likely to decouple their personal views and beliefs from when evaluating 
evidence.  In contrast, those with closed-minded dispositions operate with rigid sets of 
beliefs, which in turn makes them less willing to consider different viewpoints.  Thus, 
people with closed-minded dispositions are more likely to engage in „belief-bias‟ or 
„myside-bias‟ reasoning, in which belief-enhancing evidence is evaluated more favorably 
than belief-threatening evidence.  Using the Actively Open-minded Thinking Scale, a 41-
item survey which assessed their level of openness to different viewpoints (e.g., “I 
believe that different ideas of right and wrong that people in other societies have may be 
valid for them”), Stanovich and West (1998) showed that individuals with more open-
minded dispositions were better able to avoid belief-bias reasoning when asked to 
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evaluate belief-threatening evidence.  Interestingly, the work by Stanovich and colleagues 
has also shown that intellectual ability, as indexed by ACT scores, verbal intelligence, 
and fluid intelligence measures, are unrelated to avoiding belief-bias reasoning 
(Macpherson & Stanovich, 2007; Stanovich, 1999, 2009; Stanovich & West, 2008).   
This demonstrates that individual differences in actively open-minded thinking may be 
more important for understanding the reasoning process, especially when thinking about 
I‟ll than traditional measures of intellectual ability. 
The relationship between thinking dispositions and college experience.   Some 
work has demonstrated that thinking dispositions change over the course of college, but 
only moderately and in a non-sequential pattern (Nelson Laird, 2005; Stewart & 
Dempsey, 2005).  Giancarlo and Facione‟s (2001) longitudinal study, for example, 
followed 147 college students at the start of their freshmen year then again towards the 
end of their senior year.  They measured students‟ thinking dispositions by using the 
California Critical Thinking Disposition Inventory, a Likert-type questionnaire that 
captures seven characteristics, two which are similar to the need for cognition and 
actively open-minded thinking scales.  These characteristics were, 1) truth-seeking 
(intellectual honesty in seeking knowledge), 2) open-mindedness, 3) analyticity (alertness 
towards situations that require critical thinking), 4) systematicity (being organized and 
diligent), 5) critical thinking self-confidence (trust in one‟s own critical thinking 
abilities), 6) inquisitiveness (intellectual curiosity), and 7) maturity of judgment (ability 
to see complexity in problems).   
When aggregated into a single overall score, students‟ critical thinking 
dispositions improved over the course of four years.  But when examining each critical 
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thinking disposition, only truthseeking and critical thinking self-confidence improved 
significantly.  Giancarlo and Facione also analyzed differences in students‟ rate of growth 
(decrease, maintenance, increase) and found that most students maintained or showed 
modest gains in these thinking dispositions.  Only a few students showed drastic 
increases or decreases.  Facione and Giancarlo additionally conducted a cross-sectional 
study of freshmen and seniors to examine whether students‟ critical thinking dispositions 
were different across sex, class standing, and academic major (Giancarlo & Facione, 
2001).  Female students scored significantly higher than males on the overall disposition 
score as well as the open-mindedness and the maturity of judgment sub-scores.  
However, both males and females had equally low response scores for truthseeking, 
which reflected students‟ overall hesitation towards setting aside one‟s beliefs and values 
in pursuing truth.  When comparing these dispositions by years, seniors had higher 
overall scores, higher truth seeking, and higher critical thinking self-confidence.  Finally, 
academic major was related to the type of critical thinking skills students developed in 
college.  Business and math/science majors had low disposition scores for truth seeking 
and open-mindedness when compared to majors in the humanities, arts, and behavioral 
sciences. What is revealing about Facione and Giancarlo‟s findings is that, in addition to 
teach students domain-specific and domain-general critical thinking skills, students‟ 
major may also play a role in the thinking dispositions students develop while in college.    
The relationship between thinking dispositions and reasoning.  Using a wide 
variety of well-structured and ill-structured tasks, studies have demonstrated that a higher 
need for cognition is positively related to greater reasoning outcomes (Burrage, 2008; 
Nair & Ramnarayan, 2000; Nussbaum, 2005; Nussbaum & Bendixen, 2003; See, Petty, 
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& Evans, 2009).  However, most of this area of research has been done under the context 
of bias reasoning.  These studies have generally found that higher need for cognition and 
actively open-minded thinking are associated with avoiding belief-bias reasoning 
(Kardash & Scholes, 1996; Toplak & Stanovich, 2002; West, Toplak, & Stanovich, 
2008).   
In Cacioppo, Petty, and Morri‟s (1983) study, for example, college students read 
and evaluated a policy statement advocating for increasing college tuition, which was 
intended to activate students‟ biases.  For half of these students, the statement contained 
gave a weak argument for increasing tuition (e.g., improving the physical appearance of 
the school), whereas the half read a statement containing a strong argument (e.g., citing 
evidence that showed faculty were leaving for better paying jobs).  After reading the 
policy statement, students were asked to state their attitudes towards the recommendation 
to raise tuition (1 = negative attitude, … 9 = positive attitude) and completed the need for 
cognition scale.  For the strong argument condition, students with a high need for 
cognition showed more favorable attitudes towards the recommendation compared to 
students with a low need for cognition, suggesting that differences in students‟ need to 
seek out cognitive challenges related to their tendency to avoid bias responding.  
The relationship between thinking dispositions and the ability to evaluate research 
evidence has been less clear-cut, however (Klaczynski & Robinson, 2000; Macpherson & 
Stanovich, 2007).  Macpherson and Stanovich‟s (2007) study, for instance, found some 
contradictory results between students‟ thinking dispositions and their ability to evaluate 
evidence.  In their study, 195 college students were given three critical thinking tasks that 
assessed their syllogistic reasoning, argument evaluation, and experiment evaluation 
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skills.  The syllogistic reasoning task asked students to state whether a set of syllogisms 
were logically valid or invalid (e.g. All flowers have pedals; roses have pedals; therefore 
roses are flowers - which is logically invalid).  For the argument generation task, students 
were asked to write down their arguments about two statements: increasing college 
tuition (belief-threatening issue) and file-sharing over the Internet (belief-supporting 
issue).  In the experiment evaluation task, students were presented with two experiments: 
one study which found stay-at-home mothers raised more socially responsible children 
than working mothers (belief-supporting) and another study which found that stay-at-
home mothers raised less socially responsible children (belief-threatening). 
Both of the belief-supporting and belief-threatening studies contained 
experimenter bias.  Additionally, the belief-supporting study contained an additional 
confound (the time children were tested was different for the experiment and control 
group), which further diminished the validity of the findings.  Students evaluated each 
experiment by responding to three questions: 1) How strongly is the conclusion supported 
by the results of the experiment?, 2) What is your overall evaluation of the quality of this 
experiment?, and 3) How persuasive is this experiment? Students responded to each 
question using a six-point Likert-type scale ranging from unfavorable to favorable 
evaluations.   
Half of the students received decoupling instructions, which asked them to put 
aside their personal beliefs and think about both sides of the issue.  The other half 
received non-directive instructions, in which they were simply asked to take their time to 
read about the issues.  After completing the reasoning tasks, they were given the short 
form of the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASCI) consisting of the vocal 
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and matrix reasoning subtests, the Need for Cognition scale, the Actively Open-minded 
Thinking scale, and questions that assessed their prior beliefs about the topics presented 
in the argument generation and experiment evaluation tasks. 
 All three critical thinking tasks produced biased reasoning outcomes.  Those who 
believed that stay-at-home mothers raised more socially responsible children gave more 
favorable experiment evaluation scores to the supporting study compared to the belief-
threatening study.  For the instruction set condition, participants who received decoupling 
instructions displayed less bias in the syllogistic reasoning and argument generation task, 
but this did not occur for the experiment evaluation task.  In addition, the WASCI, Need 
for Cognition, and Actively Open-minded Thinking scores were positively correlated 
with correctly answering the inconsistent syllogisms.  As they expected, the WASCI was 
not correlated with avoiding myside bias in the argument generation and experiment 
evaluation tasks.  But different from their expectations, they only found one relationship 
between the thinking dispositions on the argument generation and experiment evaluation 
task.  This relationship contradicted their prediction, however; a higher need for cognition 
was related to providing more myside bias responses in the experiment evaluation task.  
So why didn‟t need for cognition and level of open-mindedness help students 
avoid biased reasoning in this context? It is possible that scientific knowledge is an 
important requisite for being able to think objectively about experimental evidence.  That 
is, if students do not have adequate domain-general scientific knowledge, then those with 
a high need for cognition may spend more mental energy basing their evaluations on how 
well the experimental findings fit with their beliefs and experiences.  Macpherson and 
Stanovich did not provide information regarding participants‟ majors, class standing, or 
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level of scientific knowledge, so it is unknown how these factors related to students‟ 
ability to avoid bias reasoning when evaluate evidence.  
The role of prompts, instructions, and college experience on reducing myside 
bias. Other studies, however, have demonstrated that teaching students scientific 
principles of research helps reduce bias reasoning (Leshowitz, DiCerbo, & Okun, 2002; 
Leshowitz & Okun, 2011).  In Leshowitz & Okuns‟ (2011) study, 149 college students 
with little scientific training were asked to read a court case involving a college coach 
who was blamed for the death of a player.  This case described the coach and the state of 
college sports in an unfavorable light, which was intended to influence students‟ 
favoritism towards the plaintiffs.  The plaintiffs (the player‟s parents) argued that the 
coach knew the son was taking steroids but did nothing to intervene.  In arguing their 
case, the plaintiffs presented a medical expert who testified that the steroids caused their 
son to commit suicide.  His conclusions, however, were based on his own personal 
feelings and not on any direct evidence.  The medical expert also bolstered his testimony 
by presenting a set of research studies linking steroids to suicide, which were 
experimentally flawed and unrelated to the case.   
After reading the case transcript, students were asked to offer a verdict (negligent 
vs. non-negligent).  Before reading the case, however, half of the students received a brief 
lesson on scientific methodology, which discussed the role of control groups, the idea 
that correlation does not imply causation, and the role of direct evidence in supporting 
assertions.  They found that the brief lesson increased students‟ skepticism towards the 
evidence, which in turn helped them reach more non-negligent verdicts (51%) than the 
control group (35%).  It is still important to point out, however, that half of the students 
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in the instructional condition gave a negligent verdict.  Although instructions improved 
scientific reasoning, a high proportion of students in this condition had difficulty 
applying this reasoning strategy in this context.   
Another line of work has also found that simply asking students to reason using a 
logical person‟s perspective reduces biased reasoning (Amsel et al., 2008; Klaczynski, 
2001b; Thompson, Evans, & Handley, 2005).  Although these instructional interventions 
decrease biases, these results also show that improving how students‟ reasoning is not an 
immediate process.  For instance, Mil, Grey, and Mandel (1994) found that students who 
enrolled in an applied statistics course gained few scientific reasoning skills by 
semester‟s end when compared to students in a humanities course.  In other studies, 
students were still prone to provide biased responses even after being instructed about 
biased reasoning (Follmer, Semb, Colombo, & Schreiber, 2004; Pollard, Newstead, 
Evans, & Allen, 1994).  Thus, short interventions, whether in the form of instruction or 
prompts for critical thinking, have shown to be effective in helping students avoid belief-
bias reasoning, but the actual process of developing students‟ decoupling skills may be a 
longer and more drawn-out process. 
Toplak and Stanvoich (2003) have shown that years in college is associated with 
using less bias reasoning.  In their cross-sectional study, college students were given an 
argument generation task in which they were presented with three controversial issues: 
increasing tuition costs, permitting the sale of human organs, and doubling gas prices to 
discourage driving.  They were first asked to rate their position using a 6-point Likert-
type scale, then after completing several unrelated tasks, they were asked to generate 
arguments for and against their own position for each issue.  The number of arguments 
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that endorsed their beliefs (myside arguments) compared to the number of arguments that 
did not (other-side arguments) as used as an index of myside bias reasoning.  For all three 
issues, participants gave significantly more myside than other-side arguments, but myside 
bias decreased across years in college.  After controlling for age and cognitive ability, 
regression analysis revealed that the number of years in college was an independent 
predictor of avoiding myside bias.   
In sum, higher levels of need for cognition and open-minded thinking are clearly 
related to avoiding biased reasoning for a variety of tasks, but whether this can be said for 
tasks requiring evidence evaluation skills is less certain.  What is more certain, however, 
is that domain general scientific knowledge , through the form of short instructional 
interventions, helps individuals evaluate evidence-based claims and arguments.  Toplak 
and Stanovichs‟ (2003) work has also helped demonstrate that years in college is related 
to avoiding myside bias reasoning.  However, further work is needed to establish how 
college exposure is related to developing students‟ thinking dispositions, scientific 
knowledge, and their ability to provide unbiased scientific evaluations. 
 
Dual process models of reasoning 
Dual process models of reasoning characterize mental functioning as stemming 
from two types of cognitive processes: the autonomous (Type 1) and the non-autonomous 
(Type 2) (Evans, 2003; Evans & Frankish, 2009; Stanovich, 1999).  Type 1 reasoning is 
fast, automatic, intuitive, and unconscious, and is primarily constructed via associative 
learning.  This type of reasoning does not require much cognitive effort and is seldom 
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guided by extensive analysis.  Type 2 reasoning, on the other hand, is deliberate, 
effortful, and controlled.   
Although dual process models share similarities with the work on thinking 
dispositions, rather than focus on an individual’s motivation towards thinking or level of 
open-mindedness, this perspective assumes that an individual’s thinking functions within 
the scope of basic autonomous and non-autonomous cognitive systems.  In the context of 
evaluating information and evidence, Type 1 reasoning is characterized as an intuitive-
experiential process, in which individuals naturally defer to their personal beliefs, 
experiences, heuristics, or intuitive feelings.  Type 2 reasoning is characterized as a 
rational-analytic process, in which individuals consciously process information by using 
some principle of logic or reasoning. 
 Research on dual process models primarily emerged from Kahneman and 
Tversky’s work who showed that individuals often relied on heuristics when drawing 
inferences from information (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974).  Their pioneering work found that participants often ignored base-rate 
information (70 engineers, 30 lawyers) when deciding whether an individual from the 
sample was an engineer or lawyer.  Instead, participants based their decision on a quick 
heuristic shortcuts; if the individual’s personality resembled a lawyer more that it did an 
engineer, then the individual was probably a lawyer (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973).  
One assumption about dual process models is that they function in an interactive 
parallel (De Neys, Vartanian, & Goel, 2008; Evans, 2007).  That is, even when thinking 
intuitively, individuals are still capable of noticing when they are being biased (Epstein, 
1994).  Another assumption of dual process models is that both systems of reasoning are 
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optimized for different situations (Stanovich, 2010).  For instance, intuitive-experiential 
processing works optimally in situations where time and knowledge are limited 
(Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; Gigerenzer, Hertwig, & Pachur, 2011; Goldstein & 
Gigerenzer, 2002).  Kahneman & Klein (2009) have also noted that years of effortful 
training in a given domain can lead to developing ‘intuitive expertise’ where an expert’s 
quick and intuitive judgments are just as optimal, if not better, than the effortful 
judgments of non-experts.  Scholars assert that since experts have obtained a deep 
knowledge base and experience in a given domain, they become skilled at noticing 
different problem structures and applying effective heuristic strategies to solve them (Chi, 
Glaser, & Reese, 1982; Larkin, McDermott, Simon, & Simon, 1980a).   In one line of 
research, physics students had difficulty solving physics problems despite having the 
necessary background knowledge to solve such problems.  In contrast, physics experts 
were able to quickly and accurately identify the theoretical principles underlying each 
problem and solved these problems with greater ease (Larkin, McDermott, Simon, & 
Simon, 1980b).  Studies examining chess players have also found that, under a variety of 
situations and task demands, chess experts are faster at recognizing important chess board 
patterns and better at choosing optimal moves when compared to novice chess players (F. 
Gobet & H. Simon, 1996; F. Gobet & H. A. Simon, 1996).  In one notable study, the 
quality of chess experts’ moves remained high even after the experimenters drastically 
reduced the time they could spend on each move, supporting the idea that developing 
expertise can lead to obtaining effective heuristic-based strategies (F. Gobet & H. A. 
Simon, 1996). 
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However, other studies have found that intuitive reasoning can lead to making 
biased judgments, especially in situations where individuals evaluate evidence that is 
consistent or inconsistent with their prior beliefs and expectations (Leshowitz & Okun, 
2011; Macpherson & Stanovich, 2007).   Similar to the work on thinking dispositions, the 
work on dual process models of reasoning have also focused on examining biased 
reasoning processes.  However, this area of research has not fully considered how this in 
the context of evaluating evidence.  Instead, much of this work has focused on using 
deductive reasoning (Amsel et al., 2008; Evans, 1998) or syllogistic reasoning paradigms 
(e.g., No addictive things are inexpensive; some cigarettes are expensive; therefore, some 
addictive things are not cigarettes – which is an invalid conclusion) to observe 
differences in individuals’ intuitive-experiential versus rational-analytic processes (De 
Neys, 2006; Evans, Handley, & Harper, 2001).  One study by Klaczynski, Gordon, and 
Fauth (1997) does provide some evidence, showing that the tendency to use either 
intuitive-experiential or rational-analytic processes is to patterns in college students‟ 
evaluation of evidence.  In their study, college students were given a series of summaries 
to read that were relevant to their academic major.  These summaries described 
hypothetical situations in which people made arguments that were based on an 
observation of small samples, on questionable correlational relationships, an on a poorly 
designed experimental studies.  The arguments, however, were either goal-enhancing 
(accountants are smarter), goal-neutral, or goal-threatening (accountants have poor 
marriages). 
 They were asked to rate the quality of the arguments in the study on a 9-point 
scale.  Additionally, students provided a written explanation describing why they 
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believed the arguments were valid or invalid.  These written explanations were assessed 
for depth of scientific evaluations (0 = no mention of statistical concepts, 1 = poorly 
elaborated statistical concepts, 2 = detected law of large numbers, covariation 
comparison, experimental flaw).  Participants also completed the Rational-Experiential 
Inventory (Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996), which assessed their individual 
preference using more intuitive-experientially oriented reasoning versus rational-analytic 
reasoning.   This inventory was composed two sub-scales: 1) Need for Cognition and, 2) 
Faith in Intuition scale.  Whereas the Need for Cognition scale measured a individual‟s 
willingness to engage and enjoy cognitive activities, the Faith in Intuition scale captured 
an individual‟s reliance on using intuition (e.g., I hardly ever go wrong when I listen to 
my deepest feelings to find an answer) or some form of logic (e.g., Using logic usually 
works well for me in figuring out problems in my life) when engaged in thinking. 
   In all, students thought the goal-enhancing arguments were more persuasive and 
valid than the goal-threatening arguments.  Students‟ depth of scientific evaluations were 
also lower when the arguments were goal-enhancing or neutral.  Students‟ rational-
experiential dispositions were also related to this process; those who reported a greater 
preference for thinking rationally provide more in-depth and less biased evaluations than 
those who preferred to think more experientially. 
As demonstrated by Klaczynski et al. (1997), dual process models of reasoning 
provide a useful framework for understanding how students evaluate claims and 
arguments.  In line with previous work using different reasoning tasks, they found that 
students engaged in belief-bias reasoning.  Their study added to our understanding, 
however, by directly observing the relationship between students‟ belief-bias reasoning 
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and the depth of their evaluations.  When arguments were goal enhancing, students did 
not spend much effort evaluating the evidence.  But when students encountered goal-
threatening arguments, they critiqued the evidence by mentioning statistical concepts and 
detecting the experimental flaws.  The most revealing aspect of their work found that 
students who reported a greater preference for think rationally were better able to avoid 
belief-bias reasoning when evaluating goal-threatening arguments.   
Dual process models of reasoning may help scholars understand whether college 
influences how students utilize these two cognitive systems when thinking critically.  
Given that scientific knowledge is an important requisite for being able to evaluate 
evidence, it would be interesting to understand whether differences in students‟ scientific 
knowledge are associated with a greater preference for thinking more rationally.  
Additionally, since other dispositional factors, like open-mindedness, are associated with 
avoiding biased reasoning, it would also be essential to examine whether a preference for 
thinking more rationally is also associated with greater open-mindedness.  Finally, 
developmental studies would help us understand whether college training, especially 
courses that emphasize scientific research methods, helps students shift away from using 
less intuitive-experiential and more rational-analytic processes (like scientific reasoning) 
when evaluating evidence. 
One issue regarding dual process models is that studies have yet to directly 
observe students‟ intuitive-experiential responses.  The work on dual processing have 
primarily measured biased reasoning by counting the number of instances individuals 
provide either a biased or unbiased responses.  It is also common to use students‟ ratings 
of evidence to reflect whether they are thinking more or less biasedly.  Although these 
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methods are economically feasible, over-relying on them may obscure how we 
understand the reasoning processes.  In order to shed light on how students use either 
cognitive system for reasoning, work is needed that observes what students say when 
describing or justifying their responses.  Indeed, the work by Klaczynski and colleagues 
(1997) has done this, and showed that more rationally oriented individuals were using 
more scientific reasoning when evaluating evidence.  However, measures that assess 
students‟ depth of scientific evaluations do not provide information regarding what 
students are doing when not reasoning scientifically.  One promising way to understand 
how students use both reasoning systems is to observe when either instance occurs.  For 
instance, Sá et al. (2005) found that when participants were asked to generate 
hypothetical evidence regarding several issues (what causes prisoners to return to crime 
after they are released?) they tended to discuss their personal experiences and opinions 
more so than they discussed the importance of obtaining some form of evidence.  From a 
developmental perspective, this method of observing reasoning allows us to make clear 
descriptive comparisons regarding whether college students‟ experiential versus scientific 
responses change over the course of college. 
 
The relationship between epistemic beliefs and critical thinking 
  Although dual process models provide a well-informed and well-supported basis 
for understanding human reasoning, other psychologists have focused on understanding 
how epistemic beliefs play a role in shaping peoples‟ reasoning processes (Hofer & 
Pintrich, 1997; King & Kitchener, 1994; Sandoval, 2005).  Epistemic beliefs refer to how 
people come to understand what they know about the world, in terms of where 
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knowledge comes from and how knowledge is justified.  As Hofer and Pintrich note, one 
line of work has focused on capturing age-related changes in the assumptions people hold 
about reality and the certainty of knowledge.  The other line of work has tried to uncover 
how epistemic beliefs shapes peoples‟ reasoning processes and their ability to think 
critically (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997).  In terms of how epistemic beliefs are related to 
critical thinking, as Stanovich (2009) and others point out, it is one thing for students to 
use critical thinking in the service of instrumental rationality, where one thinks critically 
in order to fulfill some personal goal.  It is another thing to use critical thinking in the 
service of epistemic rationality, where one tries to ensure that their beliefs and values 
represent an accurate reflection of what is known about the world (Baron, 2008; Foley, 
1987; Stanovich, 2009; Stanovich & Stanovich, 2010; Sternberg, 2002). 
The work on epistemic development was primarily born out of William Perry‟s 
(1970) interviews with male college students regarding their educational experiences.  As 
freshmen, the students in Perry‟s study perceived their experiences in dualistic positions; 
things were either right or wrong.  But when interviewed again as seniors, students 
focused more on considering the role context and understanding different points of view.  
Belenky et al.‟s (1986) study of female college students also found changes in their 
epistemic development.  Initially, students viewed their educational experiences as silent 
learners, where knowledge was not obtained by participating but by simply listening to 
authority figures.  But as they became older, they began to view the learning process 
something that was personally constructed by an individual.  Both Perry and Belenky et 
al.‟s studies were influential in showing that students‟ thinking reflected a developmental 
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process, where the assumptions they used to interpret their experiences became 
increasingly complex as they grew older.  
Rooted in Perry‟s ideas, King and Kitchener (1994; 1981) developed a theory of 
post-adolescent epistemic development, known as the reflective judgment model.  This 
model describes how individuals understand reality and knowledge as they grow older.  
This is observed by examining what assumptions people have about knowledge when 
asked to justify their views.  Kitchener and King developed the Reflective Judgment 
Interview to measure the assumptions people hold about the certainty of knowledge, how 
knowledge is acquired, and how knowledge is justified.  This interview presents people 
with four dilemmas that describe contradictory arguments.  The following example 
represents a dilemma about the safety of food additives.  
There have been frequent reports about the relationship between chemicals that 
are added to foods and the safety of these foods. Such studies indicate that such 
chemicals can cause cancer, making these foods unsafe to eat.  Other studies, 
however, show that chemical additives are not harmful, and actually make foods 
containing them more safe to eat (p. 260, King & Kitchener, 1994). 
 
 After reading the following passage, the interviewer prompts the participant to 
endorse a point of view, which is then followed up by six follow-up questions asking 
participants to justify how they came to adopt this view and whether they can ever know 
if their position is correct.  Kitchener and King propose that the way people justify their 
views represents seven stages of epistemic reasoning.  Stages 1 through 3 represents pre-
reflective reasoning, where knowledge is viewed as being either correct or incorrect and 
obtained by some direct experience or through some higher authority.    
People who reason pre-reflectively tend to justify their views by appealing to 
what feels right at the moment, by citing some direct example or observation, or by 
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referring to a higher authority.  People who reason this way do not identify evidence or 
the accumulation of evidence as important for understanding reality.  Instead, they 
portray knowledge as something that is already known, which can color how they view 
complex problems.  As King, Wood, & Mines note, “people who hold these assumptions 
cannot differentiate between well- and ill-structured problem, all problems as though they 
were defined with a high degree of certainty and completeness” (King, Wood, & Mines, 
1990, p. 169).   
Peoples‟ reasoning in stages 4 through 5 reflects an appreciation for evidence in 
justifying knowledge claims.  Although this represents a major shift in thinking, people 
struggle understanding whether knowledge claims can ever be known due to what they 
perceive as major limitations in obtaining evidence, which reflects a form of quasi-
reflective reasoning.  Under this view, knowledge cannot be justified until all the 
necessary evidence has been obtained, but since it is practically impossible to do so, 
people can never know what is true.  Additionally, since people are inherently biased in 
how they accumulate and interpret evidence, knowledge is seen as being highly 
subjective.  In general, people who reason quasi-reflectively are conservative about 
judging whether one subjective viewpoint is better than another.  Instead, multiple 
realities can exists, so what is true for one individual may not be true for another.  
Although quasi-reflective approach still reflects some uncertainty about whether 
knowledge can ever been known, a basic appreciation of evidence and the need to 
examine claims provides the necessary framework for being able to evaluate and 
appreciate opposing realities. 
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Stages 6 through 7 represents reflective reasoning, where people acknowledge the 
inherent difficulties involved in evaluating knowledge claims, but understand that some 
claims are more valid than others.  Reality can be determined by comparing the evidence 
that each perspective presents, in terms of whether the evidence is relevant to the claim 
that is being made, whether the evidence was obtained through reasonable means or well-
regarded principles of inquiry, and whether the evidence is being interpreted correctly. 
People who reason reflectively can also understand the changing nature of knowledge, in 
that knowledge can be revised as more evidence becomes available. 
Kitchener and Kings‟ (1994) 10-year longitudinal study found that, for over 
ninety percent of their sample, individuals‟ epistemic assumptions followed a steady 
developmental progression, where adolescents generally endorsed absolutist views of 
reality and knowledge claims but began understanding the nature of knowledge as being 
more complex as they grew older.  In one cross-sectional study, Kitchener and King 
(1981) interviewed high school juniors, college seniors majoring in liberal arts fields, and 
doctoral students studying liberal arts fields.  Ninety percent of high school students‟ 
reflective judgment scores were between stages 2 and 3, suggesting that they justified 
their beliefs using absolutist assumptions about knowledge.  Eighty-five percent of 
college students‟ scores were between stages 3 and 4.5, which reflected their growing 
appreciation for evidence as well as their apprehension to view reality and knowledge as 
certain.  Graduate students showed the highest level of epistemic understanding, where 
seventy-five percent scored above stage 5.  In contrast to high school and college 
students, graduate students understood reality and knowledge claims as something that 
could be rationally justified through evidence.  Kitchener and King were also able to 
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show that other competing factors, like sex, and verbal ability could not account for the 
difference in epistemic scores, suggesting peoples‟ epistemic understanding represents a 
unique developmental process. 
King and colleagues also examined whether the development reflective judgment 
varied by academic training.  Since the Reflective Judgment Interview involves justifying 
one‟s views about ill-structured problems, King, Wood, and Mines (1990) hypothesized 
that students in social sciences related fields would be better trained to think about ill-
structured problems than students from other fields.  To test this, they interviewed forty 
college seniors and forty graduate students who studied either social science (sociology 
and psychology) or math.  In addition to the Reflective Judgment Interview, students 
were also given the Watson Glaser-Critical CTA and the Cornell Test of Critical 
Thinking, which measured their ability to solve well- and ill-structured logical problems.  
For the Reflective Judgment Interview, they found significant differences by 
education level, where college seniors had lower reflective judgment scores compared to 
graduate students.  Although college seniors‟ reflective judgment scores did not differ by 
training, graduate students in social science had higher scores than graduate students‟ in 
math.  For the Watson Glaser and Cornell tests, college seniors had lower scores than 
graduate students.  College seniors in math, however, performed better than seniors in 
social science.  But interestingly, both graduate students in math and social science 
performed similarly. These findings suggested that different undergraduate discipline 
promote specialized critical thinking skills, but did not have a special influence on 
students‟ reflective judgment. 
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In order to account for the role of education on epistemic development Kuhn‟s 
(1992) comparative study, which used a paradigm similar to the Reflective Judgment 
Interview, sampled a group of adolescents, young adults, and older adults.  For the young 
and older adults, half were college educated, while the other half were not.  Participants 
were asked to justify their theories regarding everyday problems, like what causes 
criminals to return to crime.  When probed by the interviewers to support their argument 
(How do you know that this is the cause? What evidence can you give to show this?) 
participants who attended college were more likely to cite the importance of evidence 
when justifying their theories when compared to participants who had not attended 
college.  Of the young adult sample, 80% of the college-educated participants cited 
evidence as important where only 35% of non-college participants did so. 
Another approach to studying epistemic development have focused on the 
learning process, in terms of how students understand how knowledge should be acquired 
as learners (Schommer, 1990, 1993; Schraw, Benedixon, & Dunkle, 2002).  For instance, 
Baxter Magolda‟s (1992) longitudinal study primarily examined how college students 
understood the role of the individual, instructors, and peers in the learning process during 
their time in college.  They were able to show that students‟ assumptions about learning 
also followed a developmental progression, where they initially viewed learning as 
absolute, in that the knowledge they acquired was certain, but then moved to 
understanding learning as a contextual process as they matured, where they grew more 
considerate of understanding competing viewpoints and context.   
Using this „beliefs about knowledge‟ / „beliefs about learning‟ distinction, 
Schommer-Aikins (1990) has argued that people have a number of different kinds of 
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epistemological beliefs, which are more or less independent from each other.  In an effort 
to demonstrate this construct, Schommer-Aikins developed the Epistemic Beliefs 
Questionnaire, a 12-item Likert-type questionnaire, which assessed four types of 
epistemic beliefs: 1) Simple Knowledge (knowledge as isolated facts), 2) Certain 
Knowledge (knowledge as absolute), 3) Innate Ability (learning as innate), and 4) Quick 
Learning (learning as quick or no-at-all).  Schommer-Aikin‟s Epistemic Beliefs 
Questionnaire provided one of the earliest quantitative assessments of epistemic 
development while also emphasizing the importance of assessing beliefs in this area of 
research.   
This learning-based domain of epistemic development, however, has been 
criticized for being conceptually flawed (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997, 2002; Sandoval, 2005, 
2009).  This is primarily because beliefs about learning are self-theories, theories about 
how an individual views their own personal attributes (Dweck, 2000; Dweck, Chiu, & 
Hong, 1995).  For example, in Schommer-Aikin‟s Epistemic Beliefs Questionnaire, the 
statements assessing Innate Ability actually capture individuals‟ implicit theories about 
their intelligence, whether they think their own intelligence is innate (e.g., The really 
smart students don’t have to work hard) or malleable (e.g., Genius is 10% ability and 
90% hard work).  This is also the case for the items assessing Quick Learning, which 
assesses an individual‟s implicit theories about their own learning abilities, whether they 
think it is fixed (e.g., Going over and over a difficult text book chapter usually won’t help 
you understand it) or incremental (e.g., If I find the time to reread a textbook chapter, I 
get a lot more out of it the second time).  In order to avoid confusion surrounding 
constructs dealing with self-theories, Hofer and Pintrich recommend that  the study of 
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epistemic beliefs be conceptually defined within the boundaries of how individuals 
understand both the nature of knowledge and the process of knowing (Hofer & Pintrich, 
2002).  The nature of knowledge refers to how an individual understands what counts as 
knowledge.  This is also related to how individuals understand the certainty and 
simplicity of knowledge.  The process of knowledge, on the other hand, refers to the how 
an individual understands where knowledge comes from and how knowledge is justified. 
More recent work in this field has begun to appreciate the idea that people may 
have distinct epistemic beliefs about different domains of knowledge and that these 
beliefs can differ cross-culturally (Karabenick & Moosa, 2007; Muis, Benedixon, & 
Haerle, 2006; Pintrich, 2002; Schommer-Aikins, 2004).  Estes et al‟s. (2003) study, for 
example, examined American and British college students‟ beliefs about psychological 
and biological knowledge.  Using a Likert-type scale ranging from 1 to 7, students were 
asked to state whether they agreed or disagreed with 4 statements regarding the certainty 
of scientific research (e.g., On most issues in this field, with enough careful research, 
scientific experts can sooner or later be certain that their findings are correct).  For the 
psychological domain, these statements focused on the certainty of scientific research on 
children‟s social and emotional development, whereas statements for the biological 
domain focused on children‟s physical and biological development.   Estes and 
colleagues found that students were less certain about psychological research compared 
to biological research.  When asked to explain why, students generally stated that there 
were more inherent difficulties in conducting psychological research, in that social and 
emotional constructs were more complex, encompassed greater individual variability, and 
were further affected by other variables.  American students‟ however, were more 
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skeptical about both fields that British students were, which may reflect cultural 
differences in how students understand and value scientific research.  
Another line of work has focused on understanding the relationship between 
individuals‟ epistemic beliefs and their cognitive processes. (Hofer, 2004; Kardash & 
Scholes, 1996; Schraw et al., 1995; Weinstock, 2009).  One area of this work examines 
the interrelationship between individuals‟ beliefs about knowledge and their 
metacognitive processes, what Hofer (2004) as referred to as “epistemic metacognition.” 
In explaining this relationship Hofer states, “For example, if one believes knowledge is 
finite, then multiple sources of information might prove redundant and confusing; a 
search for competing truths is unnecessary, as is any attempt to resolve those that 
emerge” (Hofer, 2004, p. 47).  In Hofer‟s (2004) descriptive study of preliminary data, a 
group of high school and college students were asked to find information online about 
“bees and their communication behavior” for a report.  Students‟ epistemic beliefs were 
assessed by asking them to select their three best sources and explain their choices for 
doing so.  Although Hofer did not report any developmental patterns, she found that the 
sources students chose for their report reflected their level of epistemic understanding 
about the certainty and simplicity of knowledge.  In one example, a student selected a 
book from 1908 because “in biology when they know it, it‟s not likely to change” (p. 53).   
In one study, Kardash and Scholes (1996) examined whether college students‟ 
epistemic beliefs and need for cognition related to how they interpreted controversial 
issues.  Students were first asked to state whether they believed HIV caused AIDS.  
Students then read an article summarizing a debate between two research teams, one that 
supported the view that HIV was the sole cause of AIDS, and the other that HIV did not 
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cause AIDS.  The article was intended to be inconclusive in nature; both research teams 
presented equally strong evidence and rebuttals but the article itself did not conclude who 
was ultimately correct.  Students were asked to write what they concluded from the 
articles.  From there, they completed the Epistemic Beliefs Questionnaire (only the 
Certain Knowledge component was used for the analysis) and the Need for Cognition 
Scale.  Kardash and Scholes found that the more students viewed knowledge as certain, 
the more likely they were to write biased conclusions that favored their initial views.  The 
same pattern was found for students‟ need for cognition, in that students who disliked and 
avoided the process of thinking were more likely to provide biased conclusions.  
Conversely, students who viewed knowledge as less certain and who had a higher need 
for cognition were more likely to draw inconclusive results from the article.  This study 
was important for showing that epistemic views about knowledge and their motivation 
towards thinking were related to how they justified their views.    
 
How anecdotal stories influence reasoning 
At the most basic level, evidence-based claims contain two important 
components, the assertion and the supporting evidence.  They way evidence-based claims 
are reported in everyday settings, however, seldom provide such clear-cut distinctions.  
For instance, scientific news articles convey the results of scientific research studies in a 
clear an accessible ways to their readers.  One way they do this, however, is by beginning 
the article with a compelling anecdotal narrative.  Take the following anecdotal narrative 
for example, 
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Amanda knew Frank was shy when she married him.  Although Frank is a warm 
and caring person, his introverted tendencies have started to take a toll on their 
relationship.  At social gatherings, Frank always tries to find a quiet corner.  This 
makes things awkward for Amanda, who doesn‟t know whether to sit next to him 
or continue to mingle with others.  Amanda remarks, “Although I love him, it 
frustrates me when he gets like this.  It makes me question our compatibility.”  
The latest research is also revealing that introverted partners negatively impact 
marriages. 
 
Such narratives help readers create a vivid mental images of people in relevant 
scenarios, which in turn increases readers‟ ability to comprehend novel information 
(Bower & Morrow, 1990; Graesser, Singer, & Trabasco, 1994).  However, narratives also 
have an influential effect on individuals‟ perceptions and judgments.  When listening to 
stories, individuals actively construct and infer causal relationships based the events that 
transpired.  As suggested by scholars, anecdotal narratives can activate experiential 
systems, where individuals base their judgments on whether a story seems reasonable or 
believable and not how well a claim is supported by evidence (Epstein, 1994; Nisbett & 
Ross, 1980; Winterbottom et al., 2008).   
In Strange & Leung‟s (1999) study, for example, people made judgments about 
the causes of poverty based on whether an anecdotal narratives attributed the problem to 
the individual or larger structural issues. In a study by Dahlstrom (2008), undergraduate 
students read a narrative text that contained claims about the natural world (e.g., Jellyfish 
avoid the fast moving currents of the shallows).  These claims were paired alongside 
either, a) anecdotal stories with causal narrative structures, b) anecdotal stories with non-
causal narrative structures, and, c) non-anecdotal text.  Dahlstrom found that claims 
containing causal anecdotal narratives were rated as more truthful than claims with non-
casual narrative structures and non-anecdotal texts.  Interestingly, other studies find that 
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when anecdotal narratives and statistical evidence are presented alone, anecdotal 
narratives are rated as less persuasive and less believable than statistical evidence 
(Baesler & Burgonn, 1994; Hoeken, 2001). 
Much of the work on anecdotal narratives comes from medical decision-making 
studies since anecdotal narratives are commonly used to help patients understand their 
illness and make decisions about various treatment options.  Some work has found that 
anecdotal information can aid decision making if the information that is presented is 
balanced, where the advantages and disadvantages of various treatment options are 
discussed (Bekker, Hewison, & Thorton, 2003).  However, in other cases, anecdotal 
information can reduce individuals‟ ability to attend to and critically evaluate relevant 
information (Beyerstein, 2001). 
It is not entirely clear, however, whether anecdotal narratives are more influential 
than scientific evidence.  For instance, Winterbottom et al.‟s (2008) review of 17 medical 
decision making studies found that anecdotal information only had an influential effect 
on a third of the reviewed studies.  Winterbottom et al. note that much of the 
discrepancies may be due differences in how readers perceive different medical topics 
and/or whether the narrative information is written in first- or third-person.  For instance, 
anecdotal information was found to be more influential than statistical information when 
the topic was about osteoporosis and was written in third-person.  However, when the 
topic was about organ donation and the anecdotal information was written using a third-
person narrative, statistical information was more influential than anecdotal information.  
Other work has also shown that anecdotal information has little influence over peoples‟ 
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decisions if statistical information is presented in using simple graphs (Fagerlin, Wang, & 
Ubel, 2005).  
Although some argue that anecdotes, which contain causal narrative structures, 
influence individuals‟ reasoning processes (Anderson, 1983; Dahlstrom, 2010), it is 
difficult draw general conclusions about the role of anecdotes across studies with 
qualitatively different content.  Despite the uncertainty in the literature, however, it is still 
important to consider whether anecdotes influence how college students perceive and 
evaluate evidence-based claims.  As previously noted, everyday scientific news reports 
often use anecdotal stories to discuss scientific research studies, which may influence 
readers to believe the article to be more valid than what the evidence suggests.  This leads 
to the second point, in that not only is it important for educators to understand whether 
students are developing strong scientific reasoning skills, or whether they are better able 
to avoid biased reasoning, but also whether they can resist the persuasive allure of 
anecdotal stories.  The ability persuasive information and examine relevant evidence is an 
important critical thinking skills that has yet to receive extensive attention. 
 
Dissertation Goals and Contributions to the Field 
 The goal of my dissertation is to further understand the development of college 
students‟ critical thinking skills using a sample of underclassmen and seniors majoring in 
psychology.  I situate students‟ critical thinking in the context of evaluating everyday 
evidence-based claims.  These types of claims are commonly found in the health and 
science sections of newspapers and online news-sites.  The format for these article 
usually begin with a title (e.g., “Younger Siblings are More Creative”) followed by a 
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summary of the supporting study.  These types of reports seldom provide information 
about how a study was conducted, however.  In order to make these articles accessible to 
a wide audience, the methodological details are often omitted, such as the sample 
characteristics, the measures, and the scoring procedures, to name a few.  There are also 
instances where scientific news reports misinterpret the results of a study.  They may 
over-state the significance and importance of a study when the results of the study 
relatively weak.  They may also draw erroneous causal claims from correlational studies.  
Another way news articles convey scientific research studies in a clear an 
accessible ways is by introducing the topic with a compelling anecdotal narrative.  These 
narratives help explain the significance of the scientific study by helping readers create 
vivid mental images of people in relevant scenarios.  Although anecdotes help facilitate 
comprehension, they also can lead an individual to base their judgments and decisions on 
how well a story supports a claim, and not how well a claim is supported by evidence.   
Previous studies have relied on multiple choice responses or Likert-type scale 
items to capture students‟ critical thinking process.  Although these measures help us 
understand whether students are thinking more or less critically, they do little to inform 
us about how students reason.  My work adds to the literature by observing students‟ 
reasoning strategies.  I observe students‟ reasoning strategies by using a dual process 
model.  As reviewed previously, dual process models of reasoning argue that people have 
two general systems for reasoning: the intuitive-experiential and the rational-analytic 
system.  Where the former is guided by personal intuitions, beliefs, and experiences and 
the later is guided by some principle or logic or reasoning.  In the context of evaluating 
evidence-based claims, I consider rational-analytic systems to be guided by scientific 
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principles of reasoning.  I argue that attending college helps students shift away from 
using intuitive-experiential forms of reasoning and more towards scientific ones when 
evaluating evidence.  This is especially the case for students who take courses that 
challenge them to think critically about the relationship between knowledge and 
evidence.  For psychology majors, a major component of their training involves taking 
courses in research methods and applied statistics, which in turn helps promote their 
domain-general scientific knowledge and scientific reasoning strategies.  Thus, I attempt 
to capture college students‟ critical thinking development by examining whether seniors 
majoring in psychology provide less intuitive-experiential reasoning and more scientific 
reasoning strategies when evaluating evidence when compared to freshmen students. 
 In observing intuitive-experiential reasoning strategies, I distinguish between 
strategies in which students use either their, a) Opinions & Explanations or, b) Beliefs & 
Experiences to evaluate evidence-based claims.  Opinion and explanation-based 
strategies are those in which students state their personal views and opinions about a 
study or provide a personal explanation.  In doing so, however, they do not explicitly 
refer to some personal belief or experience as being the primary source of these opinions 
and explanations.  Belief and experience-based strategies, on the other hand, occur when 
students draw from their prior beliefs and previous experiences to evaluate the evidence 
or discuss why they agreed with a study‟s claim.     
There are numerous ways to evaluate evidence scientifically, from examining 
how a measure was aggregated to considering whether a research design contain inherent 
biases.  Instead of providing an exhaustive list of the various scientific strategies students 
utilize, I collapse these strategies into three broad categories.  The first category, Internal 
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Threats to Validity captures when students point out possible measurement errors or 
inherent biases in the design of the study that may invalidate study results.  ANCOVA 
Reasoning, on the other hand captures when students consider the role of third variables 
outside of the study that could interact or explain the study‟s outcome.  Finally, 
Methodological & Statistical Reasoning captures when students assess the soundness of a 
methodological and statistical procedure as well as the strength and impact of a study‟s 
outcome.  I acknowledge that internal threats to validity fall within the domain of 
methodological and statistical reasoning.  The reason I observe internal threats separately, 
however, is because my initial coding of Study 1 revealed that students routinely used 
this specific strategy to evaluate evidence.  
Another contribution I make to the work on students‟ critical thinking 
development is that I also examine the depth of students‟ scientific evaluations.   Scholars 
have noted that is isn‟t enough to observe students‟ scientific reasoning strategies.  It is 
equally important to capture how well students are able to explain and justify their 
scientific evaluations, since it can tell us how the level in which students engage in the 
scientific reasoning process.  For instance, two different students may use and the same 
scientific reasoning strategy when evaluating evidence but their depth of their evaluations 
may be quite different.  Where one students‟ ANCOVA based evaluation may simply 
state, “While researchers found the negative correlation between the two variables, there 
are other possible influences over social involvement and how it can affect marriage.” 
another students‟ evaluation may try to explain why it is important to consider the role of 
other variables, “This seems like it could be possible, but it would be important to look at 
possible mediating variables.  Perhaps introverted people are also more likely to suffer 
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from disorders such as depression or anxiety.  These would be important things to look 
at.”  Providing an observational account of students experiential and scientific reasoning 
strategies gives us a general picture of how students approach the reasoning process, 
while examining the depth of their scientific evaluations will add another important level 
of understanding – whether students are indeed learning to provide critical and 
scientifically justified evaluations. 
 As prior work has shown, there is a close relationship between domain-general 
knowledge and reasoning abilities.  If an individual has few domain-general scientific 
reasoning skills their ability to provide in-depth evaluations will be limited.  However, 
another line work suggest that thinking dispositions also matter in understanding why 
some individuals prefer to reason experientially versus scientifically and why some are 
better able to avoid belief-bias reasoning than others.  For instance, differences in need 
for cognition and has been shown to relate to how much effort people put forward when 
reasoning, while differences in open-mindedness is related to individuals‟ ability to 
decouple their beliefs and experiences when evaluating information.  Although these 
thinking dispositions have been well studied in a variety of thinking tasks, it is not well 
understood whether they are related to an individuals‟ ability to evaluate evidence-based 
claims.  My work identifies specific relationships between individual thinking 
dispositions and the tendency to prefer using either experiential or scientifically based 
reasoning strategies. 
 Epistemic beliefs are another important construct that are related to differences in 
how individuals reason.  The work of King and Kitchener has demonstrated that an 
individuals‟ level of epistemic understanding is closely related to their ability to solve ill-
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structured problems.  People who reason pre-reflectively think about problems and justify 
their views in simple, absolutist ways.  In contrast, people who reason reflectively view 
problems with greater complexity and thus better able to examine available evidence 
when drawing conclusions.  Their longitudinal work suggests that an individuals‟ 
epistemic beliefs increases in complexity from post-adolescence to adulthood.  Their 
work has also shown that attending college is related to higher levels of reflective-
judgment.   Although exposure to college seems to facilitate greater epistemic 
development, not much is known about how this development relates to students‟ critical 
thinking skills.   I try to examine the relationship between students‟ beliefs about the 
certainty social scientific knowledge and their tendency to utilize experiential versus 
scientifically reasoned evaluations.  Furthermore, I compare freshmen with senior 
psychology majors in order to observe differences in their epistemic development.  
Finally, I examine the relationship between students‟ epistemic beliefs and, a) their 
thinking dispositions, b) their experiential and scientific reasoning strategies, and c) and 
the depth of their scientific evaluations.   
  
Research Foundations and Hypotheses for Studies 1 and 2 
 The first study I present provides an observational account of college students‟ 
experiential and scientific reasoning strategies.  I examined how college underclassman 
used either strategies when evaluating evidence in two different contexts; one in which 
they were simply asked what they thought about the studies and another in which they 
were asked to critically evaluate the studies.  In doing this, I wanted to examine whether 
prompting students to think critically drastically shifted their reasoning processes or 
 53 
whether students still relied on using experience-based reasoning in this context.  I also 
examined the relationship between three individual difference measures  (need for 
cognition, actively open-minded thinking, prior beliefs) on students‟ experiential and 
scientific reasoning strategies, and the depth of their scientific evaluations. 
 For Study 2, I examined students‟ critical thinking development by comparing 
college freshmen with seniors majoring in psychology.  Like the first study, I observed 
student‟s experiential and scientific reasoning strategies as well as their depth of 
scientific evaluations.  I additionally compared whether there were differences between 
students‟ thinking dispositions (need for cognition, actively open-minded thinking), 
epistemic beliefs, and level of scientific knowledge.  Students were asked to evaluate a 
set of evidence-based claims that mimicked scientific news reports.  I was additionally 
interested in understanding whether anecdotal stories influenced students to evaluate the 
studies more favorably.  Therefore, for half of the students in this study read and 
evaluated claims containing alluring anecdotal stories. 
The model I present below (Figure 2.1) illustrates how I conceptualize college 
students‟ critical thinking development.  Based my current understanding of the 
literature, I use this model to show how the characteristics of a claim affect students‟ 
reasoning processes, while also illustrating how individual characteristics (years in 
school, major, level of scientific knowledge) is related to how they approach reasoning 
when evaluating evidence.  Finally, I attempt to capture how differences in students‟ 
thinking dispositions and epistemic beliefs moderate the reasoning process, in that 
students who have more rationally-oriented and open-minded dispositions, and who have 
more reflective epistemic beliefs will be more inclined to use scientific reasoning 
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strategies compared to those with less rationally-oriented and open-minded dispositions, 
and who have less reflective epistemic beliefs.  Based these general assumptions, I 
predict the following: 
1) Given that individuals have a preference for thinking experientially, college 
students will engage in more experiential reasoning than scientific reasoning 
when evaluating evidence-based claims.  It is only when explicitly instructed to 
think critically that student will use more scientific reasoning. 
2) With regards to the thinking disposition measures, Need for Cognition and 
Rational-Experiential reasoning will be positively correlated with Actively Open-
minded Thinking.  Individuals who are more likely to report a higher need for 
cognition and a greater preference for thinking rationally will also report being 
more open-minded.  Additionally, individuals‟ epistemic beliefs about social 
scientific knowledge will be positively related to these thinking dispositions.  The 
more reflective a students‟ beliefs about the nature of social scientific knowledge, 
the more likely they will report a preference for thinking rationally and being 
more open-minded to different viewpoints.  
3) When comparing freshmen and senior‟s individual characteristics, college seniors 
will report having greater domain-general scientific knowledge than college 
freshmen.  Additionally, seniors will report a greater preference for thinking 
rationally, being more open-minded, and having more reflective epistemic beliefs 
than freshmen.   
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4) College seniors will evaluate evidence-based claims more scientifically than 
college freshmen.  Seniors‟ scientific evaluations will also be more in-depth than 
freshmen students‟ scientific evaluations.  
5) Evidence-based claims that contain alluring anecdotal stories will be evaluated 
more favorably than claims that do not contain anecdotal stories.  Given that they 
trigger experientially based models of causality, anecdotal stories will also 
influence individuals to evaluate claims using more experiential reasoning than 
scientific reasoning.  College seniors will be less susceptible to alluring anecdotal 
stories than freshmen, which will be reflected using less experiential evaluations 
when compared to freshmen. 
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Figure 2.1.  Proposed model of college students’ critical thinking 
development 
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CHAPTER III 
Study 1 
The ability to reason scientifically about research evidence is important for 
critical thinking, since this reasoning process involves evaluating evidence in relation to 
claims, theories, and hypotheses (Zimmerman, 2000, 2007).  Although studies have 
examined students‟ scientific reasoning skills in the context of evaluating evidence, few 
have observed the specific scientific reasoning strategies students utilize.  For instance, a 
common way of measuring scientific reasoning has been to use scale response items, 
where a given value represents the ability to reasoning more or less scientifically (Amsel 
et al., 2008; Klaczynski, 2001b; Macpherson & Stanovich, 2007; Sá, West, & Stanovich, 
1999).  This approach provides us with a general sense of how students respond to 
information, but the main drawback of this method is that we gain no clearer 
understanding about how students are reasoning.  Other work has observed students‟ 
written responses (Klaczynski et al., 1997; Kosonen & Winne, 1995), which have been 
informative in uncovering the depth of students‟ scientific evaluations.  Measuring 
scientific reasoning this way, however, only inform us of the extent to which students‟ 
scientific reasoning abilities are either poor or strong (Fong et al., 1986; Norcross et al., 
1993; Zeineddin & Abd-El-Khalick, 2008).  Because of these limitations, scholars have 
called for studies that examine that capture how students reason scientifically when 
evaluating evidence (Schunn & Anderson, 1999; Sodian & Bullock, 2008). 
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The primary goal of this study was to provide an observational account of 
students‟ scientific reasoning strategies while also assessing the depth of their scientific 
evaluations.  By observing students‟ responses using these two methods, we can better 
understand the various ways students go about evaluating information scientifically and 
the extent to which their evaluations provide an informative assessment of the evidence.  
However, as scholars have implied, students don‟t always evaluate evidence scientifically 
(Burrage, 2008; Kuhn, 2009).  Therefore, I also examined students‟ experiential 
responses, such as when students provide opinions or make judgments about the validity 
of evidence from their own personal experiences. 
Dual process models of reasoning have been influential in explaining how people 
reason in a variety of tasks.  This model asserts that individuals have two systems for 
reasoning about the world: the intuitive-experiential and the rational-analytical (Estes et 
al., 2003; Pacini & Epstein, 1999).  The intuitive-experiential system represents 
reasoning that is guided by an individual‟s implicit intuitions, views, beliefs, and their 
prior experiences and expectations.  The rational-analytic system, on the other hand, is 
guided some formal principle of logic or reasoning and is characterized as being more 
deliberate and effortful.  In the context of evaluating evidence, I consider this rational-
analytic system to be guided by principles of scientific reasoning.  These two systems of 
reasoning do not function independently from one another, however.  As Pacini and 
Epstein (1999) note, they can operate in an interactive parallel, where one system informs 
the other.  Although intuitive-experiential reasoning is an optimal system for making 
decisions with limited time and information (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; Goldstein & 
Gigerenzer, 2002) other work has shown that people can make biased judgments from 
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their experiences.  The work on belief-bias reasoning has shown that when evidence 
threatens an individual‟s beliefs, they are more likely to view that evidence more 
negatively than belief-confirming evidence (Bastardi et al., in press; Lord, Ross, & 
Lepper, 1979; Stanovich & West, 2007; Toplak & Stanovich, 2003).   
In the context of evaluating research evidence, this has implications for 
understanding why students may not always engage in scientific reasoning.  Under the 
dual process model, students may be more focused on judging whether the research 
evidence fits with their previous beliefs and experiences than in examining the general 
quality of the evidence.  Some line of work has found that student do not reason 
scientifically unless explicitly prompted to do so.  It is only when prompted to be more 
critical that students provide more scientific evaluations (Macpherson & Stanovich, 2007; 
Nussbaum & Kardash, 2005).  These studies, however, have not explored whether 
prompting students to think more critically helps decrease experiential forms of 
reasoning.  Therefore, the second goal of this study was to examine whether providing 
prompts for critical thinking was influential in reducing experiential reasoning.   
Based on previous work by Sá et al. (2005) and Burrage (2008), I distinguish 
between two types of experiential reasoning strategies, those in which students use 
Opinions & Explanations and those in which they use Beliefs & Experiences to evaluate 
evidence.  Opinions & Explanations are evaluations in which students offer a personal 
view or explanation but do not explicitly refer to their beliefs or experiences as being a 
primary source of this response.  Beliefs & Experiences refer to evaluations in which 
students are explicitly referring to their personal beliefs and prior experiences.  Drawing 
from previous work examining students‟ scientific responses (Fong et al., 1986; 
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Klaczynski et al., 1997) I focus on three scientific reasoning strategies.  These strategies 
include 1) Internal Threats to Validity, 2) ANCOVA Reasoning, and 3) Methodological & 
Statistical reasoning.  Internal Threats to Validity captures when students evaluate studies 
by postulating potential problems inherent to the general design of the study, such as 
experimenter bias or measurement error. ANCOVA Reasoning strategies involve 
postulating that an observed relationship can be the result of a mediating third variable.  
Finally, Methodological & Statistical reasoning involves using conceptual and procedural 
knowledge about methods and statistical principles to evaluate research evidence, such as 
examining how variables were operationalized, the reasonable of the procedures, how the 
data was aggregated, and whether important variables were controlled for, to name a few.  
Another goal of this study was to examine how differences in individuals‟ 
thinking dispositions were related to students reasoning strategies.  I study two important 
individual thinking dispositions that may inhibit or facilitate scientific reasoning: Need 
for Cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) and Actively Open-minded Thinking (Stanovich 
& West, 1997).  Cacioppo, Petty, and Morris‟ (1983)  work on need for cognition finds 
that people with a high need for cognition are more motivated to evaluate information 
than those with a low need for cognition.  Accordingly, studies have shown that people 
with a low need for cognition favor more experiential processing compared people with a 
high need for cognition, who favor more analytic approaches (Epstein et al., 1996).  
Stanovich‟s work on actively open-minded thinking has also revealed that peoples‟ 
critical reasoning is related to their willingness appreciate different viewpoints.  In these 
studies, people with more open-minded dispositions are less likely to engage in belief-
bias reasoning (Stanovich & West, 2008; Toplak & Stanovich, 2002).  These studies, 
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however, frequently use controversial or belief-threatening evidence, so it is not clear 
whether these thinking dispositions play a role in how students evaluate more neutral 
sources of evidence. 
For this study, I considered how students evaluated two different types of research 
studies: between-group students (studies that report differences between two or more 
groups) and correlational studies (studies that report the association between two 
different variables).  I focus on these two study designs because they have important 
implications for reasoning in everyday contexts.  Findings from between-group and 
correlational studies are commonly reported in the media, but whether or not such 
findings are accurately interpreted is another matter.  For instance, news outlets 
frequently report findings from scientific studies that were published because they had 
statistically significant results.  But if studies have small effect sizes their findings do not 
necessarily warrant major changes in policy or behavior.  When the effect size of a study 
is very small, but the findings are interpreted as large, then an “effect size” error has 
occurred.  Although it is important to notice when small effects are being over-
interpreted, and psychology journals now frequently require the inclusion of effect size 
information in their publications (APA, 2009), it is not clear how sensitive students are to 
noticing when effect size errors occur.  With regards to correlational evidence, 
philosophers have long noted that it is impossible to draw definitive causal conclusions 
from correlation data and have developed a taxonomy of possible reasons why two 
variables A and B might be correlated even though A does not directly cause B.  There 
are numerous claims that individuals are particularly poor at noticing when they make 
correlation-not-causation errors, and one of the common goals of science methodology 
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training is to teach people to avoid such errors (Hatfield, Faunce, & Job, 2006).  
Although understanding the distinction between correlation and causation is important for 
interpreting scientific findings, we know little about whether students can notice when a 
correlation-not-causation error has occurred. 
I created a set of study summaries that described psychological research studies, 
which can be found in Appendix A.  These studies described social science topics and 
were written in a technical manner in which relevant details regarding the study design 
and measures were described.  I had three main predictions for the results.  First, I 
predicted that students would engage in more experiential reasoning than scientific 
reasoning when asked to evaluate the studies in an informal context.  I also expected that, 
when promoted to think critically, students‟ would reason more scientifically while also 
reasoning less experientially.  The depth of students‟ scientific evaluations would also be 
higher in the critical thinking condition than in the informal condition.  Second, I 
predicted that students would be able to distinguish between studies containing 
interpretive errors from those that did not contain errors when prompted to critically 
evaluate the studies.  This would be reflected by a higher number of scientific evaluations 
for the studies containing interpretive errors than for those without interpretive errors.  
Lastly, I predicted that higher Need for Cognition and Actively Open-minded Thinking 
scores would be positively associated with providing more scientific evaluations in both 
the informal and critical thinking contexts.  The more a student reported a higher need for 
cognition and open-mindedness, the more likely they would use scientific evaluations.  I 
also expected both dispositions to be positively associated with students‟ depth of 
scientific evaluations. 
 63 
 
Methods 
Participants 
Fifty college students (38 female, 12 male) from participated in this study.  
Students‟ mean age was 18.38 years (SD = 1.02) and were freshmen or sophomores.  
Participants were recruited from the introductory psychology subject pool at the 
University of Michigan. 
 
Procedure 
This study was administered online.  Once logged into the site, participants were 
given an hour to complete the study.  Participants were asked to read and evaluate eight 
summaries of psychological studies.  Each individual study was presented separately 
from one another.  In addition, the studies were presented in a fixed random order.  
Participants were first shown these summaries in an informal context, in which I tried to 
elicit participants‟ natural responses.  After reading each study, participants were asked to 
rate the quality of the study on a 5-point scale (1 = very poor quality… 5 = very good 
quality) and provide a written response to the question, “Have these findings affected 
your views about [study topic]?  If so, how?”   
After reviewing all the studies, participants were shown the study summaries a 
second time and explicitly prompted to critically evaluate the studies, “Please critically 
evaluate the study (e.g., What are the strengths of the study?  Is there evidence or 
information in the study that can be considered incorrect or misinterpreted?).”  After 
evaluating the study summaries in both informal and critical thinking conditions, 
participants completed two thinking dispositions measures, background questions, and 
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questions that gauged their prior beliefs about the study topics.  For the prior belief 
questions, participants were given a statement reflecting main argument of the study (e.g., 
for the study on children‟s impulsivity and grades, the statement read, “In elementary, 
children‟s academic development is a function of their ability to control their impulsive 
behaviors”).  Using a 6-point scale (1 = disagree strongly… 6 = agree strongly), they 
were asked to respond to the following question: “Prior to completing this study, the 
above statement would fit with my beliefs and experiences.” 
 
Materials 
Study Summaries.  I created eight study summaries that provided detailed 
descriptions of psychological studies.  These study summary topics were also considered 
non-belief threatening in nature (i.e., about everyday psychological topics).  These 
summaries contained descriptive information about the study goals, sample 
characteristics, methodological procedures, the results, a summary describing the 
relevance of the study.  Appendix A provides a full list of the summaries. 
 Study Summary Manipulations. I manipulated each study by, a) the study 
design, and b) the presence or absence of an interpretive error.  This was done to examine 
how participants‟ evaluations changed as a function of these manipulations as well as to 
ensure that the studies varied from one another.  For study design, half the studies 
contained between-group evidence and the other half contained correlational evidence.  
Between-group evidence reported the outcomes between two different groups (e.g., 
whether academic grades differ between impulsive and non-impulsive children) and 
correlational evidence reported the association between two different variables (e.g., 
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whether the number of children‟s books in a home is associated with the number of 
alphabet letters children know).  Half of these study summaries contained interpretive 
errors.  For the between-group evidence, an effect size error occurred when the 
differences between two groups were weak but over-interpreted as having important 
implications.  For the correlational evidence, a correlation/causation error occurred when 
the findings were misinterpreted as having a causal relationship.  Thus, of the four study 
summaries with between-group evidence, two contained interpretive errors (small effect 
size) while the other two did not (large effect size).  For the four summaries with 
correlational evidence, two contained interpretive errors (correlation-not-causation error) 
while the other two did not (correctly interpreted associative relationship).  
 
Measures 
Experiential and Scientific Evaluation Scoring. During both informal and 
critical thinking conditions, I examined participants‟ written responses for experience 
based and scientifically based evaluations.  Experienced-based evaluations occurred 
when participants used their prior beliefs, experiences, or viewpoints to inform their 
evaluations.  Scientific evaluations occurred when participants critiqued the study based 
on the quality and validity of the evidence.   
Experiential Strategies.  I used previous work by Sá et al. (2005) to distinguish 
between two different types of experience-based responses. The Opinions & 
Explanations code was assigned when a participant stated their views and opinions about 
the study or offered a personal explanation but did not explicitly refer to their beliefs, 
experiences as being a primary source for these responses (e.g., for the study on 
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children‟s impulsivity and grades, participant 34 responded, “I do not agree with the 
study's conclusion and I do not think that an impatient child is bad at school because they 
have no control over their impulses”).  The Beliefs & Experiences code, on the other 
hand, occurred when participants explicitly referred to their personal beliefs, experience, 
or values to evaluate the studies (e.g., participant 39 responded: “I don't think this study 
is strong at all because I fit the impatient stereotype and I never did poorly in school.”).  
Scientific Reasoning Strategies.  For the scientifically reasoned response, I 
coded when participants employed the following three strategies: Internal Threats to 
Validity, ANOCVA reasoning, and Methodological & Statistical reasoning. The Internal 
Threats to Validity code captured when participants identified something inherent in the 
study design they believed jeopardized the validity of the study, such as experimenter and 
participant effects, testing errors, and faulty measures (e.g., participant 24 responded: 
“Due to experimenter's implicit influence on children in the experiment, children may act 
differently and cause experiment to be invalid.”).  The ANCOVA Reasoning code 
captured when participants stated the importance of some third variable that could change 
the results of the study (e.g., participant 10 responded: “The results of impatient children 
having lower grades may be compromised by parental involvement and how much 
priority is placed on doing well in school.”).  The Methodological & Statistical 
Reasoning code captured participants‟ methodological evaluations, such as critiquing 
how the participants were sampled, how the responses were quantified, the sequence of 
the procedures, and the strength of the findings (e.g., participant 22 responded: “The time 
given to the children and the bell seem a little weak.”).   
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Depth of scientific evaluations.  Depth of scientific evaluations measured the 
degree to which participants‟ scientific evaluations were reasonably explained, in terms 
of connecting how their evaluation was relevant for understanding the quality and the 
validity of the studies.  Based off the work of Fong and Nisbett (1991), I used the 
following three-point system to code for participants‟ depth of scientific evaluations:  
1 = a non-scientific evaluation captured when participants did not evaluate the 
study scientifically.   This typically captured when participants exclusively relied on 
using their opinion or experiences (e.g., participant 15 responded, “This is a strong study 
overall, but teaching children effective self-control strategies is not the only way to 
improve academic achievement.”).   
2 = a poor scientific evaluation captured when participants provided a scientific 
evaluation, but did not explicitly state how their evaluations was relevant or important for 
understanding the validity of the study.  This code also captured when participants‟ 
scientific evaluations were poorly defined or vague (e.g., participant 45 responded, “This 
study ignores extraneous variables aside from impulsive behavior, such as underlying 
psychological disorders).   
3 = a good scientific evaluation captured when participants related their scientific 
evaluations to understanding various aspects of the study, like the quality of the 
measures, potential limitations in the research design, and the strength of the results (e.g., 
participant 43 responded, “The M&M test does not accurately test for patience. Some 
children could just be shy and not take the M&M, but they could be very impatient in real 
life.”) or when participants noticed the interpretive errors for the study summaries 
containing flaws (e.g., The interpretation of this study is off. Children with B- averages 
 68 
are not doing noticeably better than those with C+'s.  The results may be significant, but 
it's not a large enough difference to make a meaningful impact in the real world.”). 
Reasoning strategies and depth of scientific evaluation scoring procedures. 
For the experiential, scientific, and depth of scientific evaluation codes, composite scores 
were created for both the informal and critical thinking conditions.  These composite 
scores were calculated by summing the total number of coded observations across the 
eight study summaries.  These evaluations were not mutually exclusive and participants‟ 
responses may have included more than one type of evaluation.  For example, a 
participant could have provided a methodological critique while also noting that the 
findings were consistent with their previous experiences.   
Since participants evaluated the studies in two separate conditions, it was possible 
that participants would not evaluate the study scientifically during the critical thinking 
condition if they already did so during the informal condition.  However, this did not turn 
out to be the case.  Participants who provided scientific evaluations during the informal 
condition also did so during the critical thinking condition.  Most participants provided 
the same scientific evaluation across both informal and critical thinking conditions.  
There were also instances where participants would state, “please see my previous 
response.” When this occurred, participants‟ responses in the informal condition also 
counted as a response for the critical thinking condition.  Only in a couple of occasions 
did participants provide scientific evaluations in the informal condition but not in the 
critical thinking condition. 
Two trained researchers independently coded participants‟ responses.  For the 
non-directive instructions, there was a 93% agreement between both coders with Cohen‟s 
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kappa value of .79.  For the critical thinking instruction, there was an 89% agreement and 
the Cohen‟s kappa value was .63.  Both coders resolved discrepancies through 
discussion.  However, only one researcher coded for participants‟ depth of scientific 
evaluations.   
Actively Open-minded Thinking Scale.  After evaluating the summaries, 
participants completed the Actively Open-minded Thinking Scale (Stanovich & West, 
1997).  This 41-item scale assessed participants‟ degree of openness to different 
viewpoints and beliefs and flexible thinking.  Twenty statements represented open-
minded, flexible thinking (e.g., “I believe that the different ideas of right and wrong that 
people in other societies have may be valid for them”) where the remaining 21 statements 
reflected closed-minded, rigid thinking (e.g., “No one can talk me out of something I 
know is right”).  Participants were asked to agree or disagree with each statement using a 
6-point scale (1 = disagree strongly, … 6 = agree strongly).  Scores between 41 and 82 
represents having closed-minded views towards other beliefs and rigid modes of thinking, 
scores between 83 and 123 represents having slightly narrow to slightly open-minded 
views, and scores above 165 represents having open-minded views towards other beliefs 
and flexible modes of thinking. 
Need for Cognition Scale.  Participants were also given the 18-item Need for 
Cognition Scale (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) which measured their individual willingness to 
seek out, engage, and enjoy cognitively challenging activities. Ten statements reflected a 
high need for cognition (e.g., “I find satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours) 
while eight statements reflected a low need for cognition (e.g., “Thinking is not my idea 
of fun”).  Participants were asked to rate the extent to which each statement was 
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characteristic of them using a following 5-point scale (1 = extremely uncharacteristic, … 
5) extremely characteristic).  Scores between 18 and 36 represents having a low need for 
cognition, scores between 37 and 54 represents having a slightly low to slightly moderate 
need for cognition, and scores above 55 represent having a moderate to high need for 
cognition. 
 
Results 
Descriptive statistics for the outcome measures 
Table 3.1 lists participants‟ mean quality ratings, Need for Cognition scores, 
Actively Open-minded Thinking scores, and reasoning strategies. Table 3.2 presents a list 
of the study summaries and Tables 3.2 and 3.3 provide the results of two paired t-tests.  
Regarding participants‟ prior beliefs, all but one study summary had average rating above 
4, suggesting that the study topics fit participants‟ prior beliefs and experiences.  None of 
the average prior belief ratings fell below 3 (disagree slightly) or above 5 (agree 
moderately), which demonstrates that the study topics were non-controversial or belief 
threatening in nature.   
Since one of my study aims was to examine whether students noticed differences 
in the evidence quality (whether they contained interpretive errors), I needed to ensure 
that participants‟ prior beliefs were not drastically effecting how they evaluated the 
studies.  In order to check for this, I used a paired t-test to examine whether the study 
summary pairs had similar prior belief ratings. As shown in Table 3.3, three of the four 
study summary pairs were given similar prior belief ratings.  The study pair that 
significantly differed from one another contained the between-group, interpretive error 
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manipulation.  The study that discussed children‟s impulsivity and academic achievement 
had lower prior beliefs ratings than the study that discussed the role of social monitoring 
on peoples‟ public behaviors.  Since participants‟ prior beliefs differed significantly for 
this pair, it was possible that participants would base their evaluations on whether or not 
they agreed with the study and not on the quality of the evidence.  I used a pairwise t-test 
to examine whether these two studies were given different quality ratings. As shown in 
Table 3.4, participants provided similar quality ratings, suggesting that participants‟ prior 
beliefs about the study did not translate to providing different quality ratings. 
 
Participants’ quality ratings during the non-explicit instruction condition 
I first examined whether participants noticed when evidence contained 
interpretive errors during the informal condition.  A 2 x 2 ANOVA using study design 
and interpretive error as within-subject factors revealed significant main effects.  
Between-group studies were given higher quality ratings (M = 3.63, SD = .61) than 
correlational studies (M = 3.14, SD = .64), F(1, 49) = 19.53, p < .001, p
2
 = .28.  In 
addition, studies containing interpretive errors were given lower quality ratings (M = 
3.08, SD = .63) when compared to evidence that did not contain interpretive errors (M = 
3.69, SD = .55), F(1, 49) = 39.60, p < .001, p
2
 = .44. 
There was a significant interaction between the study evidence and interpretive 
error manipulations, F(1, 49) = 16.01, p < .001, p
2
 = .24.  A post-hoc pairwise t-test 
revealed that participants gave lower quality ratings when the between-group studies 
contained interpretive errors (over-interpreting small effects as being large) compared to 
the between group studies without this error, t(49) = 6.85, p < .001.  Participants‟ quality 
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ratings for the correlational studies did not differ between those that contained an 
interpretive error (correlation-not-causation error) and those that did not. 
 
The role of instructional prompts on participants’ reasoning strategies and depth of 
scientific evaluations 
Figure 3.1 provides the mean number of the reasoning strategies by the 
instructional condition.  
Figure 3.1.  Mean experiential and scientific reasoning strategies by 
instructional condition 
 
Participants provided more opinions and explanations in the informal condition 
compared to the in the critical thinking condition, but this difference was marginally 
significant, F(1, 49) = 3.53, p < .07.   However, participants did provide significantly 
more belief and experience based evaluations in the informal condition than in the critical 
thinking condition, F(1, 49) = 22.96, p < .001, p
2
 = .32.  For the scientific evaluations, 
participants provided significantly more internal threats to validity (F(1, 49) = 51.34, p < 
.00, p
2
 = .51),  ANCOVA (F(1, 49) = 53.35, p < .00, p
2
 = .52), and methodological and 
statistical evaluations (F(1, 49) = 181.30, p < .00, p
2
 = .79) in the critical thinking 
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condition compared to the informal condition.  In line with my general predictions, 
participants provided marginally more experiential evaluations in the informal condition. 
Providing prompts for critical thinking did increase participants‟ scientific evaluations.  
Interestingly however, I found that prompting students to think critically did not 
significantly reduce experiential reasoning, as indicated by the small decrease in their 
opinion and explanation-based evaluations.  There was also a significant main effect of 
the instructional condition on participants‟ depth of scientific evaluations, F(1, 49) =  
216.09, p < .00, p
2
 = .81. Although participants‟ depth of scientific evaluations were 
greater in the critical thinking condition (M = 2.05, SD = .44) than the control condition 
(M = .94, SD = .49), both scores reflected poor scientific evaluations. 
Taken together, these results suggest that participants notice whether studies 
contain interpretive flaws or not, as indicated by their quality ratings they provided in the 
informal condition. However, participants‟ written evaluations were mostly experiential 
in this context.  It was only when explicitly prompted to think critically that they 
provided more scientifically based evaluations.  Despite being prompted to critically 
evaluate the studies, participants still provided experientially based responses.  Although 
participants‟ scientific evaluations increased in the critical thinking condition, the depth 
of their scientific evaluations remained generally low.  
 
The role of study design and evidence quality on participants’ reasoning strategies 
and depth of scientific evaluations 
Scientific reasoning strategies. In this analysis, I compared whether participants 
were able to distinguish between studies that contained and did not contain interpretive 
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errors and whether they used different scientific reasoning strategies according to the 
study design (between-group vs. correlational).  Since participants did not provide many 
scientific evaluations in the informal condition, the analyses I present are for the critical 
thinking condition only.  For each scientific reasoning strategy, I used a 2 x 2 ANOVA 
with study design and interpretive error as within-subject factors.  Tables 3.5 and 3.6 
contain the results for these analyses.  Figures 3.2 and 3.3 below provide the results 
according to interpretive error for the between-group and correlational studies, 
respectively. 
Figure 3.2.  Mean scientific reasoning strategies for between-group studies 
 
 
Figure 3.3.  Mean scientific reasoning strategies for correlational studies 
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For internal threats to validity, there were no significant main effects of study 
design or interpretive error.  However, there was a significant interaction.  Participants 
provided more internal threats to validity when the between-group studies contained 
effect size errors compared to the between-group studies that did not contain this error.  
For the ANCOVA reasoning strategies, there was a main effect for study design.  
Participants provided more ANCOVA based evaluations for the correlational studies than 
for the between-group studies. There was also a main effect for interpretive error, in 
which participants provided more ANCOVA based evaluations when the studies 
contained interpretive errors than when they did not. 
There was no main effect of study design for the methodological and statistical 
evaluations.  There was a main effect of interpretive errors.  Participants provided more 
methodological and statistical evaluations when the studies contained interpretive errors 
compared to when they did not.  There was also a significant interaction, in which 
participants provided more methodological and statistical evaluations for the between-
group studies with effect size errors compared to the between-group studies without this 
error.   
Depth of scientific evaluations.  Using the same 2 x 2 analysis, I found a main 
effect of interpretive error on participants‟ depth of scientific evaluations. Participants‟ 
depth of evaluations were higher when the studies contained flaws.  There was a also a 
significant interaction, in which participants‟ depth of evaluations were higher when the 
between-group studies contained effect size errors compared to between-group studies 
that did not contain this error (See Figure 3.4). 
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Figure 3.4.  Mean depth of scientific evaluations by interpretive error and 
study design manipulations 
 
 
 These overall results show that participants‟ evaluations differed according to 
whether or not the studies contained interpretive errors.  This difference, however, was 
mostly attributed to participants‟ evaluations of the between-group studies.   For these 
studies, participants provided less opinions and explanations while providing more 
scientifically based evaluations (internal threats to validity, methodological and statistical 
reasoning) when these studies contained weak effect sizes but were over-interpreted as 
being strong.  With regards to the correlational studies, participants‟ provided more 
ANCOVA based evaluations for the correlational studies than for the between-group 
studies, which implies that they understood that third variables could explain the 
relationship between two correlated outcomes.  They also used more ANCOVA based 
evaluations when the studies contained correlation-not-causation flaws that when they did 
not.  Although participants‟ depth of scientific evaluations were higher for the studies 
containing interpretive errors, on average, these responses reflected poor scientific 
reasoning.  
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The relationship between Need for Cognition and Actively Open-minded Thinking 
on participants’ reasoning strategies and depth of scientific evaluations 
Tables 3.7 and 3.8 provide the intercorrelations between participants‟ individual 
thinking disposition scores and the reasoning outcomes for the informal and critical 
thinking conditions, respectively.  There was a positive correlation between the actively 
open-minded thinking and the need for cognition measures (r = .64, p < .01).  A higher 
disposition towards open-mindedness was associated with a higher need for cognition. 
However, neither thinking disposition score was significantly correlated to any of the 
outcomes in the informal or critical thinking conditions.  There was only one marginal 
relationship for need for cognition in the informal condition, where a higher need for 
cognition was associated with providing more belief and experience-based evaluations (r 
=  .26, p < .07). 
For the critical thinking condition, the intercorrelations between the reasoning 
outcomes revealed some interesting relationships
1
.  Providing opinion and explanation 
based evaluation was negatively associated with providing scientifically based 
evaluations.  Additionally, the more a participant provided opinion and explanation based 
evaluations, the lower their depth of scientific evaluations (r = -.627, p < .00).  This 
pattern suggests that participants provided either opinions and explanations or scientific 
evaluations, but not both at the same time.  It also shows that despite being given explicit 
prompts for critical thinking, participants still relied on using experiential reasoning. 
                                                 
1
 Regarding the intercorrelations in the informal condition: Although all the experiential and scientific 
evaluations were positively correlated with depth of processing in this condition, it should be noted that the 
average depth of processing score was low, reflecting non-scientific evaluations.  Thus, any response would 
yield a positive relationship. 
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Another interesting finding came from the correlations between the scientific 
reasoning strategies and the depth of scientific evaluation scores.  The more a participant 
used internal threats or methodological and statistical reasoning strategies, the greater the 
depth of their evaluations.  ANCOVA reasoning, however, was not related to the depth of 
scientific evaluations.  This is likely due to the high number of instances in which 
participants simply stated the importance of a third, unobserved variable without offering 
any examples or explanations.  For instance, the following evaluation by participant 38 
reflected a common response, “I think there could be some other variables at play here.” 
Since participants‟ experiential and scientific reasoning codes were categorized 
by specific strategies, it was possible that distributing their evaluations in this manner hid 
important overarching relationships.  Therefore, I added participants‟ opinion & 
explanation and belief & experience evaluations to create a composite experiential 
reasoning score.  The same was done for participants‟ scientific reasoning strategies. 
Tables 3.9 and 3.10 provide the intercorrelations for both the informal and critical 
thinking conditions, respectively.  These composite scores, however, did not reveal any 
significant relationships between Need for Cognition or Actively Open-minded Thinking. 
 
Discussion 
The goal of Study 1 was to provide an observational account of students‟ 
experiential and scientific reasoning strategies while also examining depth of their 
scientific evaluations.  I asked students to rate the quality of study summaries, discuss the 
studies in a general fashion, and critically evaluate them.  
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In the informal condition, I found that students noticed when the studies contained 
interpretive errors, as reflected by the quality ratings they provided for each study.  This 
difference was primarily due to the between-group studies.  Students provided lower 
quality ratings when the between-group studies over-interpreted small effects compared 
to those that had large effects.  However, when asked to provide a written response, 
instead of providing a scientifically based evaluation, students preferred to evaluate the 
studies experientially. 
As expected, providing prompts for critical thinking increased scientific 
reasoning.  The pattern of students‟ scientific evaluations also revealed that they 
recognized when studies contained interpretive errors.  For the between-group studies, 
students provided more internal threats to validity and methodological and statistical 
evaluations when these studies contained effect size errors.  My findings also show that 
students were reasonably sensitive to the limitations of correlational evidence.  They 
provided more ANCOVA based evaluations when discussing correlational studies than 
when discussing between-group studies.  They also provided more ANCOVA based 
evaluations when the correlational studies contained flaws compared to when they did 
not.  Providing explicit prompts for critical thinking only marginally reduced their 
experiential responses.  It seems that despite being asked to think critically, students‟ still 
preferred to evaluate the studies by discussing their personal views and experiences.  
In line with my predictions, participants‟ depth of scientific evaluations were 
higher in the critical thinking condition compared to the informal condition.  However, it 
is important to note that even though students‟ depth of evaluations increased, their 
scores remained relatively low.  These findings show that there‟s a discrepancy between 
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the scientific evaluations students offered and the extent to how much or how well they 
explained or discuss the relevance of their scientific evaluations.   
The inconsistencies in the results raise some interesting questions.  For instance 
why did students overwhelmingly prefer to reason experientially during the informal 
condition, despite noticing the differences in the quality of the studies?  This is likely a 
limitation of the design of this study.  Students were first asked to rate the quality of the 
studies using a 5-point scale and were then asked to provide a written response to the 
question, “Have these findings affected your views about [study topic]?”  Since students 
evaluated the studies using the rating scale, students may have preferred to jump into 
discussing their personal views.  Additionally, the way the question for the written was 
framed likely encouraged students to think about their personal views and not towards 
evaluating the evidence a second time. 
Additionally, why didn‟t prompting students to think critically significantly 
reduce students‟ experiential reasoning and why did the depth of students‟ scientific 
evaluations remain low in this condition? One possible reason is because the participants 
were composed of freshmen and sophomore students.  Compared to juniors or seniors, 
this sample of students may have few experiences taking statistics or research methods 
courses, which teach students to evaluate evidence using scientific principles of 
reasoning.  Therefore, students‟ tendency to provide experiential evaluations may not 
entirely reflect a preference for reasoning experientially.  Instead, it may simply reflect 
the default reasoning strategy students‟ go to when uncertain about how to evaluate 
information scientifically. 
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Previous research has found links between thinking dispositions and peoples‟ 
reasoning outcomes, where a higher need for cognition and open-mindedness is 
positively associated with using more effort when evaluating information and avoiding 
biased reasoning (Cacioppo et al., 1983; Macpherson & Stanovich, 2007; Stanovich & 
West, 1998, 2008).  However, I did not find the predicted relationship between either 
disposition on the observed reasoning outcomes.  This may be because much of the work 
on individual thinking dispositions has been done under the context of evaluating 
controversial texts, which is thought to activate more biased forms of reasoning 
(Klaczynski et al., 1997).  Therefore, it is possible that individual thinking dispositions do 
not inform how people reason when evaluating information and evidence impartial to a 
particular point of view.  However, further research is needed to understand the 
relationships students‟ dispositions share with ability to evaluate evidence. 
Finally, the intercorrelations between students‟ scientific reasoning and the depth 
of their evaluations revealed some important relationships.  When students were asked to 
critically evaluate the studies, the more they provided internal threats and methodological 
and statistical evaluations, the higher their depth of their evaluations.  But this wasn‟t the 
case for ANCOVA reasoning.  This implies that participants do not spend much effort 
discussing the role of third variables when using this strategy to evaluate evidence.  
 
Limitations & Conclusions 
There are several considerations to take into account when interpreting these 
findings.  First, the sample only consisted of freshmen and sophomore students.  
Compared to more advanced students, they may have the least sophisticated reasoning 
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skills.  Another issue involves the within-group manipulation.  Since students had already 
seen the studies during the informal condition, this could have affected how they 
evaluated the studies during the critical thinking condition.  Another limitation involved 
the study summaries themselves.  None of the summaries contained a formal title, which 
would have helped students clearly identify what claims were being made from the 
studies.  Because of this, students may have not understood the materials as easily as they 
would have otherwise.  These summaries also contained detailed information about the 
study‟s methods, materials, designs, and controls, which may have made it demanding to 
comprehend.  Although my intention for including detailed descriptions was so students 
could closely examine the measures and the general design of the study, the major 
drawback of providing this level of detail, however, was that it may have placed high 
demands on working memory, which is known to effect how well people can reason 
about information (De Neys, 2006).  Finally, since the study was conducted online, it is 
unclear how engaged participants‟ were while taking the study. 
 Despite these limitations, however, this study provides a unique insight into the 
nature of students‟ critical thinking development by showing how students reason when 
evaluating research evidence.  These observations revealed that students primarily relied 
on experiential systems of reasoning when thinking about evidence in an informal 
context.  Although students noticed when studies contain interpretive flaws, they did not 
readily offer scientific evaluations unless explicitly instructed to do so.  Additionally, 
even when given clear instructions for critical thinking, students still showed a preference 
for reasoning experientially, which may reflect a natural tendency for people to think 
about their views and experiences or a default strategy for reasoning people are uncertain.  
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By using this dual process approach, this study was effective in showing that 
underclassmen students use more experiential than scientific forms of reasoning as part of 
their repertoire for evaluating research evidence. 
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CHAPTER IV 
Study 2 
Recent work by Arum and Roska (2011) has sounded some alarms showing that 
students are not gaining many critical thinking skills within the first two years of college.  
This is especially the case regarding students‟ ability to critically evaluate claims and 
arguments.  Findings from another studies have also led scholars to question whether 
college students‟ are developing the necessary scientific reasoning skills that are needed 
to think critically (Mill et al., 1994).  Although more work is necessary to fully 
understand this issue, it has led educators to seriously reflect on whether college is 
actually teaching students important critical thinking skills (Kuhn, 2009; Kuhn et al., 
2008; Leshowitz, 1989). 
Despite the number of studies that have examined college students‟ critical 
thinking development, few studies have attempted to examine how students reason when 
evaluating claims.  Traditional measures have relied on using multiple choice and Likert-
type scale items to reflect whether students are thinking critically (Lehman & Nisbett, 
1990; Pascarella et al., 1996; Terenzini et al., 1995).  Although this provides us with a 
general indicator of students‟ critical thinking skills, it does little to reveal the process of 
how students arrived at a given response.  Other work has used more informative 
measures that asks students to provide written evaluations, which are then used to 
examine the depth of their evaluations (Arum & Roska, 2011; Fong & Nisbett, 1991; 
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Klaczynski et al., 1997).  This provides a better index of whether or not students are 
providing informed and well justified evaluations, but scoring students‟ responses in this 
way obscures the reasoning strategies students use to do so. 
Dual process models of reasoning, which assumes that people utilize either 
intuitive-experiential systems or rational-analytic systems, provides a valuable 
framework for understanding the nature of students‟ critical thinking development.  
When evaluating claims and arguments, individuals can rely on their intuitive 
impressions, personal beliefs, or experiences to judge their validity.  However, 
individuals may also think more rationally and analytically, in which they devote 
considerable effort towards evaluating the validity of a claims‟ supporting evidence.  As 
prior work has demonstrated, people in general prefer to utilize intuitive-experiential 
reasoning when evaluating information and evidence, since it is a fast and cognitively 
frugal strategy for processing information (Evans, 2003; Evans & Frankish, 2009; 
Stanovich, 1999).  This work has also shown, however, that intuitive-experiential 
reasoning can undermine the critical thinking process, since this form of reasoning can 
lead to making biased inferences from information and evidence (Amsel et al., 2008; De 
Neys, 2006; Evans, 1998; Evans et al., 2001).  What dual process models do not fully 
emphasize, however, is how domain knowledge plays a role in shaping individuals‟ 
preference for using either intuitive-experiential or rational-analytic processes when 
evaluating evidence. 
Domain-general scientific knowledge helps students discern strong from weak 
evidence when evaluating claims and arguments (Leshowitz et al., 2002; Schunn & 
Anderson, 1999). Without this knowledge, students‟ effortful evaluations may be 
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misguided or underdeveloped.  In examining students‟ critical thinking development, I 
argue that college helps students reason more rationally-analytically by teaching them 
important scientific reasoning skills.  Like Study 1, the goal of this study was to provide 
an observational account of students‟ experiential reasoning (Opinions & Explanations 
and Beliefs & Experiences) and scientific reasoning strategies (Internal Threats to 
Validity, ANCOVA Reasoning, and Methodological & Statistical Reasoning).  Unique to 
this study, however, is that I observe a group of freshmen and seniors majoring in 
psychology. 
I chose to study seniors majoring in psychology because, as previous work has 
shown, the training social science majors receive while in college teaches them principles 
of scientific reasoning that are relevant for thinking critically (King et al., 1990; Lehman 
et al., 1988; Lehman & Nisbett, 1990; Pascarella et al., 1996; Schraw et al., 1995).  For 
instance, psychology majors are required to take research methods and applied statistics 
courses, which teach them to think about how experiments are designed, how variables 
are operationalized and measured, and how to appropriately interpret scientific results.  
Students also take theoretical courses in which they learn how theories of human 
behavior are developed, tested, confirmed, revised, or rejected as new evidence becomes 
available.  Because of these experiences, psychology majors will have the appropriate 
domain-general scientific skills that help them evaluate evidence-based claims, especially 
when compared to freshmen students who may enter college with little scientific training. 
The second goal of my study was to understand whether anecdotal stories 
significantly influenced how students perceived and evaluated evidence. Some work has 
found that when students are presented with alluring information, such as descriptions or 
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images of brain scans, they view psychological studies more favorably (McCabe & 
Castel, 2008; Weisberg, Keil, Goodstein, Rawson, & Gray, 2008).  This is also the case 
for anecdotal stories.  Prior work has shown that when an anecdotal narrative is paired 
alongside statistical evidence, people view the evidence more favorably (Dahlstrom, 
2010; Winterbottom et al., 2008).  In terms of understanding how anecdotes influence the 
reasoning process, when anecdotes imply that some causal relationship has occurred, this 
activates experiential reasoning, in which individuals quickly based their judgments on 
whether or not the story fits with their prior beliefs and personal experiences.  My study 
considers whether alluring anecdotal stories influence students reduces students‟ ability 
to reason scientifically when evaluating evidence.  Although seniors may be better able to 
reason scientifically, not much is known about whether they are able to resist being 
persuaded by alluring anecdotal stories. 
 The final goal of this study was to examine whether students‟ thinking 
dispositions and epistemic beliefs differed by class standing and whether these 
differences were related to students‟ ability to reason more scientifically.  For this study, I 
examined two thinking disposition measures: the Rational-Experiential Inventory and the 
Actively Open-minded Thinking Scale. The rational-experiential inventory captures 
differences in students‟ preference for thinking either more intuitive-experientially or 
rational-analytically (Epstein et al., 1996).  The rational-experiential inventory has been 
correlated with providing more in-depth scientific evaluations and avoiding belief-bias 
reasoning (Klaczynski et al., 1997; Pacini & Epstein, 1999).  The actively open-minded 
thinking scale, which assesses the extent to which individuals are open to different 
viewpoints and have flexible modes of thinking, have also been associated with avoiding 
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biased reasoning (Stanovich & West, 1997; Toplak & Stanovich, 2002; West et al., 
2008).  Although both dispositions have important implications for understanding the 
sources of belief-bias reasoning, not much work has explored whether exposure to 
college is related to students self-reported preference for thinking more rational-
analytically and think more open-mindedly.  
I also consider how students‟ epistemic beliefs differ as a function of years in 
college.  The work on epistemic beliefs has demonstrated that college helps students 
think more reflectively about the nature and sources of knowledge (King & Kitchener, 
1994; King et al., 1990; Kuhn, 1992).  Whereas freshmen reason about knowledge in pre-
reflective terms, in that knowledge is either right or wrong, college seniors understand the 
idea that knowledge is constructed through evidence, that knowledge can be revised or 
changed in light of new evidence, and that the accumulation of evidence helps establish 
the certainty of knowledge.  For this study, I use the Epistemic Beliefs about 
Psychological Research scale, which assess the extent to which individuals endorse the 
idea that scientific findings can eventually lead establishing that a theory is certain and 
that one can trust the opinions of a scientific expert over one‟s own (Estes et al., 2003).  
Examining differences in student‟s rational-experiential dispostion, actively open-minded 
thinking, and epistemic beliefs can help us understand how college impacts these more 
reflective aspects of college students‟ critical thinking skills, especially with regards to 
students‟ ability to decouple their previous beliefs from examining the evidence at hand.  
 Unique to this study is that students are asked to evaluate articles that resemble 
short scientific news reports.  Since these reports commonly include short anecdotal 
stories, it was a good platform for understanding how anecdotes influence reasoning in 
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everyday settings.  In order to assess students‟ reasoning outcomes, I developed a 
paradigm based on King & Kitcheners‟ (1994) Reflective Judgment Interview.  Students 
were asked to rate the extent to which they agreed with the claims in the articles.  
Additionally, they were asked to provide a written response describing why they agreed 
or disagreed.  These responses where then used to examine whether they provided 
intuitive-experiential or scientifically based reasons.  Like Study 1, I also coded for 
students‟ depth of scientific evaluations. 
I also asked students to evaluate the studies using a more established experiment 
evaluation scale in order to examine whether observing students‟ reasoning strategies 
correlated with this scale.  Although not the main focus of my study, I also examined 
whether intellectual ability was correlated to students‟ reasoning outcomes.  Prior work 
has demonstrated that intellectual ability is uncorrelated to the ability to avoid biased 
reasoning (Macpherson & Stanovich, 2007; Stanovich, 1999, 2009; Stanovich & West, 
2008). Therefore, I asked students to provide their ACT scores in order to examine 
whether this index of intellectual ability was also unrelated to evaluating evidence-based 
claims.   
 I had three general predictions.  First, I predicted that seniors majoring in 
psychology would demonstrate stronger critical thinking skills than would freshmen.  
This would be reflected by providing lower agreement ratings, providing more 
scientifically reasoned evaluations, having higher depth of scientific evaluation scores, 
and providing lower experiment evaluation ratings.  Second, I predicted that seniors 
would be less influenced by anecdotal stories than would freshmen.  Third, I predicted 
that students‟ thinking dispositions would differ by class standing, where seniors would 
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report being more rationally-oriented, more open-minded, and have greater reflective 
beliefs about the nature of knowledge than freshmen.  I also expected these dispositions 
to be associated with using less experiential reasoning, more scientific reasoning, and 
demonstrating less belief-bias reasoning than freshmen. 
 
Methods 
Participants 
 Ninety-four college students (62 female, 32 male) from the University of 
Michigan participated in this study. Of these students, 48 were freshmen and 46 were 
seniors.  The majority of the participants were Caucasian (72%), followed by East Asian 
(12%), and African American (7%).  For the freshmen participants, their mean age was 
18.29 years (SD = .05) and reported being enrolled for a year or less at the university.  Of 
these participants, 46 percent reported majoring or intending to major in psychology, 33 
percent declared another major, and 21 percent were undecided.  The seniors in the study 
had an average age of 21.39 years (SD = .95) and reported being enrolled for an average 
of 4.80 years (SD = .58).   All of the seniors reported that they were psychology majors.   
Most of the freshmen and all the seniors were recruited through postings 
advertising the study.  Some of the freshmen sample was obtained from the psychology 
subject pool at the University of Michigan.  
 
Procedure 
 The study was conducted in a lab containing desktop computers, which were 
separated by privacy screens.  The study session was conducted with groups of four or 
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fewer and took an hour to complete.  The study was displayed using Qualtrics.com, a 
web-based survey site.  Although the study was displayed over a web-browser, the 
browser was set to full-screen mode so that the study content was the only information 
visible to the participant.  Participants were told that they would read eight articles 
describing psychological studies and that the goal of the study was to understand their 
thoughts regarding each article. 
Participants were randomly assigned to either the anecdote or control condition.  
For the anecdote condition, each article began with an anecdotal story followed by a 
description of the study.  The articles in the control condition only contained the 
description of the study.  Each individual study was presented independently from one 
another and the Qualtrics survey program randomly determined the order of presentation. 
When participants saw each article for the first time, they were asked, “Do you 
agree with the claim made in the article?” and responded using a 4-point scale (1 = 
strongly disagree, … 4 = strongly agree).  They also provided a written response to the 
statement, “Please describe why you agreed or disagreed with this claim.”  Afterwards, 
participants were shown the articles a second time and asked to evaluate the studies using 
an experiment evaluation scale (Macpherson & Stanovich, 2007).  After evaluating the 
articles, participants completed two thinking disposition measures, an epistemic belief 
measure, background questions, and questions that assessed their prior beliefs and 
scientific knowledge.  Participants who were recruited through the posting 
advertisements were given $15 compensation.  The subject-pool participants were given 
course credit in exchange for participating.  Since the concluding procedures differed for 
the recruited and subject-pool participants, both groups were studied in separate sessions.   
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Materials 
 Study Articles.  I developed a set of eight articles intended to mimic short 
scientific news reports.  The articles were written in a non-technical style and covered 
various psychological topics.  Each article contained a title, which made a claim about the 
study (e.g., “Introverted Partners Decrease Marital Satisfaction”).  This was then 
followed by a short description of the study, which included information about the 
sample characteristics, the sample size, procedures, measures, the results of the study, 
and a conclusion.  Many details were intentionally left out in order to encourage 
skepticism towards the articles.  For the anecdote condition, the article began with an 
anecdotal story describing scenarios intended to supported the claim being made form the 
described study.  The control condition only contained the title of the article and the 
description of the study.  Refer to Appendix B for the articles.   Also refer to Appendices 
C through G for the individual measures and background questions that were used in this 
study.  
   Study Article Manipulations.  For both anecdote and control conditions, the 
articles differed by study design (between-group vs. correlational).  Four of the articles 
described between-group studies, which examined how two groups differed on an 
outcome.  The other four articles described correlational studies, which examined the 
relationship between two different variables.   Unlike Study 1, however, all of the studies 
contained interpretive errors.  The between-group studies contained effect size errors, 
which the reported differences between the two groups were questionably small.  For 
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example, one of the between-group studies examining differences in siblings‟ creativity 
reported, 
 
As part of a recent study, researchers followed 542 sibling pairs.  The oldest child, 
who was 10-12 years old, was given a standard creativity assessment.  The 
younger sibling was assessed years later, the age when their older sibling had 
taken the assessment.  The study found differences in creative abilities between 
siblings.  Younger siblings‟ creativity scores were 2 points higher than older 
siblings‟ scores. 
 
The correlational studies contained correlation-not-causation errors, in which the findings 
were misinterpreted as having causal relationships. The correlational study examining the 
relationship between social lifestyles and memory read, 
 
 In a recent study, researchers followed 481 retired adults between 70-85 years of 
age.  They surveyed the number of social activities they engaged in during a given 
week and assessed their short-term memory.  The study found a positive 
correlation between the two variables.  Having an active social lifestyle increased 
retired adults‟ short-term memory.  In contrast, having an inactive social lifestyle 
decreased their short-term memory. 
 
 
 
Measures 
Experiential and scientific evaluation scoring.  I used the same procedures as in 
Study 1 to code and score participants‟ experiential and scientific evaluations.  
Participants‟ evaluations were not mutually exclusive to one reasoning strategy, since 
participants often included more than one type of evaluation in their responses. 
 The two experiential strategies were Opinions & Explanations and Belief & 
Experiences. The Opinions & Explanations code was assigned when a participant stated 
their views and opinions about the study or offered a personal explanation but did not 
explicitly refer to their beliefs or experiences as being a primary source for these 
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responses (e.g., regarding the article on birth order and creativity, participant 9 
responded, “I do not believe there is any correlation between birth order and creativity.  I 
feel that being born second would have nothing to do with the ability of one's 
creativity.”). The Beliefs & Experiences code, on the other hand, occurred when 
participants explicitly referred to their personal beliefs, experience, or values (e.g., 
participant 87 responded, “Considering that I‟m a younger sibling, I feel that younger 
siblings are far more creative than their older siblings.  They have a great imagination and 
more inspiration to do creative things such as drawing, observing, and building things.”) 
The three scientific evaluations were Internal Threats to Validity, ANCOVA 
Reasoning, and Methodological & Statistical Reasoning.  The Internal Threats to 
Validity code captured when participants identified something inherent in the study 
design they believed jeopardized the validity of the study, such as experimenter and 
participant effects, testing errors, and faulty measures (e.g., participant 63 responded, 
“…Also, this is a poor assessment of identifying creativity because the subjects are 
siblings.  The older who took the test beforehand could have told the younger sibling 
about the test which could account for the younger sibling doing better on the test.”).  The 
ANCOVA Reasoning code captured when participants stated the importance of some third 
variable that could change the results of the study (e.g., participant 17 responded, “There 
could be other factors at play here, such as perhaps the parents give the younger child 
more attention than the older child, and that attention could be the cause of differences in 
creative ability, not just their birth order.”). The Methodological & Statistical Reasoning 
code captured participants‟ methodological evaluations, such as critiquing how the 
participants were sampled, how the responses were quantified, the sequence of the 
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procedures, and the strength of the findings (e.g., participant 72 responded, “If the study 
were to be more valid, and the claim more believable, the experiment should have tested 
each sibling at the same time, not at the same age. When the older sibling took the 
assessment, so should have the younger sibling on the same day.”). 
Depth of scientific evaluations.  This was similar to Study 1 in that I assessed the 
degree to which participants‟ scientific evaluations were reasonably explained and 
sensitive to noticing interpretive errors.  However, since all of the articles in this study 
contained interpretive errors, I modified my scoring to capture when participants‟ 
identified these errors, which is similar to that of Fong and Nisbetts‟ (1991) and 
Klaczynski and colleagues‟ (1997) schemes.  I used a four-point system to code 
participants‟ depth of scientific evaluations.  
1 = a non-scientific evaluation captured when participants did not evaluate the 
study scientifically and instead used their opinions and explanations or belief and 
experiences.  For the article reporting on active social lifestyles and memory, participant 
33 responded, “I agree with the study because the more you use your mind the stronger it 
remains. Your mind is like any other muscle. The more you use it, the better you will be.” 
2 = a poor scientific evaluation captured when participants provided a scientific 
evaluation or statement but did not clearly explain how their evaluations were relevant or 
important for understanding the quality or the validity of the study.  Participant 82 
responded, “There may have been other variables to account for their better short-term 
memory.” 
3 = a good scientific evaluation captured when participants attempted to relate 
their scientific evaluations to understanding the quality and validity of the study. 
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Participant 38 responded, “…I wouldn't say that being social alone increases memory -
there are a lot of factors that need to be addressed in this study, especially illnesses that 
target cognitive processes in the elderly. For example someone with Alzheimer‟s 
probably has a lower working memory and less social interaction as well.” 
4 = a strong scientific evaluation captured when participants noticed the 
interpretive errors in the study.  Participant 89 responded, “I disagree because just 
because the two variables are positively correlated does not mean that socializing causes 
better memory. It could equally be asserted that having a better memory causes a person 
to socialize more.”  For the article regarding siblings and creativity, participant 29 
responded, “Though it may have a small effect, the test scores increased only by 2 points 
and this can be accredited to chance and not necessarily to birth order.” 
Reasoning strategies and depth of scientific evaluation scoring procedures. A 
composite score was calculated by summing the total number of coded observations 
across the eight study articles. The depth of scientific evaluation score was the averaged 
score across all the articles or across the articles with similar study designs (between-
group vs. correlational).  Two trained researchers independently coded participants‟ 
reasoning strategies and depth of scientific evaluation scores. 
Experiment Evaluation Scale. After rating whether they agreed with the articles 
and providing written justifications, participants were asked to re-read and evaluate the 
articles using an experiment evaluation scale (Macpherson & Stanovich, 2007).  This 
scale asked participants to evaluate the study summaries on three dimensions:  the 
strength of the claim, the persuasiveness of the study, and overall quality of the study.  
These questions read as follows:  How strongly is the claim supported by the results of 
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the study?; How persuasive was this study?; What is your overall evaluation of the 
quality of this study?  Participants responded to these questions using a 6-point scale, 
where 1 represented an unfavorable evaluation and 6 represented a favorable one.  I 
obtained a composite experiment evaluation score by summing the score for the three 
questions for each summary.  Scores between 3 and 6 represented unfavorable 
evaluations, scores between 9-12 represented slightly unfavorable to slightly favorable 
evaluations, and scores above 13 represented favorable evaluations. 
Actively Open-minded Thinking Scale. This 41-item scale assessed 
participants‟ degree of openness to different views and beliefs and flexible thinking 
(Stanovich & West, 1997).   Responses are on a 6-point scale, ranging from “disagree 
strongly” to “agree strongly.” Scores between 41 and 82 represents having closed-minded 
views towards other beliefs and rigid modes of thinking, scores between 83 and 123 
represents having slightly narrow to slightly open-minded views, and scores above 165 
represents having open-minded views towards other beliefs and flexible modes of 
thinking. 
Rational-Experiential Inventory.  The 40-item Rational-Experiential Inventory 
(Epstein et al., 1996) measured participants‟ preference for thinking using either 
intuitive-experiential or rational-analytic systems.  Eighteen statements reflect a 
preference for thinking analytically (e.g., Using logic usually works well for me in 
figuring out problems in my life.), whereas twenty-two statements reflect a preference for 
thinking intuitively (e.g., I hardly ever go wrong when I listen to my deepest gut feelings 
to find an answer).  Participants were asked to agree or disagree with the statements using 
the following 5-point scale, ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.” Scores 
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between 40 and 80 represents having a strong to moderate preference towards intuitive-
experiential thinking, between 81 and 120 represents having a slight preference for 
intuitive-experiential to a slight preference for rational-analytical thinking, and scores 
above 121 represents having a moderate to strong preference for rational-analytical 
thinking.   
Epistemic Beliefs About Psychological Research Scale (EBPR) (Estes et al., 
2003).  This scale asks participants‟ to agree or disagree with 4 statements regarding 
one‟s certainty about social scientific knowledge and one‟s confidence in scientific 
experts.  In Estes and colleagues‟ (2003) study, participants were told that the statements 
referred to research on children‟s psychological health and development.  However, since 
the articles in this study discussed a wide range of age groups, the word „children‟ was 
taken out so the instructions read, “The following statements refer to research on 
psychological health and development.”  Responses were on a 7-point scale, ranging 
from “disagree very strongly” to “agree very strongly.”  Two epistemic beliefs sub-scores 
were obtained by summing the two items regarding the certainty of social scientific 
knowledge and the two items regarding confidence towards scientific experts.  
Participants scoring between 4 and 5 disagreed with the view that scientific knowledge 
could be certain and that scientific experts‟ opinions could be trusted over one‟s own 
opinion.  Those scoring between 6 and 9 were uncertain.  Participants scoring above 10 
agreed with the view that scientific knowledge could be certain and that scientific 
experts‟ opinions could be trusted over their own. 
Prior beliefs.  Participants were shown the title for each article (e.g., “Active 
Social Lifestyles Improves Retired Adults‟ Memory”) and asked to respond to the 
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statement, “Prior to completing this study, the above claim would’ve fit with my beliefs 
and experiences.”  Participants‟ rated their level of agreement on a 4-point scale, ranging 
from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.” 
SAT and ACT scores.  Participants provided self-reports of their SAT and/or 
ACT composite scores.  If participants didn‟t fully remember their scores, they were 
asked to estimate what they think they received.  The SAT scores were not used in the 
analysis because these responses were noticeably varied, in that participants provided 
different combinations of their math, witting, critical reading, multiple choice, and essay 
scores.   
Scientific knowledge.  I assessed participants‟ knowledge about the scientific 
method using five questions.  Participants were asked, “Are you familiar with the general 
principles of the scientific method?”  Two additional questions asked if they were 
familiar with the principles regarding between-group and correlational designs.  At the 
end of the survey, participants were also asked where they were familiar about effect size 
and correlation-not-causation errors.  These questions read, “Are you familiar with the 
idea that one must examine the size of the quantitative research effect (a.k.a. effect size) 
in order to determine how large or important the result is?,” and “Are you familiar with 
the idea that just because two variables are correlated doesn’t mean that one causes the 
other?”  Participants‟ rated their knowledge confidence on a 5-point scale, ranging from 
“not at all familiar” to “very familiar.”  I created a scientific knowledge score by 
averaging the scores across the five question items. 
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Results 
Descriptive statistics for the outcome measures 
Table 4.1 list participants‟ individual differences measures and their evaluative 
outcomes.  In regards to their overall evaluations, participants neither agreed nor 
disagreed with the claims in the article (M = 2.52, SD = .40).  Also, compared to other 
reasoning strategies, participants preferred to use opinion and explanation based 
reasoning when describing why they agreed or disagreed with the claims. These 
descriptive results also show that participants did not use many scientific evaluations.  
Regarding the low instances of belief and experience based responses, it is 
important to note that this was primarily the result of how this response was coded.  This 
code was only assigned when participants explicitly referred to some belief or 
experience.  It is just as likely that participants‟ opinion and explanation were based on 
personal beliefs or experiences.  However, participants‟ opinions and explanations were 
not informative enough to confirm this with certainty (e.g., regarding the article on birth 
order and creativity, participant 10 responded, “I agree with this statement because birth 
order has a lot to do with who someone might turn out to be.”). 
 
The role of anecdotal information on freshmen and seniors’ agreement ratings 
 For this analysis, I used a 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA with anecdotal information and class 
standing as between-subjects factors and study design as a within subject factor (sex was 
included as a covariate).  Tables 4.2 and 4.3 provides the mean agreement ratings and the 
analyses for the three factors, respectively.  Below, Figure 4.1 presents the mean 
agreement ratings. 
 101 
Figure 4.1.  Mean agreement ratings by class standing and anecdote 
condition 
 
 
I found a significant main effect for anecdotal information, F(1, 89) = 11.78, p < 
.001, p
2
 = .12.  Participants in the anecdote condition agreed more with the claims in the 
article than participants in the control.  There was also a main effect for class standing, 
where seniors agreed less with the claims in the article than freshmen, F(1, 89) = 18.35, p 
< .000, p
2
 = .17.  There was no significant interaction between the anecdotal information 
and class standing. Instead, a linear relationship was found.  Although the anecdotal 
information influenced participants‟ agreement ratings, freshmen agreed more with the 
claims than seniors.  The same trend was found for the control condition; participants in 
the control condition agreed less with the claims, but seniors agreed even less so than 
freshmen.  When examining the study design factor, both freshmen and seniors‟ 
agreement ratings did not differ for the articles containing either between-group or 
correlational designs.     
 
The role of anecdotal information on freshmen and seniors’ reasoning strategies and 
depth of scientific evaluations 
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Reasoning Strategies. For these analyses, I used the same 2 x 2 x 2 design to 
examine participants‟ experiential and scientific reasoning strategies.  The means for each 
reasoning strategy are presented in Table 4.4 and analyses for the three factors are 
presented in Table 4.5.  Figures 4.2 and 4.3 presents the mean reasoning strategies by the 
anecdote condition for the freshmen and seniors, respectively. 
 
Figure 4.2. Freshmen students’ reasoning strategies by anecdote condition 
 
 
Figure 4.3. Senior students’ reasoning strategies by anecdote condition 
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For the main effects, participants in the anecdote condition gave marginally more 
opinion and explanation-based responses than participants in the control condition, F(1, 
89) = 3.52, p < .06, p
2
.  There was no main effect for the beliefs and experience-based 
responses.  The results for the scientific reasoning strategies supported my general 
predictions.  Although the number of internal threats to validity participants provided 
were virtually non-existent, participants in the anecdote condition provided significantly 
more internal threats to validity than participants in the control condition, F(1, 89) = 4.17, 
p < .04, p
2
 = .05.  This was also the case for ANCOVA reasoning, although these results 
were marginally significant, F(1, 89) = 3.79, p < .055, p
2
 = .04.  Participants in the 
anecdote condition also used more methodological and statistical reasoning than 
participants in the control, F(1, 89) = 8.37, p <.005, p
2
 = .09. 
 For class standing, seniors provided significantly less opinions and explanations 
than freshmen, F(1, 89) = 39.88, p < .0001, p
2
 = .31, and provided more methodological 
and statistical evaluations compared to freshmen, F(1, 89) = 25.37, p < .0001, p
2
 = .22.  
There were no interactions between anecdotal information and class standing.  Like 
before, this relationship was linear, in which anecdotal information influenced freshmen‟s 
reasoning strategies more than it influenced seniors‟ reasoning strategies.  Finally, there 
were no main effects of study design on any of the reasoning strategies.  Participants 
provided the same reasoned responses for the articles containing between-group and 
correlational designs. 
 Depth of scientific evaluations.  I used the same 2 x 2 x 2 design to examine 
participants‟ depth of scientific evaluations.  The means of depth of scientific evaluation 
scores are presented in Table 4.6 and analyses for the three factors are presented in Table 
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4.7.  Below, Figure 4.4 shows participants depth of scientific evaluations by the anecdote 
condition and class standing.   
Figure 4.4. Mean depth of scientific evaluations by class standing and 
anecdote condition 
 
 
As expected, participants in the anecdote condition had a lower depth of scientific 
evaluations than participants in the control condition, F(1, 89) = 10.60, p < .002, p
2
 = 
.11.  Seniors‟ depth of scientific evaluations were higher than freshmen, F(1, 89) = 34.37, 
p < .0001, p
2
 = .28.  Although there was no significant interaction, the same linear trend 
was found. For the anecdote condition, seniors had a higher depth of scientific 
evaluations score than freshmen.  Although the depth of evaluations was greater in the 
control condition, seniors showed even greater depth of evaluations than freshmen.  
There were no significant main effects for study design.  Participants‟ depth of scientific 
evaluations was similar for articles containing between-group and correlational designs. 
 
The role of anecdotal information on freshmen and seniors’ experiment evaluation 
ratings 
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 Using the same 2 x 2 x 2 analyses as before, I found that the main effects of 
anecdotes supported my predictions.  The mean experiment evaluation ratings are 
presented in Table 4.8 and analyses for the three factors are presented in Table 4.9. 
Participants in the anecdote condition provided significantly more favorable experiment 
evaluation ratings than participants in the control, F(1, 89) = 18.28,  p < .0001, p
2
 = 17.  
There was also a main effect of class standing, where seniors‟ experiment evaluation 
ratings were less favorable than freshmen‟s‟ experiment evaluation ratings, F(1, 89) = 
10.49, p < .002, p
2
 = .11.  There was no significant interaction (See Figure 4.5). 
Figure 4.5.  Mean experiment evaluation ratings by class standing and 
anecdote condition 
 
 
 With regards to the study design, across both anecdote and control conditions, 
participants gave more favorable experiment evaluation ratings to articles containing 
correlational studies (M = 10.52, SD = 3.03) than articles containing between-group 
studies (M = 9.81, SD = 2.60), F(1, 89) = 3.97, p < .05, p
2
 = .04. 
 
Differences between freshmen and seniors’ ACT scores, thinking dispositions, 
epistemic beliefs, and scientific knowledge 
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 Table 4.10 displays the pairwise t-tests examining whether freshmen and seniors 
differed in their individual characteristics.  
Table 4.10. Paired t-test of freshmen and seniors' individual 
difference measures 
Variable Freshmen Seniors paired t-test 
ACT Score (n = 83) 28.50 (2.83) 27.80 (3.68) .98 
REI 126.46 (13.17) 125.09 (11.97) .53 
AOT 178.46 (17.17) 186.08 (17.36) -2.23* 
EB Certainty 9.33 (1.83) 8.96 (1.81) 1.00 
EB Confidence 11.27 (1.62) 10.98 (1.91) .80 
Scientific Knowledge 3.52 (.64) 4.35 (.50) -6.92*** 
*p < .05, ***p < .001   
 
There were no differences in ACT scores between freshmen and seniors.  For the 
thinking disposition measures, I predicted that seniors would report having higher 
actively open-minded thinking that freshmen.  This prediction was confirmed. Although 
both groups rated themselves as having moderate open-minded views, seniors reported a 
greater preference for open-mindedness than freshmen.  However, freshmen and seniors‟ 
rational-experiential scores were not significantly different; both groups rated themselves 
as having a moderate preference for thinking rationally.  I also predicted that seniors 
would have more reflective epistemic beliefs about scientific knowledge than freshmen, 
but these results were insignificant.  Both freshmen and seniors somewhat agreed with 
the idea that scientific knowledge could eventually be certain and that they would trust 
the opinions of scientific authorities over their own.  Regarding participants‟ scientific 
knowledge, seniors reported having a greater familiarity with the principles of the 
scientific method than freshmen. 
 
Intercorrelations between participants’ individual difference measures and their 
reasoning outcomes 
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 For the following intercorrelations, I created a composite experiential reasoning 
score, which was the sum of the opinions & explanations and the beliefs & experiences 
scores.  I also created a composite scientific reasoning score by summing the three 
scientific reasoning strategy scores.  Table 4.11 presents the intercorrelations between the 
individual differences measures (ACT scores, rational-experiential ratings, open-
mindedness ratings, epistemic beliefs ratings, prior beliefs, scientific knowledge) and five 
evaluative outcomes (agreement ratings, experiential reasoning, scientific reasoning, 
depth of processing scores, experiment evaluation ratings).  The eleven participants who 
did not provide ACT scores (4 freshmen and 7 seniors) were excluded from this analysis.  
 Intercorrelations between the individual difference measures.  The ACT 
scores were not related to the thinking disposition or epistemic belief scores.  
Participants‟ intellectual ability, as indicated by the ACT score, was not related to other 
individual measures.  There were no significant relationships between the rational-
experiential inventory, the actively open-minded thinking scale, or the epistemic beliefs 
scales.  There was positive relationship with the rational-experiential inventory and 
scientific knowledge, where participants who reported a greater preference for thinking 
rationally also reported having greater scientific knowledge. 
The actively open-minded thinking scale was positively related to the epistemic 
beliefs scale assessing confidence in scientific authorities.  Participants who reported 
being more open-minded were more likely to agree that they would trust the opinions of a 
scientific expert over their own opinions.  Actively open-minded thinking was also 
positively related to scientific knowledge. 
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 Relationship between the individual difference measures and reasoning 
outcomes.  ACT scores were not associated with any of the reasoning outcome.  These 
findings support previous research showing the ability to evaluate evidence is 
independent of cognitive ability.  In line with my predictions, I found that actively open-
minded thinking was significantly related to participants‟ reasoning outcomes.  
Participants who reported being more open-minded provided less experiential reasoning 
(r = -.27, p < .01), more scientific reasoning (r =  .27, p < .01), had greater depth of 
processing (r = .30, p < .01), and provided lower experiment evaluation ratings (r = -.23, 
p < .05).  I also predicted the same relationship for the rational-experiential inventory.  
However, I found no relationships for this individual measure on the observed reasoning 
outcomes.  The results for the epistemic belief measures were mixed.  These results were 
either non-significant or were related in the opposite direction from what I expected.  For 
instance, regarding participants‟ certainty of scientific knowledge, the more a participant 
agreed with the idea the scientific evidence could eventually be certain, the more 
favorable experiment evaluation ratings they provided (r = .23, p < .05).  
 Prior beliefs were significantly correlated with all of the evaluative outcomes. 
Participants who stated that the claims in the article fit their beliefs and experiences gave 
higher agreement ratings, provided more experiential reasoning, less scientific reasoning, 
had lower depth of scientific evaluations, and provided more favorable experiment 
evaluation ratings.  As predicted, scientific knowledge was significantly correlated with 
all of the evaluate outcomes. Participants with greater scientific knowledge gave lower 
agreement ratings, provided less experiential reasoning, more scientific reasoning, had 
higher depth of processing, and provided less favorable experiment evaluation ratings.  
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Interestingly, actively open-minded thinking was not related to prior beliefs.  This may 
imply that individuals with high levels of open-mindedness are better able to decouple 
their prior beliefs when evaluating evidence.  
 Lastly, participants‟ reasoned evaluations were highly correlated with the 
experiment evaluation scores.  The more a participant provided an experiential 
evaluation, the higher their experiment evaluation rating (r = .57, p < .01).  Conversely, 
the more a participant provided a scientific evaluation the lower their experiment 
evaluation ratings (r = -.60, p < .01).  These correlations suggest that assessing 
participants‟ reasoning strategies is a good indicator of critical thinking.  Furthermore, the 
intercorrelations between the reasoning strategies and the experiment evaluation scale 
revealed how participants used either strategy; participants who provided favorable 
evaluations tended to reason more experientially whereas participants who provided 
unfavorable evaluations reasoned more scientifically. 
 
Discussion 
 The goal of this study was to provide a cross-sectional account of college 
students‟ critical thinking development.  I compared freshmen students with seniors 
majoring in psychology to determine whether there were differences in students‟ critical 
thinking abilities.  Most of my predictions were confirmed.  When examining students 
reasoned responses, seniors agreed less with the articles than freshmen. Seniors also 
provided more scientific evaluations and less experiential evaluations when describing 
why they agreed or disagreed with the articles when compared to freshmen.  The depth of 
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seniors‟ scientific evaluations were higher than freshmen students‟ depth of evaluations.  
Finally, seniors provided lower experiment evaluations ratings than freshmen.  
Together, these findings demonstrate that senior psychology majors have stronger 
critical thinking skills than freshmen students.  Although this study is cross-sectional, 
these findings have guiding implications for understanding how college potentially 
influences how students reason in everyday situations.  As my results show, college 
seniors reported having greater knowledge about the scientific method than freshmen, 
and differences in students‟ scientific knowledge were related to how often and how well 
they reasoned scientifically.  It is possible that taking courses relevant to understanding 
the scientific process helps students learn important domain-general scientific reasoning 
strategies. 
Since seniors were better at reasoning scientifically than freshmen, I also expected 
them to be better able to resist alluring anecdotal information when evaluating evidence-
based claims.  Therefore, I predicted that seniors would be better able to think critically 
when faced with alluring anecdotal stories than freshmen.  This prediction was partially 
supported.  Seniors in the anecdote condition agreed less with the articles, provided more 
scientific evaluations, and gave lower experiment evaluation scores than freshmen in the 
anecdote condition.  However, the main effect of anecdotes was consistent across class 
standing in that both freshmen and seniors evaluated the articles more favorably than the 
freshmen and seniors in the control condition.  So although seniors showed stronger 
critical thinking skills than freshmen, they still were susceptible to being influenced by 
alluring anecdotal information.  The depth of seniors‟ scientific evaluations also indicates 
this.  In the anecdote condition, seniors‟ scientific evaluations were generally poor (M = 
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1.98, SD = .72), whereas seniors in the control condition had more in-depth scientific 
evaluations (M = 2.46, SD = .87). 
 My findings also revealed that freshmen and seniors had different levels of open-
mindedness, where seniors reported being more open-minded to different viewpoints than 
freshmen students.  However, I did not find my predicted results for the rational-
experiential inventory and the two epistemic beliefs about psychology research scores.   
Although freshmen reported having the same preference for thinking rationally as seniors 
reported, freshmen overwhelmingly preferred to reason experientially about the claims.  
This finding shows that freshmen students may not have accurate perceptions of how 
they believe they prefer to think and how they actually think when evaluating evidence.  
I was also surprised to find no differences between freshmen and seniors‟ 
epistemic beliefs.  These non-significant findings go against previous work, which shows 
that students enter college with a tendency to reason pre-reflectively about the nature and 
sources of knowledge.  In this study, freshmen reported having the same beliefs about 
scientific research as seniors.  Although I don‟t have a clear explanation for these 
findings, it may be that the epistemic beliefs about psychological research scale does not 
adequately capture more varied aspects of how students view the nature and sources of 
knowledge.  This scale only measures whether students believe scientific research can be 
certain and whether they would trust a scientific experts‟ opinion.  In order to get a more 
accurate measure of epistemic beliefs, it is important to capture various dimensions 
relevant to how students‟ understand the nature and sources of knowledge.  For instance, 
based on Hofer & Pintrichs‟ (2002) conceptions of epistemic beliefs, additional questions 
could assess how students understand what counts as knowledge, whether knowledge is 
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simple or complex, where knowledge comes from, how knowledge is justified, and the 
extent to which different sources of knowledge are certain. 
 Interestingly, I found that actively open-minded thinking was related to students 
reasoning outcomes in very interesting ways.  Students‟ level of open-mindedness was 
not related to their prior beliefs (r = -.09).  However, open-mindedness was associated 
with agreeing less with the articles, providing less experiential evaluations, and providing 
more scientific evaluations.  Additionally, open-mindedness was associated with 
providing more in-depth scientific evaluations and providing lower experiment 
evaluations ratings.  These solid relationships across all of the reasoning outcomes 
suggest that that open-minded thinking bears an important relationship with the ability to 
avoid biased reasoning and with providing in-depth scientific evaluations.   These 
correlations, however, are partially confounded by the fact that more seniors reported 
being more open-minded than freshmen.  Therefore, it can also be the case that seniors in 
general are better able to avoid biased reasoning that freshmen students.  In order to 
address this issue, future studies should focus on obtaining a greater sample of seniors 
and examining whether within-group differences in their level of open-mindedness is 
related to avoiding belief-bias reasoning.   
 
 Limitations and conclusion 
 This study showed that, when given evidence-based claims to evaluate, senior 
psychology majoring were better able to think critically than freshmen. This may largely 
be because, as previous work has shown, social science students may be better trained to 
think about these types of ill-structured tasks when compared to students who major in 
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math or business, or the natural sciences, for example (Burrage, 2008; King et al., 1990; 
Lehmann, 1963; Norcross et al., 1993). Therefore, these findings should not be 
generalized beyond understanding the development of critical thinking skills among 
psychology majors.   One potential limitation of this study is that it is uncertain whether 
the anecdotes were influencing individuals by activating experiential responses, since I 
only found a marginal relationship between students‟ experiential evaluations and the 
anecdote condition manipulation.  The length of the articles may also potentially explain 
why students viewed articles containing anecdotal stories more favorably.  Prior work has 
found longer articles are judged as being better written than shorter ones (Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1986; Pierro, Mannetti, Erb, Spiegel, & Kruglanski, 2005).  Therefore, 
students in the anecdote condition may have been less critical because they thought the 
articles were better written – as opposed to being persuaded to think that the anecdotal 
stories provided conclusive, experience-based support for the claims.  However, Study 2b 
address this concern. 
These results have implications for understanding what students, especially those 
majoring in psychology, learn in college.  These findings imply that senior psychology 
majors are learning important scientific reasoning skills that help them approach critical 
thinking more purposefully than freshmen.  These seniors also seem to learn how to think 
more open-mindedly in college, which is closely related to the ability to decouple one‟s 
prior beliefs from the reasoning process.  Although college potentially helps students‟ 
shift away from using less experiential forms of reasoning and more towards rational-
analytic ones (or scientific, in this case), seniors still have difficulty resisting persuasive 
anecdotal information when evaluating claims.  
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CHAPTER V 
Study 3 
An alternative explanation for the results of Study 2a is that participants in the 
anecdote condition were simply influenced by the length of the articles and not the 
anecdotal stories themselves.  As previous work has shown, people think longer articles 
are better written than shorter ones (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Pierro et al., 2005). This 
may have influenced students in the anecdote condition to evaluate the articles based on 
how well they were written and not on the persuasiveness of the anecdotal stories.   
Therefore, I conducted a follow-up study to see whether the length of the articles was 
influencing students to believe that they were better written.  In order to control the 
effects of participants‟ prior beliefs, they were reminded to separate their beliefs from 
their evaluations throughout the study. 
 
Methods 
Participants, procedures, and measures 
Thirty-six college students (12 females, 24 males) with a mean age of 18.94 years 
(SD = 1.14) participated in this study. All of the students were recruited from the 
psychology subject-pool.  This sample was composed of 72% freshmen, 17% 
sophomores, 3% juniors, and 8% seniors.    
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 Participants came into the lab and were presented with the same materials as 
before.  In this instance, however, they were told that the articles were presented for 
possible publication in a local news site and that we wanted their feedback regarding how 
well the articles were written.  Eighteen participants were randomly placed in the 
anecdote condition and eighteen in the control. 
Writing quality rating.  When each article was presented, they were given the 
following instructions, “Regardless of how you feel about the claims being made in this 
article, please base your responses on the quality of the writing.”  Based on measured 
used by Cacioppo, Petty, & Morris (1983), they were asked to judge the quality of the 
writing on three dimensions using a 6-point scale.  The first statement read, “Considering 
both content and style, please rate how well this article was written,” and the responses 
ranged from “very poorly written” to “very well written.”  The second statement read, 
“Please rate how well a person will be able to understand this article,” and responses 
ranged from “very difficulty to understand” to “very easy to understand.”  The final 
statement read, “Please rate the structure of the article,” and the responses ranged from 
“contains very complex structure” to “contains very simple structure.” I created a writing 
quality composite score by summing the three responses.  Scores between 3 and 6 were 
rated as being a poorly written article, scores between 9 and 12 were neither poorly or 
well written, and scores above 13 were rated as being a well-written article.   
Experiment evaluation scale.  After rating the quality of the writing, participants 
saw the articles a second time.  In this instance, they were given the following 
instructions, “Regardless about how you feel about the claims being made in this article, 
please base your responses on the quality of the study presented in this article,” and rated 
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the article using an experiment evaluation scale (Macpherson & Stanovich, 2007).  
Afterwards, participants completed the same thinking disposition and background 
questionnaires. 
Results and Discussion 
Writing quality.  I used a 2 x 2 ANOVA with anecdotal information as a 
between-subject factor and study design as within-subject factor on the writing quality 
score.  I found no main effect for anecdotal information on the quality of the writing, F(1, 
34) < 1, ns.  The quality of the writing was rated similarly for the anecdote (M = 13.63, 
SE = .32) and control conditions (M = 13.56, SE = .32).  There were also no differences 
for the study design, F (1, 34) < 1, ns.  Articles containing between-group studies were 
given the same writing quality ratings (M = 13.54, SE = .26) as articles containing 
correlational studies (M = 13.64, SE = .24). 
Experiment evaluation scale.  Using the same 2 x 2 ANOVA analysis, I found 
no main effect of anecdotal information on the experiment evaluation ratings, F(1, 34) < 
1, ns.  Participants‟ experiment evaluation ratings were similar in the anecdote (M = 
10.78, SE = .47) and control conditions (M = 10.43, SE = .47).  There was a main effect 
for study design, where participants provided lower ratings when the articles contained 
between-group studies (M = 9.92, SE = .45) compared to the articles containing 
correlational studies (M = 11.30, SE = .32), F(1, 34) = 11.56, p <  .002, p
2
 = .24. 
These results demonstrate that, when asked to decouple their beliefs when 
evaluating the articles, the anecdotal stories did not influence students to think that they 
were better written than the articles in the control condition.  This provides some support 
 117 
for my argument that anecdotal stories elicit experiential reasoning, which in turn 
influence students to perceive and evaluate the articles more favorably.   
 Intercorrelations between individual difference measures, the writing quality 
ratings, and experiment evaluation ratings.   Since this study asked participants to 
separate their prior beliefs from their responses, I did not expect to find any associations 
between participants‟ prior belief scores and their evaluations.  However, this did not turn 
out to be the case.  As shown in Table 5.1, there was a positive association between prior 
beliefs and the writing quality ratings.  Participants who were more likely to state that the 
articles fit with their beliefs and experiences were also more likely to rate the quality of 
the writing as being higher.  The same association was found between participants‟ prior 
beliefs and their experiment evaluations scores.  Although asking participants to separate 
their beliefs when evaluating the articles counteracted the influence of anecdotal stories, 
students still had trouble separating their beliefs and experiences when evaluating the 
claims. 
Interestingly, there were significant associations between ACT scores across the 
individual difference measures. However, ACT was only marginally related to the 
writing quality rating and unrelated to the experiment evaluation rating.  The rational-
experiential inventory was positively related to actively open-minded thinking.  Although 
the results for the ACT and rational-experiential inventory scores are different from the 
findings in Study 2, it is possible that these relationships were caused by the nature of this 
study.  Participants were explicitly reminded to decouple their experiences from their 
evaluations throughout the study.  It is therefore possible that when taking the thinking 
disposition surveys, participants may have based their answers according to whether or 
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they thought they were avoiding biased responding.  However, whether or not this 
reflects a more accurate portrayal of participants‟ thinking dispositions is difficult to say, 
since it is uncertain whether the task influenced students to respond more honestly or 
more extremely towards the thinking disposition items.
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CHAPTER VI 
General Discussion 
 Using a dual process framework, which assumes that individuals rely on using 
quick, intuitive-experiential responses more so than deliberate, rational-analytic 
responses, the goal of my dissertation was to understand whether college training helped 
students reason less experientially and more scientifically when evaluating research 
evidence.  My dissertation also advanced how researchers examine college students‟ 
critical thinking skills by observing the reasoning processes students used when evaluate 
evidence.  
Across both studies I found that students preferred to use more experiential 
reasoning strategies than scientific ones when evaluating evidence.  Study 1 showed that 
college underclassmen overwhelmingly preferred to reason experientially when 
evaluating research studies in an informal context.  Although prompting students to think 
critically increased scientific reasoning, it did not significantly decrease their experiential 
evaluations.  The overall descriptive statistics for Study 2 also found that students 
preferred to provide more experientially based evaluations than scientific ones when 
asked to describe why they agreed or disagreed with a set of claims that were made from 
news-like science articles.  Both findings support dual process views of reasoning, in that 
students approached thinking critically using more autonomous, experiential systems than 
deliberate, rational ones. 
 120 
Do these results show that students fail to reason scientifically when critically 
evaluating evidence?  Not necessarily.  As discussed in Study 1, even college 
underclassmen were able to notice when research evidence contained interpretive errors 
when asked to rate the quality of the studies.  On possible reason there was a discrepancy 
between students‟ quality ratings and their preference for providing experiential 
responses could be due to the design of the task.  In the informal condition, students were 
asked to rate the quality of the studies on 5-point scale and provide a written response to 
the question, “Have these findings affected your views about [study topic]?”  Because the 
quality ratings had an evaluative component, students may have simply preferred to jump 
into discussing their personal views and experiences when providing a written response, 
having already made a judgment about the quality of the evidence.  Additionally, since 
the question asked students to think about their views, this may have influenced students 
to reason more experientially than they would have otherwise.  Therefore, the results 
from students‟ responses in the informal condition are somewhat confounded by how the 
questions were ordered and framed.   
The findings from the critical thinking condition provide more room for 
interpretation, however.  Prompting students to think critically increased scientific 
reasoning.  Students also provided more scientific evaluations when the studies contained 
interpretive errors.  Interestingly, their scientific evaluations were also strategic.  For 
instance, they provided more ANCOVA evaluations for the correlational studies than for 
the between-group studies.  They also provide more methodological and statistical 
evaluations when the between-group studies contained errors compared to the between-
group studies that did not contain this error.  However, the depth of students‟ scientific 
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evaluations were relatively low.  Additionally, students still gave a high number of 
experiential evaluations in this context.  This may imply that students had difficulty 
articulating their scientific evaluations and may have therefore provided experiential 
evaluations as a sort of default strategy for reasoning.  Thus, the results of Study 1 show 
that even underclassmen could think critically about evidence, but their written scientific 
evaluations did not reflect a strong scientific understanding.  This lack of evaluative 
depth may have been due to students‟ general lack of scientific knowledge.   
Building off of these findings, the primary goal of Study 2 was to examine the 
relationship between domain-general scientific knowledge and students‟ ability to 
evaluate evidence scientifically.  More simply put, I wanted to know whether college 
training helped students acquire adequate scientific knowledge, and whether this helped 
students reason more scientifically than experientially when evaluating evidence.  I 
compared seniors majoring in psychology (who I assumed acquired some relevant 
domain-general scientific strategies from their statistics and research methods 
coursework) with freshmen students.  Students read a set of articles that made claims 
about various social-scientific studies.   These studies, however, contained clear 
interpretive errors, such as over-interpreting small effects and implying causation from 
correlations findings.   
When students were asked to rate how much they agreed with the claims, seniors 
disagreed more with the claims when compared to freshmen.  Additionally, when asked 
to describe why they agreed or disagreed with the claims, seniors provided more 
scientific evaluations and less experiential evaluations than freshmen students.  Seniors‟ 
evaluations also reflected a greater ability to reason strategically; when the studies 
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contained effect size errors, seniors provided more methodological and statistical 
evaluations, and when the studies contained correlation-not-causation errors, they 
provided more ANCOVA based evaluations.  Finally, seniors‟ scientific evaluations were 
more in-depth than freshmen students‟ evaluations.  
Although I can‟t imply causation from these results, these comparative findings 
provide a guiding framework for understanding how college training potentially helps 
students shift away from using experiential systems of reasoning and more towards 
scientific ones.  Seniors reported having significantly greater scientific knowledge than 
freshmen, which provides some support for the view that college training, specifically in 
psychology, helps students develop important domain-general scientific skills.   
The seniors in this study demonstrated the ability to think critically, in that they 
were less willing to agree with claims containing flawed interpretations and provided 
more scientifically reasoned evaluations.  However, another important critical thinking 
skill involves being able to resist persuasive information.  Scientific news reports often 
begin with a short narrative account about a person or a scenario that helps highlight the 
relevance of a study.  Although anecdotal narratives are useful for facilitating 
comprehension and learning, they can also undermine critical thinking.  Anecdotal stories 
are believed to activate experiential systems of reasoning, in which individuals make 
judgments about claims based on whether the story fits with one‟s own experiences or 
whether the story seems believable.  Therefore, including anecdotal narratives alongside 
scientific news reports may inadvertently influence students to think more about their 
beliefs and experiences than the general quality of the scientific evidence.   
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Study 2 additionally compared whether senior psychology majors were also able 
to resist the persuasive allure of anecdotal narratives.  Half of the students in this study 
received articles that contained short anecdotal stories followed by a description of the 
study.  For the anecdote condition, seniors were less influenced by the anecdotal stories 
than freshmen.  However, seniors in the anecdote condition still agreed more with the 
claims and provided more experiential evaluations when compared to the seniors in the 
control condition.  These findings show that despite demonstrating stronger scientific 
reasoning skills than freshmen, senior psychology majors still had difficulty ignoring 
anecdotal stories.  These findings lend support to the view that anecdotal narratives are 
influential in activating experiential systems of reasoning.  
The final goal of my dissertation was to examine important reflective aspects of 
the critical thinking process.  I examined whether differences in thinking dispositions, 
such as need for cognition, actively open-minded thinking, and rational-experiential 
thinking, were related to how students critically evaluated evidence.  I additionally 
examined the role of epistemic beliefs on students‟ critical thinking.   In Study 1, I 
expected two important thinking dispositions (need for cognition, actively open-minded 
thinking) to be negatively associated with providing experiential evaluations.  
Conversely, I expected these thinking dispositions to be positively associated with 
providing scientific evaluations.   However, I failed to find these expected relationships.  
This may be partly due to the characteristics of the study summaries.  The summaries 
students evaluated was written using technical language and provided detailed 
descriptions of the methods.  The content of these summaries contrasts previous thinking 
dispositions studies, in which individuals are asked to evaluate evidence that either 
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support or threaten their previous beliefs.  In studies where individuals‟ beliefs are 
brought to bare, the need for cognition and actively open-minded thinking have been 
associated with providing less biased evaluations.  Therefore, the materials for Study 1 
were not well suited for capturing the expected relationships. 
 Study 2 also examined the relationship between actively open-minded thinking 
on students‟ reasoning outcomes.  In addition, I used the rational-experiential inventory 
to examine whether the disposition to think more rationally (versus experientially) was 
related to students‟ reasoning outcomes.  Finally, using the epistemic beliefs about 
psychology research scale, I wanted to understand whether viewing psychological 
research as a valid source of knowledge was related to students‟ reasoning outcomes. 
When comparing these thinking dispositions by class standing, I found that 
seniors reported being more open-minded towards different viewpoints than freshmen.  
Whether through general maturation, exposure to the college environment, coursework, 
or through the culmination of all these factors, the senior psychology majors in this 
sample seemed to have developed a greater appreciation for different perspectives and 
greater openness towards belief change.  Although my findings are not developmental, 
they coincide with previous work showing that college students become more open-
minded as they grow older.     
Open-minded thinking was correlated to the reasoning outcomes in a way to 
suggest that this disposition is important for understanding the critical thinking process.  
Students who reported being more open-minded agreed less with the claims in the 
articles, provided less experiential evaluations, and provided more scientific evaluations.  
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Additionally, students‟ open-mindedness was positively related to having more in-depth 
scientific evaluations. 
These relationships were interesting, considering that students‟ ACT scores were 
not significantly related to any of the reasoning outcomes.  The non-significant findings 
from the ACT scores lend support to Stanovich‟s claim that reflective aspects of 
individuals‟ thinking dispositions, like level of open-mindedness, are more important for 
being able to avoid biased reasoning than intellectual ability.  However, it should be 
noted that seniors and freshmen differed on actively open-minded thinking.  Therefore, 
the correlational results for the actively open-minded thinking scores are confounded by 
the fact that seniors reported being more open-minded than freshmen. 
Different from my expectations, I did not find any significant relationships 
between students‟ rational-experiential inventory scores, their epistemic beliefs about 
psychological research scores, and their reasoning outcomes.  This was especially 
puzzling for the rational-experiential inventory, a measure that has previously been 
associated with the ability to reason scientifically.  The epistemic beliefs about 
psychology research scale, on the other hand, was limited in that it only captured whether 
students viewed psychological research with certainty and whether they would change 
their views if they differed from that of a scientific expert.   
Based on my dissertation findings, I present a revision of my initial model in 
Figure 6.1, which represents college students‟ critical thinking development.  Different 
from my previous model, I excluded the „college experience‟ box in favor of a „college 
training‟ box, which represents important school-related factors that help develop 
students‟ critical thinking skills (college major, courses taken relevant to understanding 
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scientific principles).  This in turn has an influence on students‟ domain-general scientific 
knowledge, which is now represented in the „individual factors‟ box.  This was done in 
order to emphasize the important relationship I found between scientific knowledge and 
students‟ reasoning outcomes. Also, my previous model assumed that students enter 
college with little scientific knowledge, and that college experience is the cardinal factor 
that helps students learn to think scientifically.  But it is not possible to assume that this is 
the case.  Students‟ scientific knowledge may have also been shaped by their prior 
experiences in high school or elsewhere.  Additionally, as the results of Study 1 showed, 
even underclassmen, who may not have experience taking courses relevant to the 
scientific method, could think scientifically in informal contexts. 
My findings also revealed that actively open-minded thinking had an important 
relationship with students‟ reasoning outcomes.  Therefore, my individual factors box 
highlights this construct.  Although I did not find relationships between students‟ 
epistemic beliefs and their reasoning outcomes, I still included this disposition in model, 
given that the measures I used did not adequately capture this construct.  Finally, I placed 
the individual factors box as a moderator for students‟ reasoning systems, given that 
students‟ preference for thinking experientially or scientifically may initially be guided 
these factors. 
Aside from my findings, my studies have important implications for instruction.  
Scholars have emphasized that helping students think more critically involves teaching 
both deliberate skills, such as the ability to reason scientifically, and reflective ones, like 
the ability to decouple one‟s beliefs from the critical thinking process.  What is less 
emphasized, however, is the importance of teaching students to be able to identify when 
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claims and arguments contain alluring information, since such information can 
potentially undermine the critical thinking process.  One effective way to helps students‟ 
resist alluring information would be to assign activities in which students identify 
instances in the media, whether on television or in newsprint, where anecdotal stories are 
used to support some claim or argument.  Such activities would help students‟ apply their 
critical thinking skills towards evaluating evidence in an everyday context. 
My studies have also helped advanced how critical thinking is measured.  
Observing students‟ reasoned evaluations uncovered the various ways they utilized 
specific scientific reasoning strategies, such as providing ANCOVA based evaluations 
for correlational studies or providing methodological and statistical evaluations when the 
between-group studies contained effect size errors.  By observing students‟ non-scientific 
evaluations, I was also able to show that students‟ often discussed their personal views or 
opinions when evaluating research evidence.  The findings I obtained from this 
observational approach also supported the underlying assumption of dual process models, 
in that people often favor intuitive-experiential forms of reasoning over rational-analytic 
ones.  Finally, this approach was effective in capturing the differences in freshmen and 
senior psychology majors‟ evaluations.  Since students‟ experientially- and scientifically-
based evaluations correlated strongly with students‟ experiment evaluation scale ratings 
(a more traditional, Likert-type measure of critical thinking), this shows that this 
observational approach is effective in capturing how students critically evaluate research 
evidence.  
In order to understand how college training influences students‟ reasoning 
systems, their ability to evaluate evidence-based claims, and their thinking dispositions, 
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longitudinal work is needed that examines these constructs over the course of students‟ 
time in college.  It would also be beneficial to further understand how college majors 
differentially promote particular rational-analytic skills and specific dispositions towards 
thinking.
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Table 3.1. Descriptive statistics for the quality ratings, thinking 
dispositions, reasoning strategies, and depth of processing 
      
Variable  (N = 50)   M SD Range 
Quality Ratings  3.39 0.49 2.40 
Need for Cognition 58.40 10.01 44.00 
Actively Open-minded Thinking 166.76 19.66 85.00 
      
Informal Condition    
 Opinions & Explanations 3.22 1.66 7.00 
 Beliefs & Experiences 1.30 1.36 5.00 
 Internal Threats 0.14 0.35 1.00 
 ANCOVA Reasoning 0.38 0.76 4.00 
 Meth & Stats Reasoning 0.72 0.95 4.00 
 Depth of Processing 0.94 0.50 1.75 
      
Critical Thinking Condition    
 Opinions & Explanations 2.54 1.96 8.00 
 Beliefs & Experiences 0.28 0.57 2.00 
 Internal Threats 1.28 1.16 5.00 
 ANCOVA Reasoning 1.78 1.52 5.00 
 Meth & Stats Reasoning 3.98 1.82 7.00 
  Depth of Processing 2.05 0.44 2.00 
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Table 3.2. List of study summary topics and prior beliefs paired t-test 
results 
   
Study Summary Topic Study Design Error 
A. Children's impulsivity and grades between-group interpretive error 
B. Public monitoring and social obedience between-group interpretive error 
   
A. Children's aggression learning between-group no error 
B. Presumptive questions and memory between-group no error 
   
A. Home environment and letter knowledge correlational interpretive error 
B. Motivation and career achievement correlational interpretive error 
   
A. Children's task frustration and anger correlational no error 
B. Social engagement and memory correlational no error 
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Table 3.3. Paired t-test of prior beliefs scores (standard deviations in 
parentheses) 
     
Study Summary Manipulations Summary A Summary B 
paired t-test, 
within groups 
Between-group    
 Interpretive error 3.34 (1.17) 4.88 (1.00) -7.32*** 
 No error 4.40 (1.03) 4.40 (1.34) .00 
Correlational    
 Interpretive error 4.28 (1.39) 4.42 (1.20) -.57 
  No error 4.22 (1.00) 4.16 (0.98) .30 
***p < .001    
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Table 3.4. Paired t-test of quality rating scores (standard deviations in 
parentheses) 
     
Study Summary Manipulations Summary A Summary B 
paired t-test, 
within groups 
Between-group    
 Interpretive error 3.02 (1.27) 3.24 (1.17) -.93 
 No error 4.04 (1.00) 4.22 (0.93) -1.00 
Correlational    
 Interpretive error 3.14 (1.21) 2.92 (1.05) 1.04 
  No error 3.18 (1.10) 3.32 (1.10) -.60 
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Table 3.5. Mean reasoning strategies and depth of scientific 
evaluations by study design and interpretive error (standard 
deviations in parentheses) 
   Study Design 
   Between-group  Correlational 
      Error No Error   Error No Error 
Opinions & 
Explanations .42 (.64) 1.00 (.86)  .58 (.73) .54 (.65) 
Beliefs & Experiences .16 (.37) .04 (.20)  .04 (.20) .04 (.20) 
Internal Threats to 
Validity .36 (.53) .18 (.44)  .22 (.42) .52 (.70) 
ANCOVA Reasoning .46 (.65) .16 (.37)  .78 (.68) .38 (.60) 
Method & Stats 
Reasoning 1.34 (.66) .60 (.80)  1.20 (.78) .84 (.68) 
Depth of Scientific Eval 2.28 (.60) 1.90 (.65)   2.03 (.61) 2.00 (.51) 
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Table 3.6. Results of reasoning strategies and depth of processing 
by study design and interpretive error 
        F p hp
2
  
Opinions & Explanations     
 Study Design   3.13 .08 -- 
 Interpretive Error  12.66 .00 .21 
 Study Design x Interpretive Error 9.83 .00 .17 
Beliefs & Experiences     
 Study Design   3.13 .08 -- 
 Interpretive Error  3.13 .08 -- 
 Study Design x Interpretive Error 3.13 .08 -- 
Internal Threats to Validity     
 Study Design   2.60 .12 -- 
 Interpretive Error  .70 .41 -- 
 Study Design x Interpretive Error 9.33 .00 .16 
ANCOVA Reasoning     
 Study Design   14.8 .00 .23 
 Interpretive Error  23.77 .00 .33 
 Study Design x Interpretive Error .42 .52 -- 
Method & Stats Reasoning     
 Study Design   .27 .61 -- 
 Interpretive Error  39.80 .00 .45 
 Study Design x Interpretive Error 4.34 .04 .08 
Depth of Scientific Evaluations     
 Study Design   1.56 .22 -- 
 Interpretive Error  10.37 .00 .18 
  Study Design x Interpretive Error 7.51 .01 .13 
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Table 3.7. Intercorrelations for thinking dispositions, quality ratings, prior 
beliefs, reasoning strategies, and depth of scientific evaluations in the informal 
condition 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. NFC --         
2. AOT  .64** --        
3. Quality Ratings  .09  .12 --       
4. Prior Beliefs Ratings  .05  .06  .23 --      
5. Opinion & Explanations -.11 -.04  .25 -.04 --     
6. Belief & Experiences  .26
†
  .06  .14  .14  .07 --    
7. Internal Threats  .00  .04 -.07  .11 -.12  .34* --   
8. ANCOVA Reasoning  .10  .14  .18  .15  .08  .15 -.05 --  
9. Meth & Stats Reasoning -.20 -.14 -.23 -.26
†
 -.05  .07  .24
†
 -.02 -- 
10. Depth of Scientific Eval -.05 -.10  .02 -.08  .34*  .53**  .52**  .33*  .63** 
Note: NFC = Need for Cognition: AOT = Actively Open-minded Thinking. 
†
p  < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01 
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Table 3.8. Intercorrelations for thinking dispositions, quality ratings, prior 
beliefs, reasoning strategies, and depth of scientific evaluations in the critical 
thinking condition 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. NFC --         
2. AOT  .64** --        
3. Quality Ratings  .10  .12 --       
4. Prior Beliefs Ratings  .05  .06  .23 --      
5. Opinion & Explanations  .00  .06 -.28*  .05 --     
6. Belief & Experiences  .00  .20 -.08 -.01  .28* --    
7. Internal Threats -.10 -.04  .33*  .13 -.54** -.15 --   
8. ANCOVA Reasoning  .13  .15  .12 -.04 -.24
†
 -.09  .30* --  
9. Meth & Stats Reasoning -.16  .00 -.02  .01 -.35* -.07  .30*  .15 -- 
10. Depth of Scientific Eval -.80 -.08  .16  .02 -.63** -.18  .48**  .20  .65** 
Note: NFC = Need for Cognition: AOT = Actively Open-minded Thinking. 
†
p  < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01 
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Table 3.9. Intercorrelations for thinking dispositions, quality ratings, prior 
beliefs, composite reasoning strategy scores, and depth of scientific evaluations 
in the informal condition 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. NFC --      
2. AOT  .64** --     
3. Quality Ratings  .09  .12 --    
4. Prior Belief Ratings  .05  .06  .23 --   
5. Experiential Composite Score  .08  .00  .28
†
  .06 --  
6. Scientific Composite Score -.08  .00 -.08 -.70  .12 -- 
7. Depth of Scientific Eval -.05 -.09  .02 -.08  .58**  .78** 
Note: NFC = Need for Cognition: AOT = Actively Open-minded Thinking. 
†
p  < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01 
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Table 3.10. Intercorrelations for thinking dispositions, quality ratings, prior 
beliefs, composite reasoning strategy scores, and depth of scientific evaluations 
in the critical thinking condition 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. NFC --      
2. AOT  .64** --     
3. Quality Ratings  .09  .12 --    
4. Prior Belief Ratings  .05  .06  .23 --   
5. Experiential Composite Score  .00  .10 -.27
†
  .04 --  
6. Scientific Composite Score -.06  .06  .16  .03 -.50** -- 
7. Depth of Scientific Eval -.08 -.08  .17  .02 -.61**  .64** 
Note: NFC = Need for Cognition: AOT = Actively Open-minded Thinking. 
†
p  < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01 
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Table 4.1. Descriptive statistics for the individual differences 
measures and evaluative outcomes 
Variable  (N = 94) M SD Range 
ACT Scores (n = 83) 28.17 3.26 15.00 
REI  125.79 12.55 71.00 
AOT 182.03 17.63 84.00 
EB Certainty 9.15 1.82 8.00 
EB Confidence 11.13 1.77 8.00 
     
Agreement Ratings 2.52 0.4 2.00 
Reasoning Strategies    
 Opinions & Explanations 4.96 2.27 8.00 
 Belief & Experiences 0.84 1.06 5.00 
 Internal Threats 0.21 0.44 2.00 
 ANCOVA Reasoning 1.17 1.28 6.00 
 Meth & Stats Reasoning 2.07 2.23 8.00 
Depth of Scientific Evaluations 1.82 0.78 2.75 
Experiment Evaluation Ratings 10.16 2.52 11.38 
Note: NFC = Need for Cognition: AOT = Actively Open-minded Thinking: 
EB Certainty = epistemic beliefs about the certainty of scientific 
knowledge: EB Confidence = epistemic beliefs about one's confidence in 
scientific experts 
 1
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Table 4.2. Mean agreement ratings by anecdote condition, study design, and class standing with 
sex as a covariate (standard deviations in parentheses) 
    Anecdotal Information Condition 
   Anecdote    Control 
  Overall Between-group Correlational   Overall Between-group Correlational 
Freshmen 2.80 (.28) 2.68 (.30) 2.91 (.45)  2.53 (.37) 2.46 (.44) 2.59 (.45) 
Seniors 2.47 (.27) 2.42 (.37) 2.52 (.35)   2.24 (.44) 2.28 (.42) 2.20 (.59) 
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Table 4.3. Results of agreement ratings by anecdote condition, study 
design, and class standing with sex as a covariate 
Variable F p hp
2
  
Anecdote Condition 11.77 .001 0.12 
Study Design 0.01 .940 -- 
Class Standing 18.35 .000 0.17 
Anecdote x Study Design 1.66 .200 -- 
Study Design x Class Standing 2.69 .110 -- 
Anecdote x Class Standing 0.08 .780 -- 
 1
4
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Table 4.4. Mean reasoning strategies by anecdote condition, study design, and class standing with sex as a covariate 
(standard deviations in parentheses) 
    Anecdotal Information Condition 
  Anecdote  Control 
    Overall Between-group Correlational   Overall Between-group Correlational 
Opinions & Explanations        
 Freshmen 6.54 (1.47) 3.08 (.82) 3.45 (.93)  5.80 (1.77) 2.70 (1.08) 3.08 (.92) 
 Seniors 4.04 (1.89) 1.75 (1.11) 2.29 (1.23)  3.31 (2.37) 1.68 (1.12) 1.63 (1.46) 
Beliefs & Experiences        
 Freshmen .79 (1.21) .45 (.65) .33 (.70)  .67 (.92) .45 (.65) .20 (.50) 
 Seniors 1.20 (1.31) .87 (1.03) .33 (.48)  .68 (.57) .31 (.47) .36 (.58) 
Internal Threats         
 Freshmen .08 (.28) .00 (.00) .08 (.28)  .25 (.44) .20 (.41) .04 (.20) 
 Seniors .16 (.48) .00 (.00) .16 (.48)  .36 (.49) .36 (.49) .00 (.00) 
ANCOVA Reasoning        
 Freshmen .54 (.72) .33 (.56) .20 (.41)  .67 (1.00) .29 (.55) .37 (.57) 
 Seniors 1.37 (1.09) .58 (.65) .79 (.97)  2.18 (1.56) .95 (.84) 1.22 (1.02) 
Meth & Stats Reasoning        
 Freshmen .58 (.97) .33 (.76) .25 (.60)  1.63 (1.88) .91 (1.01) .70 (1.00) 
  Seniors 2.46 (2.10) 1.54 (1.35) .91 (1.10)   3.77 (2.49) 2.13 (1.52) 1.63 (1.39) 
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Table 4.5. Results of reasoning strategies by anecdote condition, 
study design, and class standing with sex as a covariate 
Variable F p hp
2
  
Opinions & Explanations    
 Anecdote Condition 3.51 .060 .04 
 Study Design .07 .790 -- 
 Class Standing 39.88 .000 .30 
 Anecdote x Study Design 1.18 .220 -- 
 Study Design x Class Standing .31 .570 -- 
 Anecdote x Class Standing .00 .970 -- 
Beliefs & Experiences    
 Anecdote Condition 1.95 .160 -- 
 Study Design 1.50 .220 -- 
 Class Standing .96 .170 -- 
 Anecdote x Study Design 1.99 .160 -- 
 Study Design x Class Standing .14 .710 -- 
 Anecdote x Class Standing .90 .350 -- 
Internal Threats    
 Anecdote Condition 4.16 .040 .05 
 Study Design 1.32 .250 -- 
 Class Standing 1.20 .270 -- 
 Anecdote x Study Design 19.75 .000 .18 
 Study Design x Class Standing .37 .550 -- 
 Anecdote x Class Standing .03 .870 -- 
ANCOVA Reasoning    
 Anecdote Condition 3.79 .055 .04 
 Study Design 1.32 .250 -- 
 Class Standing 25.41 .000 .22 
 Anecdote x Study Design .72 .400 -- 
 Study Design x Class Standing 1.90 .170 -- 
 Anecdote x Class Standing 2.16 .150 -- 
Meth & Stats Reasoning    
 Anecdote Condition 8.38 .005 .08 
 Study Design .04 .850 -- 
 Class Standing 25.37 .000 .22 
 Anecdote x Study Design .01 .920 -- 
 Study Design x Class Standing 2.80 .100 -- 
  Anecdote x Class Standing .12 .730 -- 
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Table 4.6. Mean depth of scientific evaluation scores by anecdote condition, study design, and 
class standing with sex as a covariate (standard deviations in parentheses) 
  Anecdotal Information Condition 
 Anecdote  Control 
  Overall Between-group Correlational   Overall Between-group Correlational 
Freshmen 1.22 (.26) 1.26 (.35) 1.18 (.58)  1.65 (.61) 1.68 (.68) 1.60 (.67) 
Seniors 1.98 (.72) 2.08 (.81) 1.88 (.94)   2.46 (.87) 2.59 (1.01) 2.32 (.95) 
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Table 4.7. Results of depth of scientific evaluation scores by anecdote condition, 
study design, and class standing with sex as a covariate 
Variable F p hp
2
  
Anecdote Condition 10.60 .002 .11 
Study Design 0.01 .950 -- 
Class Standing 34.37 .000 .28 
Anecdote x Study Design 0.08 .780 -- 
Study Design x Class Standing 0.88 .350 -- 
Anecdote x Class Standing 0.05 .830 -- 
  
1
4
6
 
Table 4.8. Mean experiment evaluation ratings by anecdote condition, study design, and class 
standing with sex as a covariate (standard deviations in parentheses) 
  Anecdotal Information Condition 
 Anecdote  Control 
  Overall Between-group Correlational   Overall Between-group Correlational 
Freshmen 11.92 (2.17) 11.60 (2.30) 12.23 (2.86)  9.84 (2.52) 9.66 (2.70) 10.03 (2.84) 
Seniors 10.35 (1.92) 9.76 (2.02) 10.93 (2.57)   8.42 (2.27) 8.09 (2.22) 8.75 (2.94) 
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Table 4.9. Results of experiment evaluation ratings by anecdote condition, study 
design, and class standing with sex as a covariate 
Variable F p hp
2
  
Anecdote Condition 18.28 .000 .17 
Study Design 3.97 .050 .04 
Class Standing 10.48 .002 .11 
Anecdote x Study Design 0.27 .600 -- 
Study Design x Class Standing 0.60 .440 -- 
Anecdote x Class Standing 0.02 .882 -- 
  
1
4
8
 
Table 4.11. Intercorrelations for ACT scores, thinking dispositions, epistemic beliefs, prior beliefs, scientific 
knowledge, composite reasoning strategy scores, depth of processing, and experiment evaluation ratings 
Variable (n = 83) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. ACT Score --           
2. REI  .11 --          
3. AOT  .05  .15 --         
4. EB Certainty -.14 -.08 -.06 --        
5. EB Confidence  .04  .04  .28**  .18
†
 --       
6. Prior Belief Ratings  .04 -.03 -.09  .10  .04 --      
7. Scientific Knowledge  .04  .26*  .32** -.11 -.01 -.06 --     
8. Agreement Ratings -.01 -.12 -.18
†
  .18
†
 -.12  .47** -.44** --    
9. Experiential Composite Score  .15 -.07 -.27**  .04 -.08  .25* -.46**  .64** --   
10. Scientific Composite Score  .13  .07  .27** -.07  .04 -.34**  .46** -.68** -.90** --  
11. Depth of Scientific Eval  .14  .10  .30** -.10  .05 -.32**  .44** -.65** -.85**  .95** -- 
12. Experiment Eval Rating -.06 -.10 -.23* .23* -.03  .44** -.43**  .74**  .57** -.60** -.59** 
Note: NFC = Need for Cognition: AOT = Actively Open-minded Thinking: EB Certainty = epistemic beliefs about the certainty of 
scientific knowledge: EB Confidence = epistemic beliefs about one's confidence in scientific experts 
†
p  < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01            
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Table 5.1.  Intercorrelations for ACT scores, thinking dispositions, epistemic 
beliefs, prior beliefs, scientific knowledge, writing quality ratings, and 
experiment evaluation ratings 
Variable  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. ACT Score --        
2. REI  .06 --       
3. AOT  .35
†
 .39** --      
4. EB Certainty  .33
†
  .34*  .28
†
 --     
5. EB Confidence -.02  .13  .34*  .19 --    
6. Prior Belief Ratings  .33
†
 -.35* -.09 -.16 -.18 --   
7. Scientific Knowledge  .38*  .09  .09  .34*  .05 .33* --  
8. Writing Quality Rating  .30
†
  .27  .26  .24  .26 .41*  .27 -- 
9. Experiment Eval Rating -.02 -.04 -.04 -.37*  .05 .34*  .15 0.3
†
 
Note: NFC = Need for Cognition: AOT = Actively Open-minded Thinking: EB Certainty = 
epistemic beliefs about the certainty of scientific knowledge: EB Confidence = epistemic 
beliefs about one's confidence in scientific experts 
†
p  < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01 
 
  
1
5
0
 
     Figure 6.1. Revised model of college students’ critical thinking development 
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Appendices 
Appendix A.  Study 1 Summaries 
 
Note: The interpretive error manipulations (no interpretive error, interpretive error) are 
highlighted.  These sections were not highlighted for participants.  
 
 
Children‟s Aggression learning (between-group study with no interpretive error) 
 
A group of psychologist wanted to examine the relationship between watching aggressive 
acts and aggressive behavior in children.  In this study, 4 and 5 year old children were 
randomly assigned to two different conditions.  In the first condition, children watched a 
5-minute video of two men, Rocky and Johnny, play with a set of toys.  In the video, 
Johnny does not want Rocky to play with his toys, so Rocky uses aggression (pushing 
and kicking) to take the toys away from Johnny.  In the second condition, children 
watched a video of Johnny and Rocky playing cooperatively (sharing toys).  After 
children watched the video, they were left alone in a playroom for 20 minutes.  The 
experimenters observed the children through a one-way mirror and recorded their 
behaviors.  The experimenters found significant differences between the two conditions.   
 
Children who watched the aggressive video engaged in 38 individual acts of 
aggressive behavior (throwing, kicking, punching toys), whereas children who 
watched the non-aggressive video engaged in 11 individual acts of aggressive 
behaviors. 
 
This study suggests that children can be induced to behave aggressively by showing 
videos of people engaging in aggressive acts. These findings raise some serious concerns 
regarding the extent to which violent programming on television encourages aggression 
in children.  
 
 
Presumptions questions and false memories (between-group study with no interpretive error) 
 
This study examined how presumptions in questions related to individuals‟ memory of 
prior events.  A presumption refers to a condition in a question that must be true in order 
for the question to make sense.   So a question like, “what color was the speeding car?” 
presupposes that the car was speeding.  In this study, college students in small groups of 
10 watched a video in which a white car causes a five-car chain reaction accident.  The 
video was a minute long, but the car accident itself lasted only 4 seconds.  After the film, 
the students were given a 10-item questionnaire.  For half of the students, the first 
question asked, “How fast was the white car going?” For the other half of students, the 
first question contained a presumption, which asked, “How fast was the white car going 
when it passed the barn?”  The remaining questions were irrelevant to the experiment 
except for the final question, which asked, “Did you see a barn in the video?”  In 
actuality, the video did not contain a barn.    
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Of the group of students that were only asked about the speed of the car, only 5% 
claimed to have seen a barn.  Of the group that was asked the presumptive question, 
78% claimed to have seen a barn.  
 
This research shows that individuals do not accurately remember previous events because 
presumptive questions can illicit false memories. Although simple in its design, this study 
demonstrates the importance of detecting presumptions when using eyewitness testimony 
to recount a prior event. 
 
 
Children‟s Impulsivity and Grades (between-group study with effect size error) 
 
This study examined how children‟s impulsive behaviors related to academic 
achievement in school. Children in 2nd grade were used for this study.  The researchers 
tested children‟s impulsiveness by asking them to wait to eat an M&M that was placed on 
a table directly in front of them.  The M&M was in a clear plastic container, which the 
child had to lift in order to get the treat.  The experimenter, who sat on the other side of 
the table, told the child they had to wait until she rang a bell before they were allowed to 
open the container and eat the treat.  If the child took the M&M before this time he/she 
was categorized as “impatient.”  Those children who waited until the experimenter rang 
the bell were categorized as “patient.”     
 
After controlling for a variety of variables, such as socio-economic status, child sex, 
language ability, and parental education, the researchers found that impatient 
children had significantly lower grades (C+ average) than the patient children (B- 
average) at the end of the school year.     
 
These findings suggests that patient children do well in school because they are good at 
controlling their impulses when compared to impatient children who have little control 
over their impulses.  Therefore, in order to improve academic achievement in elementary 
school, children should be taught effective self-control strategies. 
 
 
Personal messages and public obedience (between-group study with effect size error) 
 
A group of social psychologists set out to examine public obedience.  They did this by 
observing whether or not people parked illegally in handicap spaces.  After obtaining 
permission from the city, the experimenters observed a single parking lot with a set of 
four handicap spaces under two conditions: using a vertical sign or a sign that contained a 
personal message.  The vertical sign contained the standard white handicap access 
symbol on a blue background.  The sign containing a personal message read, 
“WARNING: THIS SPACE WATCHED BY CONCERNED CITIZENS.” Both 
manipulations lasted for a week.  In order to control for ordering effects, the 
experimenters ran the study a second time and switched the order the conditions were 
presented.  When the drivers parked in these spaces and left, the experimenters checked 
to see if the vehicle had a handicap display, handicap license plates, or handicap 
modifications on the car.  If none of these criteria were met, the car was recorded as 
illegally parked. 
 
After analyzing the data, they found significant differences between the signs.  
People parked illegally 26% of the time when the vertical sign was displayed 
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whereas illegal parking occurred only 22% of the time when the personal message 
was displayed. 
 
This study shows that people are more likely to obey public ordinances when they feel 
their actions are being watched, and more likely to disobey public ordinances when they 
think no one is watching them.  Therefore, personalizing public signs to convey a sense 
of vigilant public monitoring may influence people to obey public laws and ordinances. 
 
 
Anger and Task Frustration in Children (correlational study with no interpretive error) 
 
A group of experimenters wanted to study the relationship between anger and task 
frustration in boys.  Boys, 8 to 10 years of age, participated in the study.  Anger was 
assessed using a 10-item scale that examined the strength to which the boys exhibited 
feelings of annoyance, displeasure, and or hostility in the classroom within the past week.  
The scale for each items ranged from a score of 1 to 5, where a score of 1 reflected no 
angry feelings and a 5 reflected a very angry feelings.  The boys‟ teachers filled out the 
assessment.  Each boy was asked to solve 4 different pencil and paper mazes.  Two of the 
mazes were relatively easy, whereas the other two mazes were impossible to solve.  To 
control for order effects, the mazes were ordered randomly.  The experimenters assessed 
task frustration by recording instances where the boys would display frustrating reactions 
(breathing heavily or grunting loudly) when they attempted to solve the impossible 
mazes. 
 
After controlling for numerous variables, such as SES, child sex, and parental education, 
the experimenters found a positive relationship between anger and task frustration. 
 
This study shows that lower anger scores were associated with lower task 
frustration, whereas higher anger scores were associated with higher task 
frustration.  Studies, such as these, are relevant for understanding how anger in children 
relates to how they deal with difficulties in the classroom. 
 
 
Social engagement and memory (correlational study with no interpretive flaw) 
 
In this study, researchers wanted to examine the links between social engagement and 
short-term memory in older age.  A large sample of retired adults, between 70 to 80 years 
of age, participated in the study.  In order to control for confounding influences, 
participants were screened for hearing and vision loss.  Social engagement was assessed 
by asking the participants write down the names of people they routinely interacted with 
during a given week. The total number of people that the participant listed was used as 
the social engagement score.  To test-short term memory, the researchers asked each 
participant to recall a set of digits that the researcher read aloud. This task had a total of 6 
trails. The first trail consisted of 3 digits (eg., 5, 3, 9).  Each subsequent trial consisted of 
a new set of digits with an additional digit string (e.g., 6, 9, 2, 4 for trail #2).  The total 
number of correctly recalled numbers was used as the short-term memory score. 
 
After controlling for education, cognitive activities, sex, and income, the study found 
a positive relationship between social engagement and short-term memory.  Low 
social engagement was associated with lower short-term memory scores, whereas 
high social engagement was associated with higher short-term memory scores. 
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Although it common knowledge that mental exercise is important for maintaining good 
memory, this study shows that frequent social contact with others may help maintain 
good memory as well. 
 
 
Motivation and career achievement (correlational study with correlation/causation error) 
 
A group of researchers set out to understand how achievement motivation causes 
different job status outcomes among older adults.  Achievement motivation is a willing 
desire to be successful at a skill, trade, or profession.  A sample of adults in a national 
corporation, 40 to 48 years of age, participated in this study.  All the participants came in 
with low-status positions and had been working for the company for the last 10 years.  
Participants were given the Need for Achievement Scale to fill out.  This 5-point scale 
contains 14-question items regarding their perceived ability to produce a desired goal and 
their self-esteem about their achievement.  Higher scores on this scale reflected higher 
need for personal achievement.  The participants were also asked to rank the status of 
their current job position on a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 signified a low status position, 
and 10 reflected a high status position within the corporation. 
 
After controlling for sex, level of education, and prior job experience, the experimenters 
found a positive relationship between achievement motivation and job status.     
 
This study shows that people stay in low status positions because they lack the 
personal motivation to achieve, whereas obtaining a high status position is the end 
up with more successful careers when compared to people with little motivation. 
 
 
The Home environment and alphabet knowledge (correlational study with correlation/causation 
error) 
 
A group of researchers set out to understand how richness in the home environment 
influenced children‟s knowledge of the alphabet.  To do this, the researchers visited the 
homes of sample of families who had a 4- to 5-year-old child.  They examined the 
richness of the home environment by taking record of the number of children‟s books in 
the household.  After this was done, children were presented with a set of flash cards, 
each which contained a single letter in the alphabet.  Children were asked to name the 
letter on the flashcard.  In order to control for ordering effects, the cards were shuffled 
prior to asking children to name each letter. 
 
After controlling for numerous variables, such as SES, child sex, and parental education, 
they found a positive relationship between the number of children‟s books and 
knowledge of letters in the alphabet.   
 
This study shows that having books at home causes children to learn more letters, 
whereas having fewer books at home causes children to learn fewer letters.  These 
findings, therefore, emphasize the importance of providing young children with enriching 
experiences in the home. 
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Appendix B.  Study 2 Articles 
Note:  The articles listed below were for the anecdote condition.  
 
Between-group Study 1 
 
 
 
 
Between-group Study 2 
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Between-group Study 3 
 
 
 
 
 
Between-group Study 4 
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Correlational Study 1 
 
 
 
 
Correlational Study 2 
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Correlational Study 3 
 
 
 
 
 
Correlational Study 4 
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Appendix C.  Rational-Experiential Inventory  
(Pacini & Epstein, 1999) 
 
For each of the statements below, mark the alternative that best describes your opinion.  There are 
no right or wrong answers so do not spend too much time deciding on an answer. The first thing 
that comes to mind is probably the best response.  Response options: 1 – Strongly disagree, 2 – 
Disagree, 3 – Neither agree nor disagree, 4 – Agree, 5 – Strongly Agree.  
 
1. I try to avoid situations that require thinking in depth about something. (Reversed Scored) 
2. I like to rely on my intuitive impressions. (Reversed Scored) 
3. I'm not that good at figuring out complicated problems. (Reversed Scored) 
4. I don't have a very good sense of intuition. 
5. I enjoy intellectual challenges. 
6. Using my gut feelings works well for me in figuring out problems in my life. (Reversed 
Scored) 
7. I am not very good at solving problems that require careful logical analysis. (Reversed 
Scored) 
8. I believe in trusting my hunches. (Reversed Scored) 
9. I don't like to have to do a lot of thinking. (Reversed Scored) 
10. Intuition can be a very useful way to solve problems. (Reversed Scored) 
11. I enjoy solving problems that require hard thinking.  
12. I often go by my instincts when deciding on a course of action. (Reversed Scored) 
13. Thinking is not my idea of an enjoyable activity. (Reversed Scored) 
14. I trust my initial feelings about people. (Reversed Scored) 
15. I am not a very analytical thinker. (Reversed Scored) 
16. When it comes to trusting people, I can usually rely on my gut feelings. (Reversed Scored) 
17. Reasoning things out carefully is not one of my strong points. (Reversed Scored) 
18. If I were to rely on my gut feelings, I would often make mistakes. 
19. I prefer complex problems to simple problems. 
20. I don't like situations in which I have to rely on intuition.  
21. Thinking hard and for a long time about something gives me little satisfaction. (Reversed 
Scored) 
22. I think there are times when one should rely on one's intuition. (Reversed Scored) 
23. I don't reason well under pressure. (Reversed Scored) 
24. I think it is foolish to make important decisions based on feelings. (Reversed Scored) 
25. I am much better at figuring things out logically than most people. 
26. I don't think it is a good idea to rely on one's intuition for important decisions. 
27. I have a logical mind. 
28. I generally don't depend on my feelings to help me make decisions. 
29. I enjoy thinking in abstract terms. 
30. I hardly ever go wrong when I listen to my deepest gut feelings to find an answer. (Reversed 
Scored) 
31. I have no problem thinking things through carefully. 
32. I would not want to depend on anyone who described himself or herself as intuitive. 
33. Using logic usually works well for me in figuring out problems in my life. 
34. My snap judgments are probably not as good as most people's. 
35. Knowing the answer without having to understand the reasoning behind it is good enough for 
me. (Reversed Scored) 
36. I tend to use my heart as a guide for my actions. (Reversed Scored) 
37. I usually have clear, explainable reasons for my decisions. 
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38. I can usually feel when a person is right or wrong, even if I can't explain how I know. 
(Reversed Scored) 
39. Learning new ways to think would be very appealing to me.  
40. I suspect my hunches are inaccurate as often as they are accurate. 
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Appendix D.  Actively Open-Minded Thinking Scale  
(Stanovich & West, 1997) 
 
For each of the statements below, mark the alternative that best describes your opinion.  There are 
no right or wrong answers so do not spend too much time deciding on an answer. The first thing 
that comes to mind is probably the best response.  Response options: 1 – Disagree strongly, 2 – 
Disagree moderately, 3 – Disagree slightly, 4 – Agree slightly, 5 – Agree moderately, 6 – Agree 
strongly 
 
1. Even though freedom of speech for all groups is a worthwhile goal, it is unfortunately 
necessary to restrict the freedom of certain political groups. (Reversed Scored) 
2. What beliefs you hold have more to do with your own personal character than the experiences 
that may have given rise to them. (Reversed Scored) 
3. I tend to classify people as either for me or against me. (Reversed Scored) 
4. A person should always consider new possibilities. 
5. There are two kinds of people in this world: those who are for the truth and those who are 
against the truth. (Reversed Scored) 
6. Changing your mind is a sign of weakness. (Reversed Scored) 
7. I believe we should look to our religious authorities for decisions on moral issues. (Reversed 
Scored) 
8. I think there are many wrong ways, but only one right way, to almost anything. (Reversed 
Scored) 
9. It makes me happy and proud when someone famous holds the same beliefs that I do. 
(Reversed Scored) 
10. Difficulties can usually be overcome by thinking about the problem, rather than through 
waiting for good fortune.  
11. There are a number of people I have come to hate because of the things they stand for. 
(Reversed Scored) 
12. Abandoning a previous belief is a sign of strong character. 
13. No one can talk me out of something I know is right. (Reversed Scored) 
14. Basically, I know everything I need to know about the important things in life. (Reversed 
Scored) 
15. It is important to persevere in your beliefs even when evidence is brought to bear against 
them. (Reversed Scored) 
16. Considering too many different opinions often leads to bad decisions. (Reversed Scored) 
17. There are basically two kinds of people in this world, good and bad. (Reversed Scored) 
18. I consider myself broad-minded and tolerant of other people's lifestyles. 
19. Certain beliefs are just too important to abandon no matter how good a case can be made 
against them. (Reversed Scored) 
20. Most people just don't know what's good for them. (Reversed Scored) 
21. It is a noble thing when someone holds the same beliefs as their parents. (Reversed Scored) 
22. Coming to decisions quickly is a sign of wisdom. (Reversed Scored) 
23. I believe that loyalty to one's ideals and principles is more important than "open-
mindedness." (Reversed Scored) 
24. Of all the different philosophies which exist in the world there is probably only one which is 
correct. (Reversed Scored) 
25. My beliefs would not have been very different if I had been raised by a different set of 
parents. (Reversed Scored) 
26. If I think longer about a problem I will be more likely to solve it. 
27. I believe that the different ideas of right and wrong that people in other societies have may be 
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valid for them. 
28. Even if my environment (family, neighborhood, schools) had been different, I probably 
would have the same religious views. (Reversed Scored) 
29. There is nothing wrong with being undecided about many issues. 
30. I believe that laws and social policies should change to reflect the needs of a changing world. 
31. My blood boils over whenever a person stubbornly refuses to admit he's wrong. (Reversed 
Scored) 
32. I believe that the "new morality" of permissiveness is no morality at all. (Reversed Scored) 
33. One should disregard evidence that conflicts with your established beliefs. (Reversed Scored) 
34.  Someone who attacks my beliefs is not insulting me personally. 
35. A group which tolerates too much difference of opinion among its members cannot exist for 
long. (Reversed Scored) 
36. Often, when people criticize me, they don't have their facts straight. (Reversed Scored) 
37. Beliefs should always be revised in response to new information or evidence. 
38. I think that if people don't know what they believe in by the time they're 25, there's something 
wrong with them. (Reversed Scored) 
39. I believe letting students hear controversial speakers can only confuse and mislead them. 
(Reversed Scored) 
40. Intuition is the best guide in making decisions. (Reversed Scored) 
41. People should always take into consideration evidence that goes against their beliefs. 
 
 
  163 
Appendix E.  Epistemic Beliefs About Psychological Research Scale 
 (Estes et al., 2003) 
 
The purpose of these following questions is to understand your attitudes towards psychological 
research.  The following statements refer to research on psychological health and development. 
Researchers in this field try to find out how different factors influence or are related to social, 
emotional, and intellectual development. 
 
1. On most issues in this field, with enough careful research, scientific experts can sooner or 
later be certain that their findings are correct. 
 Disagree very strongly 
 Disagree strongly 
 Disagree 
 Not sure 
 Agree 
 Agree strongly 
 Agree very strongly 
 
2. On most issues in this filed, I would trust my own opinion more than the opinion of a 
scientific expert. (Reversed Scored) 
 Disagree very strongly 
 Disagree strongly 
 Disagree 
 Not sure 
 Agree 
 Agree strongly 
 Agree very strongly 
 
3. On most issues in this field, I would trust the opinions of a respected adult over the 
opinion of a scientific expert. (Reversed Scored) 
 Disagree very strongly 
 Disagree strongly 
 Disagree 
 Not sure 
 Agree 
 Agree strongly 
 Agree very strongly 
 
4. On most issues in this field, I would change my mind if I heard about new scientific 
evidence that went against my beliefs. 
 Disagree very strongly 
 Disagree strongly 
 Disagree 
 Not sure 
 Agree 
 Agree strongly 
 Agree very strongly 
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Appendix F.  Study 2 Prior Beliefs Questions 
 
Please respond to the following statements. 
 
Response options: 1 – Disagree very strongly, 2 – Disagree strongly, 3 – disagree, 4 – No 
opinion, 5 – Agree, 6 – Agree strongly, 7 – Agree very strongly 
 
 
1. “Younger Siblings are More Creative”  
Before completing this study, this statement would‟ve fit with my beliefs and experiences. 
 
2. “Suggestive Questions Create False Memories”  
Before completing this study, this statement would‟ve fit with my beliefs and experiences. 
 
3. “Being Overly Thankful Makes People Less Happy”  
Before completing this study, this statement would‟ve fit with my beliefs and experiences. 
 
4. “Having Enemies Improves Children’s Social Development”  
Before completing this study, this statement would‟ve fit with my beliefs and experiences. 
 
5. “Active Social Lifestyles Improves Memories in Retired Adults”  
Before completing this study, this statement would‟ve fit with my beliefs and experiences. 
 
6. “Controlling Mothers Increase Children’s Weight Gain”  
Before completing this study, this statement would‟ve fit with my beliefs and experiences. 
 
7. “Social Cluelessness Increases Depressive Symptoms”  
Before completing this study, this statement would‟ve fit with my beliefs and experiences. 
 
8. “Introverted Partners Decrease Marital Satisfaction”  
Before completing this study, this statement would‟ve fit with my beliefs and experiences. 
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Appendix G.  Study 2 Background Questions 
 
 
1. Please list your sex. 
 Female 
 Male 
2. Please list your age. 
3. Please indicate your race or ethnicity (This will only be used to obtain descriptive 
information about our study sample).  
 African American 
 African, non-American (e.g., African, West Indian, etc.) 
 Bi-racial/Mixed/Multicultural/Multi-racial 
 Caucasian (White/European Ancestry) 
 East Asian  (Chinese, Japanese, Korean, etc.) 
 Hispanic/Latino/Chicano/Puerto Rican 
 Native American 
 Pacific Islander (Filipino, Samoan, etc.) 
 South Asian (Indian, Pakistani, etc.) 
 Southeast Asian (Cambodian, Laotian, Vietnamese, etc.) 
 Other 
4. Is English your primary language? (Yes, No) 
5. How many years have you been a student at the University of Michigan? 
 Entering Student 
 1 year 
 2 years 
 3 years 
 4 years 
 5 years 
 6 years 
 More than 7 years 
6. What is your current class standing? 
 Freshmen 
 Sophomore 
 Junior 
 Senior 
 
7. Have you taken or are currently taking a basic statistics or research methods course at 
Michigan (100-200 level courses)? (Yes, No) 
 
8. Have you taken or are currently taking an upper-division statistics or research methods 
course at Michigan (300-400 level courses)? (Yes, No) 
 
9. Please report your composite SAT score.  If you don't fully remember, please estimate 
what you think you received.  If you didn't take the SAT, mark "N/A." 
 
10. Please report your composite ACT score.  If you don't fully remember, please estimate 
what you think you received.  If you didn't take the ACT, mark "N/A." 
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